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ABSTRACT
NATION BRAND, NATIONAL PRESTIGE, AND THE SOCIAL IMAGINARIES OF THE
ADVANCED NATION IN SOUTH KOREA
FEBRUARY 2021
JUNG-YUP LEE, B.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, SOUTH KOREA
M.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, SOUTH KOREA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Henry Geddes
The dissertation focused on how the discourses and institutions of nation
branding and public diplomacy reshaped the social imaginary of the nation.
Following the trajectory of the nation branding discourse in South Korea in the first
fifteen years of the 21st century, I examined different moments of the re-imagining
of the nation by multiple agents with regard to nation branding and public
diplomacy.
Firstly, I examined how the news media played a crucial mediating role in
importing and disseminating the globally emerging discourse of nation branding in
collaboration with private and public think tanks in the early and mid 2000s.
Secondly, I examined how the South Korean government instituted the mediapromoted public agenda of nation branding as a highly visible official public policy
by setting up the Presidential Council for Nation Branding in 2009. Lastly, I
examined how the public diplomacy efforts by non-state agencies and their critiques
from the online subculture and the media and publicity experts.
To complete this research, I collected and analyzed data from news media
reports, policy-related documents by governmental agencies, and internet blogs,
vi

online forums, and OP/ED columns. I adopted the political economy perspective to
analyze the economic and political interests; the narrative analysis of the news
media discourse; the political-economy and image analysis of the public service
advertisement; and the discursive analysis of the public controversies on online
forums and news media.
I discovered that the discursive practices of nation branding and public
diplomacy conducted by different agencies converged into the idea of “national
prestige” and the post-developmental reimagining of the advanced nation in terms
of culture and civility. However, the different agencies reimagined the advanced
nation in varied ways: in the news media discourse, it was imagined as a businessfriendly and “lawful and orderly” nation; in the public policy discourse, it was
imagined as a neoliberal “brand nation,”; in the online subculture discourse, it was
imagined negatively as an opposite of the current status; and in the experts’
discourse, it was imagined as a culturally sophisticated, globally accepted nation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
IMF crisis, World Cup, Sewol ferry disaster and presidential impeachment.
These are historical events which epitomized the drastic social transformation in
South Korea for the last two decades. As a native South Korean, I have personally
experienced and observed the historical turmoil. The experiences and observations
of these events contributed to the initial formation and continued development of
the main idea of the dissertation research. Let me begin this dissertation with a few
snapshots of these historical events and reflect on how they informed this
dissertation on the discourses and institutions of nation branding, national prestige,
and the advanced nation for the last two decades.
Scene #1: In December 1997, in the midst of global financial meltdown, South
Korea had no choice but to accept the reform program proposed by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for a bailout. The financial crisis,
usually called “IMF wigi” (literally meaning the “IMF crisis”) in South Korea,
practically put an end to an era of rapid national economic growth and the state-led
development in South Korea. IMF wigi in fact opened up the era of the
neoliberalization of the whole society, characterized by rapid liberalization, market
opening, financialization, privatization, labor flexibility, widening income and asset
gap, intensifying competition, the highest suicidal rate among OECD countries, and
the lowest birth rate in the world. IMF wigi happened partly due to the segyehwa
initiative introduced in 1993-4 by the Kim Young-sam government. Segyehwa,
literally meaning “advancing into the world,” was regarded as the “next step of
1

Korean development” (K.-Y. Shin, 2000, p. 431) and taken as an expression of the
“national pride of successful economic growth” (p. 430). However, with IMF wigi, it
turned into its opposite. The oppositional party and the news media called the
bailout a “national disgrace,” invoking “the 1910 national disgrace” (Kyŏngsul
kukch’i) in which Korea was forcibly annexed to Japan and lost its state sovereignty.
This description of “disgrace” and the sense that the country collapsed were so
widely accepted and circulated as a taken-for-granted expression that the National
Archives of Korea put the title on the article about the currency crisis, “The day of
national economic disgrace with 55-billion-dollar debt” (Nam).
Scene #2: Approximately four and a half years later, in June 2002, South
Korea co-hosted the 2002 World Cup soccer games with Japan. The South Korean
team unexpectedly kept winning and ended up taking the 4th place. The news media
lauded the achievement of the national team as well as the orderly cheering by the
crowd in the street as the case for enhancing the international image and the nation
brand of the country. The news media praised how the achievement in sports could
generate economic effects by helping the growth of exports and GDP, boosting the
consumer sentiment, restoring national confidence among the people, and
enhancing the national brand image (Y.-s. Sin, 2002). The street cheering featured
the chant of “Taehanminguk,”1 the full official name of South Korea. It was by this
moment that it began to be used on sports broadcasting and in many other

“Taehanminguk 대한민국” is the official name of the Republic of Korea
(South Korea), literally meaning the “great people’s nation of Han.”
1
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occasions. This was the moment when the state was approved by the majority of
publics as an object of national and personal pride.
Scene #3: Nearly twelve years later, in the morning of April 16, 2014, a
coastal ferry named Sewol flipped and sank while carrying more than 500
passengers to Cheju island. The drowning of more than 304 passengers in the
sinking ferry, mostly high school students on a school trip, was broadcast
nationwide on live television. National audiences painfully watched the scene on
television in which the authorities were not able to provide any proper efforts of
rescuing. The disaster traumatized publics and raised the question about the role of
the state in protecting and saving the lives of the people. Despaired of the
incompetence and irresponsibility of the government, the families of the victims and
protesters shouted and cried, “Ige naranya 이게 나라냐?”, which means, “Is this a
nation?” The sense that the disaster exposed how South Korea lacked a properly
working “normal nation” was widely shared. The disaster was further linked to the
downfall of “national prestige,” the international status of the country, so that one
year later the appeal court judge put the ferry captain in life sentence, blaming him
for, among others, driving “national prestige” down (C.-n. Cho, 2015).
Scene #4: About two and a half years later, in November and December 2016,
the chant “Ige naranya!” continued in the street, being shouted and sung by millions
of people in the street.2 President Park Geun-hye was blamed for defrauding the

Kim Ho-ch’ŏl, a famous minjung gayo (people’s song) composer, adopting
the chant, wrote a satire song, “Ige Naranya, SB 이게 나라냐, ㅅㅂ(Is this a nation,
2

3

government and abusing the power for her secret associate. She was impeached in
the National Assembly in December and finally removed from office by the
determination in the Constitutional Court in March 2017. As the chant and the song
symbolized, the candlelight demonstration protested against the incompetent and
irresponsible government and the corrupt President and asked for a properly
working, “normal nation” (K.-i. Park, 2017; T. a.-k. Yi, 2012, p. 28). The candlelight
demonstration and the subsequent impeachment stood out not only because it
mobilized a historic number of people, but because they went on completely within
the boundary of the constitutional and legal limit in an obsessive manner. The
weekly protests were running completely peaceful without any violence. The news
media frequently featured the scene in which many participants voluntarily
collected garbage and cleaned up the street at midnight after the event of protest
(Noh, 2016). The non-violent protest as well as the cleaned-up street by voluntary
citizens might epitomize the image of a properly working “normal nation” and
provide the source of national pride among South Koreans. A former human rights
lawyer, Moon Jae-in of the oppositional Democratic Party was elected as President
in May 2017, proclaiming to build “Naradaun nara (a decent nation)” (Moon, 2017,
p. 15).3

Mofo).” The song was frequently played through the PA speakers during the
demonstration and widely sung along by protesters.
3 "Naradaun nara 나라다운 나라" is one of the phrases which are used as a
slogan to indicate the orientation of state management by the Moon government.
The Korean phrase could be translated into English in various ways. In the official
translation of the presidential speeches, it was translated into "a decent nation"
(Moon, 2017, p. 15) and "a properly functioning country" (Moon, 2017, p. 23). Word
by word, it can also be translated into a "nation of a nation-worth."
4

Twenty years apart, these four snapshots of the historical events capture the
ups and downs of the collective experiences and perceptions in contemporary South
Korean society. Although they do not necessarily seem to be closely connected at
first glance, they are marked by common threads which run through the two
decades.
First of all, while these events are different events in nature — financial,
festive, disastrous, and political — the perception of them converged into the idea of
the state and the nation. While it seems natural to think of them at national level
considering the size and significance of these events, it is striking that these
snapshots ended up being certain images and imaginaries of the state and the
nation. Clearly, the snapshots hint how all aspects of public life is understood from
the perspective of the state and the nation.
Secondly, these events are typically perceived and described in affective
terms of the pride and shame of the state and the nation. It suggests that publics
have been deeply concerned about international recognition as well as selfawareness of the international status of South Korea.
Lastly, while the images and imaginaries of the state and the nation
continued to be central to the public mind throughout modern South Korea, the
snapshots suggest that a certain perception of the state and the nation emerged
during this era out of old and fading images from the earlier era. Especially, a certain
aspiration for a more desirable state and nation is a common theme. The underlying
demand and aspiration for a better public life stands out through the imaginaries of

5

a functioning normal state, an advanced country, a nation of nation-worth, and a
proud nation.
Bracketed by these historical events, the dissertation is an attempt to make
sense of a broad social transformation in South Korea by following how the images
and imaginaries of the state and the nation evolved with significant political and
cultural implications. For this investigation, the dissertation takes the discourses of
nation branding, national prestige, and an advanced nation as keywords which
provide a potentially powerful access to the changes in contemporary cultural
politics in South Korea. I will examine how these discourses traversed different
institutional terrains such as the news media, government policy, and public talks.
Inspired by Charles Taylor (1990, 1995, 2002) and other scholars (Anderson,
2006, pp. 22-30; Crane, 1998, 1999; Gupta, 2007, p. 270; T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998;
Orgad, 2014; Wyatt, 2005a, 2005b), I use the keywords such as national imaginary
and state imagination to refer to the way in which national publics make sense of
self and the world dominantly in terms of the state and the nation through
discourses of nation branding, national prestige, and the advanced nation
(Aronczyk, 2013; Kaneva, 2012; Valaskivi, 2016, more discussion will follow in the
next chapter). To examine the changes and continuities of national imaginary and
state imagination, I look at representations, narratives, rhetoric, and discourses in
the news media, public policy, and public talks. I use the term discourse in a
Foucauldian sense, defined as a body of specific knowledge governed by rules which
make certain ways of thinking make sense and not others (Bacchi, 2000; 2009, more
discussions will follow later in this chapter). Nation branding and related ideas of
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national prestige and an “advanced nation” are discourses in this sense because of
the ways they form certain ways of thinking and imagining and generate knowledge
and imaginations about the state and the nation.
The English terms the state and the nation are already charged with complex
historical meanings, but they are more complicated in South Korean historical
context. The term kukka 국가 or nara 나라 in Korean can be translated into state,
usually referring to institutions and systems of government. But it has a wider
implication in South Korean context, encompassing the aspect of political
community, which is captured by the English term nation as an “imagined
community” (Anderson, 1983). The distinct use of the term 국가 in South Korea
might epitomize the central position of the state in the national imaginary. The
phrase “the state and the nation” frequently used in this dissertation is intended to
match the Korean term 국가, where the two terms are closely bound together.
Nation branding, national prestige, and the “advanced nation”
Nation branding is a set of discursive and institutional practices that aim to
project a positive image of a country to the outside world by adopting business
techniques of marketing and branding (Kaneva, 2011a, p. 118). It has been avidly
disseminated and widely circulated by transnational business marketing/branding
consultants and adopted by many governments around the world. Indeed, for the
last two decades, nation branding has become a public policy fad across the globe
from advanced capitalist countries like Japan and the UK to developing and
transitional countries in Eastern and Central Europe and Southeast Asia. Thus, for
7

the last twenty years or so, we have seen nation branding slogans such as “Cool
Britannia,” “Cool Japan,” “100% Pure New Zealand,” “Amazing Thailand,” “Malaysia
Truly Asia,” “Vietnam, A Different Orient,” “I feel Slovenia,” “Latvia, the Land that
Sings,” and so on. These countries adopted nation branding as a way to manage their
appearance with the aspiration to promote their status in the globalizing world,
launching various nation-branding campaigns, adopting nation brand slogans, and
setting up related governmental organizations (Dinnie, 2008).
South Korea, among others, took nation branding seriously. Jumping on the
bandwagon of nation branding at the time of co-hosting the 2002 Korea-Japan
World Cup, South Korea even set up a high-profile governmental institution, the
Presidential Council for Nation Branding (PCNB) in January 2009. Not only being
instituted as the key public policy agenda, the idea of nation branding became an
underlying reference point to which the implementation of other key public policies
was justified and legitimized. The instituted discourse of nation branding expanded
to include broader policy issues such as multiculturalism, official development
assistance (ODA), and public diplomacy. Moreover, it worked as an extensive public
policy framework, gluing together different public policies. Major public policies by
the Lee Myung-bak government (2008-2013) were justified in the name of
enhancing the nation brand, such as the global promotion of hansik (Korean food),
“resource diplomacy,” the export of nuclear power plants, “green growth,” the “Four
Major Rivers Project,” and so on. Beyond the official public policy discourse, the
term nation branding, in combination with the idea of “culture-advanced country”
and a neologism “national prestige,” became a staple vocabulary in the news media

8

as well as in public discourses on a wide variety of political, social and cultural
issues in South Korea. Most prominently, the Korean Wave, a wide popularity of
Korean popular culture and popular music in East Asia and beyond, has been
increasingly illuminated in terms of enhancing the nation brand. Domestically, labor
disputes and political conflicts have been increasingly contrasted with national
prestige. In sum, the matters of enhancing the nation brand, national image, and
national prestige have provided a dominant framework that encompasses a wide
range of national issues.
This dissertation follows the trajectories of the discourses and institutions of
nation branding, “national prestige,” and an “advanced country” in South Korea
since the early 2000s. Imported by the mainstream news media and public and
private think tanks, nation branding operated as an externally oriented campaign
for the improvement of national image toward tourists, capital investors, and
entrepreneurs. However, it is notable that the campaign deployed in the name of the
nation brand by the news media as well as by the government mainly targeted
domestic publics rather than external audiences. The fact that neither logo nor
slogan was adopted during the apogee of the nation branding campaign under the
Lee government4 might suggest the nation branding campaign was less about the
outward projection of national image per se.
The nation brand slogan “Dynamic Korea” was devised for the 2002 World
Cup event, but discarded by the Lee government. The tourism brand slogan, “Korea,
Sparkling” was also abolished. The PCNB assured that it would devise a new nation
brand logo and slogan, but it never realized. The new English-language nation brand
slogan, “Creative Korea” was introduced as late as 2016. The slogan was blamed for
plagiarizing the French nation brand slogan (Marshall, 2017) and became practically
4

9

The transnational phenomenon of nation branding drew attention from
critical media and cultural studies as well as anthropology and international studies
(Aronczyk, 2013; Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Browning, 2015; Dzenovska, 2005;
Graan, 2010; Jansen, 2008; Kaneva, 2011b; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011; Valaskivi,
2013; Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). Some of these authors showed how nation
branding contributed to the construction of specific national identities in favor of
transnational capital and domestic politicians. Some others also focused on how
nation branding was in line with the neoliberal rationality of international
competitiveness, aiming to produce flexible, competitive subjects.
However, the existing critical literature has focused on the role played by
transnational branding consultants and government officials in terms of the agency
of nation branding, thereby neglecting the role played by the news media and
publics. It was only recently that critical media scholars paid attention to the role
played by the latter (for instance, Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Graan, 2010, 2013).
Additionally, most critical literature focused on the “transitional” countries in
Eastern Europe. While nation branding and other related discourses and practices
such as soft power and public diplomacy have been in the list of buzzwords in East
Asia, most academic works have come from public administration, business
management, tourism, and marketing with practical, technical and administrative
concerns. Moreover, while there exists some critical works on nation branding in
Japan and China (de Kloet, Chong, & Landsberger, 2011; Iwabuchi, 2015; Valaskivi,

obsolete. Allegedly, it was devised by the company associated with Ch’oe Sun-sil
(Choi Soon-sil), a longtime confidante of President Park Geun-hye (H.-m. Kim, 2017).
10

2013, 2016), critical literature on nation branding in South Korea is almost nonexistent.
In this study, I aim to contribute to critical cultural and media studies on
nation branding, which emerged not just as a public policy framework, but as a
reference point by which wider reforms of the state and the nation were envisioned
from different social and political perspectives and positions. Following the
discursive and institutional trajectories of nation branding, national prestige, and
the advanced nation, I am asking a series of questions: Beyond being a technique of
publicizing and managing the name and the image of a nation, how did the
discourses of nation branding and national prestige (hereafter, NBNP) offer a new
way of imagining a nation, especially an advanced nation? How new was the reimagining of NBNP in the contemporary context of global neoliberalism? To what
extent was it a continuation of the imaginary of the state, the economy, and the
nation in the historical context of South Korean modernity?
Pursuing these questions, the primary purpose of this dissertation is to
contribute to the understanding of the workings of the discourses of NBNP,
especially in shaping and reshaping the collective social imaginaries of the state and
the nation.
Theoretically informed by critical literature (introduced in the next section),
I focus on two distinctive contexts within which the discourses of NBNP imagined
and re-imagined the state and the nation.
On the one hand, my purpose is to contribute to an understanding of the
workings of neoliberalism vis-a-vis the state and the nation. In the contemporary
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context, I aim to examine the extent to which the discourses of NBNP as part of
neoliberal rationality provided a new imaginary of the state and the nation. I aim to
examine how the discourses of NBNP worked as an integral part of the construction
of the neoliberal “competition state” (Cerny, 1997) in South Korea.
On the other hand, in the historical context, my purpose is to engage with the
academic and intellectual discussions and debates about cultural modernity in
South Korea. My focus here is to examine the workings of the discourses of NBNP in
the re/shaping of the developmental imaginary of the state and the nation in South
Korean modernity.
Theoretical and historical context
To investigate the multi-faceted, internally-oriented implications and effects
of NBNP in South Korea in a broader context, I situate the present dissertation
within multiple streams of existing literature. My examination of the discursive and
institutional practices of nation branding in South Korea addresses the academic
discussions of 1) the imagined nature of the nation vis-a-vis the state and the
economy, 2) the neoliberal transformation of the state as a competitive entity in the
globalizing world, and 3) the changing nature of South Korea’s cultural modernity.
Imagined state, economy, and nation
First, the dissertation conceives of the discursive and institutional practices
of NBNP as offering new ways of imagining a nation (Aronczyk, 2013; Kaneva, 2012;
Valaskivi, 2016), which are predicated on specific social imaginaries of the state and
economy (Crane, 1998, 1999; T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998; Taylor, 2002; Wyatt, 2005a,
2005b). I rely on the theories of the state that explain its significance not just in
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terms of how it actually wields power and influence over society and economy, but
also in terms of how it is conceived, imagined, and idealized, especially with regard
to the economy.
The state is not a self-evident entity, a taken-for-granted center of power, or
an institutional actor, but an effect of discursive and material practices (Cameron &
Palan, 2004; Dean, 2010; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, &
Miller, 1991; Gupta, 1995; T. B. Hansen & Stepputat, 2001; Lemke, 2001, 2002,
2007; T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998, 2006; Rose, 1999, p. 35; Rose & Miller, 1992; Sharma
& Gupta, 2006; Steinmetz, 1999). Referencing this body of literature, I examine the
discursive and institutional practices of nation branding in the context of the
discourses on the state which have informed the state imaginations in modern
South Korea.
The dominant imaginary of the state has been constructed in relation to the
national economy in the modern history of South Korea. Especially in the
geopolitical context of the Cold War, the discourses of modernization and
development shaped a specific form of the state, called the “developmental state,”
whose historical role was defined as “development” in relation to the national
economy. In the context of neoliberal globalization, political discourses on the state
have exploded and variously reshaped the relation between the state and the
economy in domestic and transnational settings. Quite a lot of academic books and
articles have been written on the developmental state and the neoliberal transition
of the state in South Korea. However, most works were on the institutional aspects
from the political economy perspectives (for instance, Chang, Fine, & Weiss, 2012;
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Chi, 2007; Lim & Jang, 2006; Pirie, 2012; Woo-Cumings, 1999), with rare works on
the cultural constructions and the imaginations of the state (Among the exceptions,
Kwon, 2014).
I regard nation branding as one of the latest forms of state imagination,
which is flexibly connected with and translated into different state discourses on
national image, national prestige, soft power, the advanced country, the “normal
nation” and so on. It offers new ways of imagining the nation by putting a new
emphasis on the articulation between the state and economy.
The rise of the neoliberal competition state
Secondly, I situate the discursive and institutional practices of nation
branding in the contemporary context of neoliberal globalization in South Korea.
Many critical scholars agree that South Korea has turned into a neoliberal society,
especially since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s (for instance, from the
field of political economy, C.-j. Ch’oe, 2006; Chang et al., 2012; Chi, 2007; H.-Y. Cho,
Surendra, & Cho, 2013; Lim & Jang, 2006).
For the last few decades, a new political rationality called neoliberalism
emerged to readjust the state-economy relations and "reengineering the state"
(Hilgers, 2012), especially by reconstituting the changing conditions called
globalization. Neoliberalism, defined as the extension of the principles of market
competition beyond the economy into the whole society (Brown, 2005, pp. 39-40),
has constituted a dominant governing rationality in South Korea (for instance, Jun,
2012; H.-m. Kim et al., 2010; J. Song, 2010). In the neoliberal domination,
commercializing logics overwhelm almost every aspect of personal, social, political
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and cultural life beyond the business world. The logic of the brand stands as a
dominant discourse and technique in this commercialization of society, extending
its application to the state and the nation.
It is in this context in which NBNP emerged as a set of discourses and
techniques of imagining and constructing the state as a competitive market entity
and as a location manager for transnational capital. It envisions a new globalizing
economy and world order, redefining national identity and shaping new citizenship
in a neoliberal manner. The discourses of nation branding illustrate a concrete way
in which the neoliberal transformation of the South Korean state and the economy
has unfolded. The dissertation explores how nation branding has worked as part of
neoliberal rationality, constructing a cultural version of the neoliberal “competition
state” (Cerny, 1997, 2010; Fougner, 2006, 2008) in South Korea. Across the news
media discourses and public policies, I examine how the dominant practices of
nation branding re-imagined the state as a neoliberal commercial entity in the
global market of competing images of nations in the name of the nation brand,
national image, and national prestige.
South Korea’s cultural modernity
Lastly, I situate the discursive and institutional practices of NBNP in a wider
historical context of cultural modernity of South Korea. In other words, in order to
understand the effect of the neoliberal competition state, we need to examine the
continuity and the change of the social imaginary of the state and the nation in the
historical specificity of South Korean modernity.
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In this dissertation, I attend to how South Korean modernity has formed with
the state and the economy at the center of national imaginaries in the discourses
and programs of modernization and development. This “developmental modernity”
seems to constitute a dominant social imaginary in South Korea even after the
official demolition of the developmental state in the late 1990s. Additionally, we
need to consider the Western-oriented nature of South Korean modernity, in which
the West has become the normative standard of modernization and development
through sped-up imitations and adaptations. Notably, within the Western
orientation of South Korean modernity, cultural and social aspects, along with
political and economic aspects, have gotten increasingly emphasized in the official
and public discourses of NBNP.
South Korea’s take on nation branding shows how it constituted a neoliberal
“competition state” (Cerny, 1997) not just in terms of economy and technology but
also in terms of culture and civility. It is usually regarded that nation branding
represents public policies that aimed to enhance national image and reputation. At a
deeper level, however, it articulates popular expectation, desire, needs and
imagination: a popular aspiration for the status of an advanced country, a popular
demand for a cultural status that matches the economic level of the country, a
popular desire by the middle class for a nation with a higher standard of living that
is equivalent to the “global standard” of Western advanced countries. It is notable
that emphases are increasingly put on social and cultural aspects such as civility,
manners, public behaviors, “global citizenship,” and so on, the reference of which
comes from the comparison between the idealized West and South Korea.

16

I attend to the translation of the term nation brand into national prestige
(국격 kukkyŏk) as the manifestation of the Western-oriented nature of NBNP. In the
late 2000s, the technical discourse of nation branding was transformed into the
discourse of national prestige, implying the dignity and class of a nation. This term
took a conservative implication, based on a state-centered cultural and civilizational
imagination. While it was frequently associated with developmental discourses of
“the first-rate, advanced nation,” it also illustrated the reflexivity on the economycentric developmentalism, imagining a “normal country” with a higher cultural and
civilized status. A dominant state imagination of a “culturally advanced country” was
developed in this vein with a growing attention to traditional as well as modern
popular culture in regard to the international status of the nation. Most notably, the
development of South Korean popular culture and popular music, the Korean Wave
and K-pop, illustrates how culture is converted into resources for nation branding.
In this sense, the political discourses of NBNP provide a new imagination of the state
and the nation, an imagination that hinges upon Western modernity as the norm.
In this context, the idea of a “culture-advanced country” (munhwa sŏnjinguk
문화선진국) has emerged as a vision of modernity in South Korea. Now it is culture
that is regarded as an indicator of modernity and civilization, and being advanced as
a nation and in the international ranks of advanced countries. The discourses of
NBNP emerged in the early 2000s along with the vision of a culture-advanced
country. It is in terms of NBNP that a culture-advanced country as a truly advanced,
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modern country is specifically presented and imagined beyond the status of an
economically-advanced country.
Against this theoretical and historical backdrop, the dissertation begins by
following the discourses of nation branding, which were propagated by
transnational business consultants and embraced by national policy makers around
the world. The dissertation takes the case of South Korea and focuses on how
globally-circulating discourses of nation branding was adapted in the local context.
In the examination of the localization, the dissertation highlights the processes of
local adaptations and transformation of nation branding. It focuses on how the
discourses and institutions of nation branding became connected with and
converted into various existing and emerging discourses such as national prestige
and the advanced nation among others. It also emphasizes how they were driven by
various institutional actors such as transnational and domestic think tanks, the
national news media, and domestic politicians and policy makers, and publics. In
this way, this dissertation aims to understand the processes of transformation and
conversion of discourses and institutions of nation branding, national prestige, and
the advanced nation in a specific historical and contemporary-political context.
Research design
Social imaginaries and state imaginations rely on rhetorical narratives and
symbolic representations (Orgad, 2014, p. 41). Thus, in the methodological
consideration, the study of social imaginaries and state imaginations can be carried
out through the examination of rhetorics and discourses. In the examination of the
social imaginaries of the state and the nation in South Korean modernity, I take the
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public discourses of nation branding, national prestige (NBNP) as the main focus of
the investigation. In this section, I discuss how to examine NBNP as discourses, and
identify the data to collect and examine.
By discourse, I refer to “socially produced forms of knowledge that set limits
upon what it is possible to think, write or speak about a ‘given social object or
practice’” (McHoul & Grace, 1993 cited in Bacchi, 2009, p. 35) (more discussion will
follow later in this chapter). Discourse includes not just to public policy discourses
produced by the government, but wider discourses disseminated by the news media
as well as circulated among publics. In this study, I follow the trajectories of the
discourses of NBNP, focusing on three critical moments created in their discursive
circulation. First, I look at how NBNP emerged as the news media discourses in the
early-mid 2000s. Then, I examine how it was established as official policy discourses
in the late 2000s. Finally, I examine how public discourses of NBNP, facilitated by
the media and public policy discourses, circulated among publics in various forms.
Data
For the study of NBNP in South Korea, I focus on three distinctive moments
of the circulation of the discourses with distinctive agencies in distinctive
institutional settings.
The first moment is the emergence of the discourses of NBNP in the earlymid 2000s, in which the news media played a crucial role. In the aftermath of the
financial crisis in November 1997, South Korea tried to recover from the economic
collapse and regain confidence. The 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan turned out
to be a crucial moment to announce the recovery. By that time, the talks of nation
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branding emerged as a major public discourse in South Korea, greatly promoted by
the news media.
The second moment is the institutionalization of NBNP in 2009 and its
spread as a public policy discourse from the late 2000s to the early 2010s. The
conservative Lee Myung-bak government, which declared a “business-friendly”
administration, established the PCNB as the official governmental public policy
agency for nation branding. It concentrated public relations and promotion
activities around the time of hosting the G20 (or Group of Twenty) event in 2010, a
meeting among the governments and central bank governors from 19 countries and
the European Union. The PCNB heavily publicized the hosting of the prestigious
international forum as an enhancement of the nation brand.
The last moment is the proliferation of the NBNP discourses among publics
in the early-mid 2010s, when non-governmental organizations got engaged in
various campaigns for the “promotion of Korea.” Especially, their activities of buying
ad spaces on billboards in Manhattan and prestigious US newspapers drew great
attention from the news media and publics. These campaigns helped raise the
awareness of nation branding and public diplomacy among publics as well as stirred
controversies about how to enhance nation image and national prestige.
These three distinctive moments are roughly in chronological order.
However, my purpose is to illustrate the multifaceted and overlapping nature of the
discourses in circulation with distinctive agencies in distinctive institutional
settings, not to suggest a definite periodization or a linear development of the
discourses of NBNP. According to the characteristics of these moments, I used
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multiple sets of data which show the multidimensional, dynamic nature of the
discourses of NBNP.
The first batch of the data was obtained from the news media archives. For
the collection of the news media data, I used Kinds (www.kinds.or.kr), a public news
archive, funded and run by the Korea Press Foundation. I also used the Naver News
(news.naver.com), a commercial news archive as a supplementary tool for
additional data.
I used the Kinds archive to search seven national newspapers (Han’gyŏre,
Kyŏnghyang Sinmun, Hanguk Ilbo, Segye Ilbo, Munhwa Ilbo, Seoul Sinmun, and
Kungmin Ilbo), three economic newspapers (Hanguk Kyŏngje, Seoul Kyŏngje, and
Maeil Kyŏngje). I used the Naver News Archive to search Tong’a Ilbo, three weekly
news magazines (Han’gyŏre 21, Sisa-in, and Sisa Journal), and two online news
(Pŭresian and Ohmynews). Additionally, for the two major nationwide newspapers
that do not provide their data to external archives, I visited their individual websites
(www.joins.com for Chung’ang Ilbo and www.chosun.com for Chosŏn Ilbo) and used
their own search tool. In this way, I covered all ten major nation-wide newspaperbased news media.
These newspaper-based, national news media continued to be the major
source of news consumption for citizens through the Internet news aggregators
such as Naver News, which has practically monopolized the circulation of news in
South Korea. Most news came to be circulated and consumed through these news
aggregators, rather than on the individual web sites by the news media themselves
(W.-g. Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2013; S.-m. Yi, 2007).
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I did not include in the analysis news reports from broadcasting – that is,
KBS, MBC, and SBS, three national television stations, and YTN, a cable television
dedicated to news. The national television news programs were widely watched and
remained influential during the period of the research, although both television and
newspapers were quickly losing their audiences (W.-g. Kim et al., 2013; C.-h. Yi,
2012). However, television news programs were typically limited to short straight
news reports, lacking in-depth analysis and op-eds. Moreover, television news
programs were mobilized simply for the promotion of governmental policy, while
some newspapers were actively and strategically engaged in setting political and
policy agenda. Thus, newspapers seemed more adequate in this specific
examination of the role played by the news media in terms of institutional and
discursive shaping of governmental policy and public agenda.
From the news media archives, I searched news report data from 2000 to
2016. Major newspapers and magazines began to publish reports and opinions
related to NBNP since the early 2000s, and the amount and depth of news media
articles enormously increased in the late 2000s, especially around the launch of the
PCNB in 2009 and the hosting of the G20 summit in 2010.
For the search, I used keywords such as “nation brand 국가 브랜드, “national
prestige 국격,” and “culture-advanced country 문화선진국,” Each search showed a
large number of results: 8924, 9081, and 1136 respectively (including 438
overlapping articles). Due to the large quantity of articles, I actually examined
articles with the three keywords in the title (876, 701, and 41 articles for each
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keyword with a small number of duplicates). The yearly breakdown of the number
of articles, which contain with the three keywords in the title, from seven national
newspapers and three economic newspapers, shows the general trend. Out of these
1,500+ articles, I found about half of them were relevant to my research as many
articles which contained those keywords were not substantively meaningful. For
instance, many articles on “국가 브랜드” were not about “nation branding” or
“nation brand,” but “national brand.” “Nation brand” and “national brand” are
distinct jargons in marketing and branding as the latter concerns corporate brands
(Thus, Hyundai, LG and Samsung are South Korea national brands, and Sony, Honda
and Toyota are Japanese national brands). They are written in distinct words in
English, but they share the same phrases in Korean. Many other articles were also
short straight reports, and still others were duplicate articles supplied by the same
sources from the government and other private and public institutions (for instance,
Anholt’s and SERI’s annual Nation Branding Index were widely reported by most
newspapers and magazines, but they were almost identical as they were copied
from newswire articles and the press release). In this way, I ended up reading 6-700
articles with the keywords in the title at least once.
Reading the articles, I was able to get the sense of the general trend of how
nation branding, national prestige, and advanced nation were covered in the news
media. My use of news media materials is twofold. On the one hand, they were
useful in the political economy analysis for grasping the institutional influence on
NBNP, that is, to identify individual and organizational actors who had a stake in
and how they were engaged in the shaping of the public policy of NBNP. Most of all,
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news media articles gave a lead to a broader examination of public and private
actors such as Simon Anholt, Philip Kotler, Guy Sorman, the Institute for Industrial
Policy Studies (IPS), Hyundai Research Institute (HRI), Samsung Economic Research
Institute (SERI), and so on. The articles also were helpful to identify the role of the
news media organizations themselves in the promotion of NBNP through organizing
conferences and launching media campaigns in cooperation with the government
agencies and corporations.
On the other hand, for a closer analysis of the discourses revealed in news
media articles, I took a closer reading of op-ed pieces, special reports, and feature
and series articles. The series articles from several media-led campaigns for NBNP
were helpful to grasp their perspectives and orientations. In the analysis of how the
news media problematized NBNP and presented a solution to the presumed
problems, I focused on how the news media constructed the narratives of the past,
the present, and the future of South Korea. The following is the list of major news
media campaigns related to nation branding, which I focused on for the analysis of
the news media narrative of NBNP:
1997 The age of global standards (Tong’a Ilbo)
1998-2002 Global etiquette campaign (Chosŏn Ilbo)
2002 Let’s find a new vision (Han’gyŏre)
2002 Upgrade Korea (Chung’ang Ilbo)
2005 Soft power, soft Korea (Chung’ang Ilbo)
2005 UP Korea (Tong’a Ilbo)
2005 Upgrade the prestige (Chung’ang Ilbo)
2007 Put new energy to the Brand Korea (Han’gyŏre)
2007 Enhance national prestige: Image Up Korea (Han’guk Ilbo)
2007 Toward soft power Korea (Seoul Kyŏngje)
2008 Enhance national prestige (Maeil Kyŏngje)
2008 Let’s enhance national prestige (Seoul Kyŏngje)
2010 National prestige campaign (Tong’a Ilbo)
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The second batch of the data is from materials produced by various
governmental agencies in relation to NBNP. First, I gathered and examined all
official documents publicly available from the PCNB. Included are official
documents, press releases, websites, minutes of the meetings, white papers, and
policy reports produced by the institution. I also obtained relevant documents from
other related institutions by using keyword search from each document archive: the
Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST), the Korean Culture and
Information Service (KOCIS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),
Korea Food Foundation (KFF), and the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA). I
gathered the data from their individual websites as well as the Nation Archives of
Korea (www.archives.go.kr), which put together and archived past governmental
documents. They were supplemented by interviews of and writings by
governmental officials (published as newspaper op-ed pieces, columns, and books
and pamphlets).
These materials were used to understand general operations of the
institutions and to figure out the institutional settings and procedures in which the
public policy discourses of NBNP are produced to have effect.
Besides, I analyzed the public campaign advertising materials produced in
association with the PCNB. As the PCNB concentrated on public relations and
worked closely with the private corporations, these public campaign ads were
produced by private corporations in collaboration with the PCNB. I pay attention to
them because they greatly illustrate the institutional nature and the discursive
features of the nation branding campaign. For the analysis of the ad narrative, I used
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the “global etiquette” campaign ad, “Saranghaeyo, Korea,” produced by the LG Group
and aired in 2010. The ad series, featuring visual representations of Korea and the
West, illustrate how the neoliberal version of nation branding reshaped national
imaginaries.
The last batch of the data is collected from multiple sources because the
focus here is to follow the trajectories of discourses in circulation among publics.
Informed by anthropologists (Appadurai, 1986; Marcus, 1995), I conducted a multisited research following the circulation and the movement of a specific discourse. To
examine the circulation of the discourses of NBNP among publics, I focused on the
campaign for the “promotion of Korea” or the “Korea publicity” by nongovernmental actors, which was widely promoted by the media (including the news
media), and celebrities, and publics. The campaign drew not only a big and mostly
favorable attention from the media, but engendered controversies among publics.
The scuffles around the Korea publicity campaign illustrates the nature of how the
state and the nation got re-imagined among publics. The promotion of Korea is a
relevant research object because it constituted an intersection between the official
public policy by the government, the civilian campaign for the “promotion of Korea”
by the non-governmental actors, a wide attention by the news media, and responses
and debates among publics.
To examine the NGO activities for the promotion of Korea, I followed a
celebrity individual, Sŏ Kyŏng-dŏk (a.k.a. Kyung-duk Seo), and an NGO, Volunteer
Agency Network of Korea (Vank) because they were the most active and wellknown activist groups in the field of the promotion of Korea. For data gathering, I
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used their websites (in the case of Vank), as well as the media coverage and
interviews because their activities heavily relied on media publicity (in the case of
Mr. Seo).
Lastly, for examining public controversies over the promotion of Korea,
which were produced and circulated among publics, I gathered data from online
modes of public engagement with public affairs. Various online services provided
platforms for the participation in and engagement with public issues. A good
example is the candlelit protest against the decision by the Lee Myung-bak
government for the import of US beef in Seoul in 2008. The massive demonstration
was, especially among teenagers and youths, facilitated by various digital platforms
such as text messaging, online forums (such as Daum Agora), and webcasting (J.
Kang, 2017; K.-M. Kim & Park, 2011; K. Lee, 2017; S. Yun & Chang, 2011).
Out of these various online platforms, I used blog postings and online
subculture communities for analysis. The reasons I used blogs are several. First, the
blog platform gained a significant popularity in the late 2000s and the early-mid
2010s, although it was not the most popular. The platform was competitively
promoted by large and small online services in South Korea. While the examination
of all aspects of all online participation is beyond the purpose and scope of this
research, blogs provided an efficient way of gathering data suitable to the
exploratory nature of this research. Second, blogs are an open platform, freely
accessible by publics, in contrast with closed platforms such as Cyworld (which was
extremely popular around the turn of the century in South Korea, but in quick
decline afterwards). Besides, due to its openness, it was more efficient for browsing
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and searching with search engines (W.-g. Kim, Yi, & Yi, 2010). Third, as blogs are
suitable for a personal and individual communication, despite the extent to which
they are interactive and networked, they have a better chance to give a picture of
individual perspectives on a particular issue in a more coherent way. Thus, it is
more convenient to identify individual perspectives and personal voices better than
other platforms such as internet forums. Lastly, blogs were often used not just to
show what the bloggers thought but also to show (off) what they actually did in
relation to direct action and active participation in a more vivid manner. Thus, blog
postings were helpful to look into how bloggers, actively participating part of
publics, were engaged in the public campaign for the promotion of Korea and
Korean food.
To collect blog postings which made participation in or comment on the
promotion of Korean food in the early-mid 2010s, I used Google search as well as
native search engines built in three major blog services, Tistory (tistory.com), Naver
Blog (blog.naver.com), and Egloos (egloos.com). These blog communities were the
largest in South Korea and hosted so called “power bloggers” who were opinion
leaders in the “blogosphere” (W.-g. Kim et al., 2010). I used keywords for themes
(“nation brand,” “national prestige,” “advanced nation,” and so on), crossed with
related specific topics (“hansik,” “Times Square,” “Tokto,” and so on), and examined
top search results. The blog postings, which were collected, read, and used as
illustrative examples in this research, were not necessarily by power bloggers. But
they were rather neatly and articulately presented and written by more or less
“active” participants (for instance, who personally visited the Times Square in New
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York) than by average or “passive” bloggers (for instance, who used the blog
platform for clipping news and blog postings) (W.-g. Kim et al., 2010).
The online communities I examined for the analysis of the criticism of
excessive nationalism are DC Inside (디시 인사이드, dcinside.com) and Ilbe (일베,
ilbe.com), two of the largest online communities.5 They are equivalent to the
English-language imageboard 4chan (www.4chan.org), a home for online subculture
communities, famous for spreading prominent internet memes ("4chan," n.d.).
These online communities are vastly diverse and flexible and cannot be lumped
together as a homogenous group, but a basic characterization might be necessary
for the discussion.
DC Inside was established in 1999 as a forum for digital camera and
photography and evolved into one of the largest online community websites with
numerous sub-communities. These sub-communities host discussions and
exchanges about specific topics on their own imageboards (called “galleries”). DC
Inside became famous for generating and circulating jokes, buzzwords, neologisms,
and internet memes. The main user base is known to be those in their 20-30s, the
majority of which is male. The political orientation is hard to tell in a uniform way
because different sub-communities show different and changing orientations, but
using parody, satire, and cynicism, they usually show rebellious and defiant attitude

According to one online poll (C.-g. Hŏ, 2013), most popular online
communities among office workers include Oyu (Onŭlŭi Yumŏ, that is, Today’s
Humor, 25.7 percent), Ilbe (20 percent), DC Inside (17.3 percent), Ppomppu (16.6
percent), and Kliang (Clien, 9.5 percent). I chose DC Inside and Ilbe among others
because their archives of the early-mid 2010s are conveniently available for
keyword search.
5

29

toward the social establishment whether it is left of right, liberal or conservative
("DC Inside," n.d.).
Ilbe (short for 일간베스트 저장소 Ilgan Besŭtŭ Chŏjangso, which means
“Daily Best Storage”) began as a spin-off site of DC Inside in 2010 against the
moderation policy of DC Inside. Initially, it worked as “storage” of the “best” threads
of DC Inside before they were removed by the moderators from DC Inside for
violating the moderation policy of DC Inside. Later, it evolved into an online
community on its own, separate from and independent of DC Inside. It became
notorious for its populist, far-right-oriented subculture. It drew enormous negative
media and public attention with its misogyny, hate speech, antisocial behaviors,
cyber vandalism, and hostility toward ideas such as democracy. Cynicism, parody,
and satire also thrive in Ilbe community, usually targeting leftists (in South Korean
political context, mostly liberals) and attacking the socially weak (such as women,
disabled people, etc.). Ilbe is known as a still more male-dominated community than
DC Inside with the user base being younger ("Ilbe Storehouse," n.d.).
I searched the archives by using keywords such as “Sŏ Kyŏngdŏk,” “Tokto,”
and “pibimpap.” I found 414 postings from DC Inside (2008-2016) and 99 postings
from Ilbe (2010-2016). Not all postings are relevant to the keywords. After gleaning
the titles and snippets of the postings, I finally read carefully several dozen postings
and their comments and used them for analysis.
Additionally, in the examination of online subcultures, I referred to
Namuwiki, the biggest subculture-based Wiki site in South Korea. Namuwiki in no
sense abides by the principles of neutrality and objectivity of Wikipedia. Rather, it is
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a subculture itself, pursuing playfulness, satire, and pun in the online community
("Namuwiki," n.d.). However, as still a wiki platform, Namuwiki is especially strong
and rich in the description and archiving of popular cultures and subcultures in
South Korea.6
It should be noted that these internet-based subcultures do not fit in with
traditional political divisions between left and right, conservative and liberal
(progressive), and so on. While they drew attention from the media and the public
due to its antisocial behaviors such as misogyny and hate speech, they are also
characterized by the pursuit of playful defiance against the presumed established
power and vested interests perceived by the subculture communities in their own
ways. They are engrossed in generating and circulating internet memes, buzzwords,
puns and jokes, many of which have made a good point about critical issues in South
Korean society and have been widely circulated in mainstream media and among
wider publics.
Discourse analysis
This study adopts and attempts to contribute to the analysis of public
discourse by examining NBNP as discourses. Informed by a Foucauldian notion,
discourse refers to “socially produced forms of knowledge that set limits upon what
it is possible to think, write or speak about a ‘given social object or practice’”
(McHoul & Grace, 1993 cited in Bacchi, 2009, p. 35). In this sense, discourse has a
power to construct reality by defining problems, and producing subjects and space

Namuwiki launched in 2015, but has roots in Rigveda Wiki (Enha Wiki)
which started in 2007.
6
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through constructing knowledge, especially in the forms of abstract concepts and
categories (Bacchi, 2000, p. 48). The analysis of discourse begins with analyzing
those binaries, key concepts, and categories embedded in rhetorics and discourses,
and explicating the presuppositions, assumptions, or “conceptual logics” (Bacchi,
2009, pp. 5-7) that underpin the discursive formation. In this vein, this study
investigates how the discourses of NBNP in South Korea have produced certain
knowledges and imaginations about the state and the nation since the early 2000s.
In methodological terms, the analysis of discourse in this study attends to a few
points: discourse in discursive chains, discourse in institution, and discourse in
contestation.
First, this study analyzes the discourse of NBNP not in isolation, but in the
chains of other discourses (Hall, 1985, p. 104). As Stuart Hall points out, discourses
are not closed systems. Rather, “a discourse draws on elements in other discourses,
binding them into its own network of meanings” (Hall, 1992, p. 292). The discursive
rise of nation branding needs to be examined in the context of the re-imaginings of
the state and the nation in South Korea. I especially attended to how the nation
branding discourse was translated into the national prestige discourse, and how
they were deployed in association with other related and competing discourses such
as soft power, public diplomacy, and culture-advanced country, which variously
informed the re-imaginings of the state and the nation in South Korea in the early
21st century.
Secondly, this study attends to the political economy of discourse, that is, it
examines discourse as a process in institutions (Fischer, 2003, p. 76; Hall, 1992, p.
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292). While appreciating the constitutive power of discourse, I also attend to “the
conditions of exercise, functioning, of institutionalization of scientific discourses”
(Foucault, 1991, cited in Bacchi, 2009, p. 37). The material effect of the discourse
should be considered in relation to the “nondiscursive domains of institutions,
political events and economic processes” (Bernauer, cited in Bacchi, 2009, p. 37).
Moreover, the discursive and institutional practices are not confined to the
apparatuses of the state, but also made in the area of civil society — the media,
political parties, NGOs, interest groups, think tanks, academics, business interests,
lobbyists, and so on — as of the formal institutions of the state” (Jenkins, 2007, p.
26). In this vein, I followed the circulation of the discourses of NBNP in different
institutional settings, focusing on three critical forms of discourse: the news media
discourse, public policy discourse, and discourse among publics. By following the
trajectories of discourses within and across these institutional contexts, I
highlighted the changes and continuities, uncertainty and complexity in the process.
Lastly, in this study, I examined discourses as the site of contestation, rather
than of the unidirectional imposition of power. The discourse analysis might suggest
one-way operation of power in which discourses are used by those who hold power
upon those who lack power. However, it is necessary to theorize the possibilities for
the challenges to dominant discourses (Bacchi, 2000, pp. 51-54). In this vein, rather
than scientific and neutral, discourse is implicated not just in the legitimacy and
authority, but the contestation and challenge of state power. Related to the second
point above, the wider area of civil society is the site of contestation where tensions
and contradictions are revealed, and the possibilities of challenge, resistance, and
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discursive reshaping arise (Bacchi, 2009, p. 37). The discourses of NBNP, which
were disseminated by the news media and think tanks, and instituted as public
policy by the government, created a discursive space for publics in which dominant
discourses were negotiated and challenged (Warner, 2002). Following Warner’s
(2002) discussion, “publics” are a reflexive social form constituted through
discourse and the circulation of texts and are used in plural to emphasize the
divergent formations vis-à-vis discourses.
Contributions of the study
This study will contribute to an understanding of the global phenomenon of
nation branding, theoretically and empirically, in at least three primary aspects.
First, this study will contribute to an expanding body of literature on nation
branding and other related discourses and institutions in critical media and cultural
studies. The critical attention to nation branding as a media- and communicationrelated phenomenon is increasing, but still falls short compared to its prominence in
the administrative and promotional studies. Beyond the practical and technical
concerns in marketing and publicity, the discourses and institutions of NBNP need
to be regarded and examined as part of a larger body of representations and
discourses, and examined as situated in a social, national, and global context. Critical
media and cultural studies provide frameworks and tools to deal with the
phenomenon of NBNP as discursive power to imbue collective imagination.
Furthermore, discourse analysis and representation studies provide effective
methods to analyze NBNP as social practices which offer a way of imagining and reimagining the self, the state, the nation, and the world. Firmly rooted in critical
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media and cultural studies, this study will expand knowledge of the emerging social
practices of NBNP. In particular, incorporating a thoughtful consideration of
institutional and historical context, this study will contribute to the deepening of
discourse analysis and representation studies.
Secondly, this study will contribute to the understanding of the global spread
of neoliberalism, especially in relation to the state and the nation. Rather than a
totalizing force, neoliberalism needs to be examined as particularly situated
practices and institutions at global as well as local levels. In this understanding, the
study focuses on the centrality of the state and the nation and highlights the way in
which the discourses of NBNP mediated the process of global neoliberalization. This
study examines neoliberalism as discursive and institutional practices which offer
new ways of re-imagining the state and the nation as competitive entities in the
globalizing world.
Lastly, by situating the discursive and institutional practices of NBNP in a
specific local context of South Korea, this study will contribute to a better
understanding of the changes in Korean society in the early years in the 21st
century, and contribute to the field of Korean studies. I characterize these years as
the times when the people raised a fundamental question about what the state and
the nation are and should be, and the discourses of NBNP offered not just a
dominant way to redefine the state and the nation in neoliberal rationality, but
opened up a discursive space around which different imaginations and reflections
could be evoked about the role of the state, the identity of the nation, and the nature
of modernity. This study will offer a glimpse into the extent to which South Korea is
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being transformed into a neoliberal society and to which the neoliberalization is
facilitated by and predicated on a developmental imaginary of state-centered,
economy-obsessed, Western-oriented modernity.
Outline of chapters
The dissertation is organized in the following manner.
In Chapter 1, I introduced the dissertation, laying out a relevant context and
identifying the methods adopted in the study.
In Chapter 2, I provide the relevant body of literature on which this study is
built on: the imagined nature of the state and the nation, the rise of a competition
state in the global neoliberalization, and the global phenomenon of nation branding.
Chapter 3 locates the study in the historical and contemporary context in
South Korea. In this chapter, I put the discourses of nation branding and national
prestige (NBNP) in a broader historical context of national imaginaries of the
modern state, economy, and nation, focusing on the continuity and transition
between developmentalism and neoliberalism in South Korea. I explore the social
imaginaries of modernization and development as an economy-centric discursive
framework for the developmental state. The post-developmental transformation of
the state is discussed as the discursive construction of neoliberal competition state,
centered on the transnational and techno-economic imaginations of globalization
and knowledge economy.
The following three research chapters describe how the discursive and
institutional practices of NBNP played out in South Korea. I examine the shifting
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institutional deployment of the discourses of NBNP, focusing on the agencies of the
news media (Chapter 4), the government (Chapter 5), and publics (Chapter 6).
In Chapter 4, I focus on the agency of the major national news media in
importing and disseminating the idea of nation branding along with domestic public
and private think tanks. I also attend to how the narratives by the news media
contributed to a specific re-imagination of the state and the nation. The examination
of the news media highlights the institutional and discursive formation of NBNP
beyond the official institution of government public policy, and better illustrates the
wider discursive terrain in which multiple stakeholders were involved, often in
contested ways, in the neoliberal re-imagination of the South Korean state and
nation.
In Chapter 5, I examine how nation branding policy emerged under the Lee
government, focusing on the policy activities by the Presidential Council for Nation
Branding. The Council (PCNB) took the responsibility for coordinating public
policies across different governmental departments and agencies and implementing
various publicity-oriented activities in regard to nation branding. In coordinating
and implementing the public policy for nation branding, the Council emphasized the
key principle: the cooperation between government and business on the one hand,
and between government and citizens on the other. I will focus on how this principle
actually played out in the deployment of the public policies for nation branding.
In chapter 6, I examine how the official discourses and practices of NBNP
have opened up a discursive space for publics. Focusing on the debates and
controversies around the campaign for the “promotion of Korea” by the non-
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governmental bodies and individuals, I examine how different social actors
articulate and imagine different ideas of an “advanced nation” and cultural
modernity.
In the conclusion chapter, I summarize the findings in the study, and reflect
on the implications. I also discuss the limitations and gaps left by this study and the
directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, I review literature relevant to understand the phenomenon of
nation branding as discursive and institutional practices. While the study is
grounded on the traditions of critical media and cultural studies in terms of
methods and theories, it is also greatly informed by academic discussions and
theories from broader academic fields and disciplines such as anthropology,
political science, international studies, globalization studies, development studies,
and sociology.
Theoretically, I situate the phenomenon of nation branding at the
intersection of the renewed imaginaries of the state and the nation, and the
neoliberalization in the global context. My point of entry to a critical study of nation
branding is the academic discussions about the imagined nature of the state.
Through the literature, I explore the extent to which the idea of the state is central
to the way in which the self, the nation, and the world are imagined. Then, I review
literature on the state vis-a-vis global neoliberalism. I focus on how the ideas of
“global governmentality” and the “competition state” can shed light on the
neoliberalization of the state toward the rationality of international
competitiveness. Built on these discussions, in the last section, I review relevant
literature on nation branding as a set of discourses, practices and techniques from
critical media and cultural studies and anthropology.

39

The imagined state, economy and nation
First, the dissertation conceives of the discursive and institutional practices
of nation branding as offering new ways of imagining a nation (Aronczyk, 2013;
Kaneva, 2012; Valaskivi, 2016), which is predicated on specific social imaginaries of
the state and the economy (Crane, 1998, 1999; T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998; Taylor,
2002; Wyatt, 2005a, 2005b).
Since the path-breaking work by Benedict Anderson, The Imagined
Communities (1983/1991/2006), the intellectual tradition has developed to
illuminate the modern emergence of enormous abstract structures and entities like
the nation, the economy, and the state in terms of the collective working of shared
ideas, representations, symbols, and imaginations.
Anderson defines the nation as a community, collectively imagined among
members who do not know each other, but share a sense of “a deep, horizontal
comradeship” (Anderson, 2006, p. 7). He explains the emergence of this “fraternity”
in a larger context of the rise of what he calls “vernacular print capitalism”
(Anderson, 2006, p. 76). With the introduction of new print media such as
newspapers and novels, people began to share the sense of living in the same
temporality (Anderson, 2006, pp. 22-30; Gupta, 2007, p. 270).
Charles Taylor, inspired by Anderson, expands the idea of imaginary. The
idea of “social imaginary” describes “the ways in which people imagine their social
existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and
their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative
notions and images that underlie these expectations” (Taylor, 2002, p. 106).
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He explains that the formation of Western modernity depended on the
historical emergence of new social imaginaries which grew out of the perceived
relations of reciprocity among equal individuals: those of the market economy, the
public sphere, and the self-governing people. The concept of social imaginaries helps
to understand the cultural and moral grounds of modernity which buttress the
working of apparent grand structures and institutions as well as constitute the
formation of communities and collective identities (González-Vélez, 2002, p. 349). In
a similar vein, the imagination as a “social practice,” “a form of work,” and “a social
fact” constitutes broader conditions for ways of modern lives, especially in the
increasingly globalizing world (Appadurai, 1996, p. 31). More specifically to nation
branding, Valaskivi shows how a certain circulation of the transnational idea of
nation branding in the context of Japan formulated and reproduced a particular
social imaginary of a nation among globally competing nations (Valaskivi, 2013,
2016; Valaskivi & Sumiala, 2013).
The idea of social imaginary helps understand the cultural formations of the
large institutions and structures such as the state and the economy, the formations
in which nation branding plays an important part in the contemporary context.
Many authors further scrutinized how the institutional entities such as the state and
the economy are constructed through cultural and imaginative works. Most notably,
the idea of social imaginary helps to understand how the state actually wields
discursive and institutional power by highlighting how it was imagined,
rationalized, and idealized, especially with regard to the economy. In his discussion,
Taylor (2002) implies that the social imaginaries of the state (as the citizen state)
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and the economy (as the market economy) constitute crucial components of the
nation building in Western modernity.
In the Western tradition of media and cultural studies that has mainly
grappled with the issues of power and rule from a cultural perspective, the state has
curiously been a relatively neglected theme. The state has usually been discussed as
a powerful actor in culture and media policies, as an ideological institution for
capitalist reproduction (which is, what Althusser called, the “ideological state
apparatuses” (ISAs)), or as a powerful entity vis-a-vis the media and cultural
industries. In other words, the state has been conceived of as a definite institutional
entity, clearly demarcated from non-state domains such as civil society and the
economy. The state was conceived of as a center of power, but, in many discussions,
reduced to a certain person and group in power or to the bureaucracy. Ironically,
critical media and cultural studies has engaged in the examinations of many takenfor-granted entities as cultural and discursive constructions, but the state has not
been under the same scrutiny in terms of culture, discourse, representation, and
imagination (compare this situation with the case of the "nation").
The dissertation is predicated on the discussion which regards the state not
as a self-evident entity, a taken-for-granted center of power, or an institutional
actor, but as an effect of discursive and material practices.
The state is a central concept when critical scholars, especially with
postcolonial perspectives, conceptualize the question of modern power and how it
works in capitalism. Anthropologists and sociologists, influenced by Foucauldian
thought about knowledge/power and governmentality, have developed a
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decentered concept of the state (Dean, 2010; Foucault et al., 1991; Lemke, 2001,
2002; Rose & Miller, 1992). They raised such questions as how and why the state
emerges as central and how state centrality is produced and reproduced, and paid
attention to the cultural process of symbolic and discursive production as well as
the technical process of institutions, techniques, procedures and tactics. It is through
these processes that the state effect is produced (Cameron & Palan, 2004; Ferguson
& Gupta, 2002; Gupta, 1995; T. B. Hansen & Stepputat, 2001; T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998,
2006; Rose, 1999, p. 35; Sharma & Gupta, 2006; Steinmetz, 1999). Mitchell (1999,
2002) locates the state in relation to modern forms of power. Following Foucault, he
conceptualizes microphysical power not as held by state apparatuses and imposed
upon the governed, but as dispersed throughout society in the forms of modern
disciplinary techniques which produce individuals as subjects by setting the
possibilities and limits of thoughts and conducts at minute levels of social life. At a
macro level, the governmental form of modern power works on population as a new
object of management by statistical knowledge and political technologies. While
governmental power is not reducible to the state, it is at this macro level that power
is structured, codified and “institutionally crystallized” in the formation of the state
(Foucalut, quoted in Jessop, 2006, p. 37). Moreover, the structural appearance of the
state as objective, neutral, abstract, and external to its object is the real source of
power and order by maintaining and reproducing the division between the state
and non-state (Lemke, 2007). As Mitchell (1991) explains:
The state should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial
organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and
supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world
fundamentally divided into state and society. The essence of modern politics
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is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped
by the other, but the producing and reproducing of this line of difference (p.
95).
Many authors also illuminated the institutional entities of the state and the
economy in terms of discursive construction and imagination. Especially, many
have paid attention to the relation between the state and the economy in the
examination of the appearance of the state as the authoritative center. Foucault's
concept of "government" provided a useful theoretical idea in this aspect.
Government refers to "the ‘conduct of conduct,’ a more or less calculated and
rational set of ways of shaping conduct and of securing rule through a multiplicity of
authorities and agencies in and outside of the state and at a variety of spatial levels"
(Watts, 2003, p. 9). The concept of government allows us to understand how the
object of the economy is constructed through representations, discourse, and
knowledge, as well as through procedure and techniques and how the state emerged
as a legitimate authority to accumulate the knowledge and procedure of the
economy (T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998, 2006).
Mitchell (2006) argues that "the economy" was invented out of the post-war
regime of expertise as a real domain separated from the state and society, as a "selfcontained totality" of production, distribution, and consumption within a given
territory (pp. 182-183). The reimagining of the economy as a natural object to be
managed, adjusted, and intervened by the state was part of the realignment of
government. It is in this context which the post-war national economies and nationstates were reimagined. The "national economy" was reimagined as geographicallybased bounded entity, and then became the basis for the reimagining of the state as
44

the nation-state (Dean, 2010, p. 28; T. B. Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 7; Sharma &
Gupta, 2006, p. 7). In other words, modern nation-states are not just imagined
communities based on shared territory, language and public sphere (Anderson,
1983); they are discursive and technical effects of the construction of the abstract
entity of the national economy.
We can identify further implications of the reimagining of the national
economy and nation-state with regard to the examination of nation branding in the
present. First of all, from a geo-political perspective, nation-states are effects of
transnational discursive and technical practices (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 178), and
the geo-political order is reimagined as a relation among comparable, but hierarchic
nation-states and national economies. In this order, Western liberal democratic
states are normalized as "fully developed" and "ideal" forms of advanced states. In
turn, non-Western states are put into the international hierarchy in which "Western
state become the norm against which other states are judged" (Sharma & Gupta,
2006, p. 10).
Then, we can consider "development" from the perspective of transnational
government (Watts, 2003, p. 12). The developmental discourse problematized
"poverty" as a problem, and circulated a universal logic that provided an
explanation and solution based on statistical representations and expert knowledge
(Sharma & Gupta, 2006, pp. 20-21). Thus, transnational developmental discourse
produced the effect of the "developmentalist Third World state," for which national
development emerged as the primary mandate for the state to accomplish (Sharma
& Gupta, 2006, pp. 20-21).
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More broadly, the modern state was "no longer defined in terms of an
historical mission but legitimated itself with reference to economic growth" (Lemke,
2001, p. 196). In other words, development of the national economy, mainly
presented in terms of economic growth, became naturalized as a given sublime task
of the nation-state (T. Mitchell, 1998, pp. 91-92).
Relatedly in terms of the economic formation of the nation, some scholars
presented the idea of the “imagined economy” (Crane, 1998, 1999) or “economic
imaginary” (Wyatt, 2005a, 2005b). Crane examines the economic representations in
China and emphasizes that they are constitutive of the formation of national
identity. National economic narratives of suffering, accomplishment, and social
cohesion provided an “imagined economy” (Crane, 1999, p. 216), a shared sense of
economic destiny. He emphasizes that this sense of economic national identity
enables a specific global economic integration which aggravates social inequality. In
a similar vein, Wyatt illustrates how a specific “economic imaginary” of “emerging
power” (Wyatt, 2005a, p. 467) enabled the uneven and unequal incorporation of the
Indian economy into the global economy.
Throughout the modern history of Korea, the state has emerged in varying
forms in different historical moments: as “absence” during the Japanese occupation,
as an overwhelmingly violent force (massacres and tortures by military
dictatorship), as a leader toward modernization through economic development
and industrialization, or as an institutional entity that (failed to) provide(d) safety
and protection for the people's lives in times of disasters (the Sewol ferry
disaster). These varying emergences and presences of the state in modern history
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have been central in shaping the normative basis of social imaginaries. The state
imaginations in turn have been central in the collective understanding of the nation
and the communal lives, and the individual perception of the self and others
whether it is imagined as an enormous violence, an agent of modernization, the
provider of protection and rescue, or lately, as a nation brand.
It is noted that the dominant imaginary of the state has been constructed in
relation to the national economy in the modern history of South Korea. Especially in
the geopolitical context of the Cold War, the discourses of modernization and
development shaped a specific form of the state, called the “developmental state,”
whose historical role was defined as “development” in relation to the national
economy. In the context of neoliberal globalization, political discourses on the state
have exploded and variously reshaped the relation between the state and the
economy in domestic and transnational settings. Quite a lot of academic articles and
books have been written on the developmental state and the neoliberal transition of
the state in South Korea. However, most works were on the institutional aspects
from the political economy perspectives (for instance, Chang et al., 2012; Chi, 2007;
Lim & Jang, 2006; Pirie, 2012; Woo-Cumings, 1999), with rare works on the cultural
constructions and the imaginations of the state (Kwon, 2014).
I regard nation branding as one of the latest forms of state imagination,
which is flexibly connected with and translated into different state discourses such
as national image, national prestige, soft power, the advanced country, the normal
nation and so on. It offers new ways of imagining the state and the nation by putting
a new emphasis on the connection between the state, the nation, and the economy.
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Neoliberal transformation of the state into a competitive entity in the
globalizing world
Second, I situate the discourse and practice of nation branding in the
contemporary context of neoliberalization in South Korea. For the last few decades,
a new political rationality called neoliberalism emerged to attempt at readjusting
the state-economy relations and "reengineering the state" (Hilgers, 2012), especially
by reconstituting the changing conditions called globalization.
Neoliberalism is usually understood as a "retreat of the state," exemplified by
a series of public policy initiatives toward the privatization of public assets and
national enterprises, the deregulation of private business activities, the reduction of
public services and welfare, and the extension of market principles. Rather than a
coherent and orderly implementation of ideological public policies, we can
understand neoliberalism as entailing a wider change beyond the realm of public
policies (Larner, 2000, p. 12). In this regard, neoliberalism is an emerging form of
governmental rationality, aiming to establish market competition as the primary
principle for organizing the whole society and requiring the state and individuals to
be reorganized as enterprises to meet the normative imperatives of
competitiveness, commercial rationale and risk calculation (Hilgers, 2012, p. 358).
In these terms, the neoliberal state is an entity that proliferates the market
norms and the principle of competition beyond the market (Brown, 2005, pp. 3940). We can conceptualize the nature of neoliberal state with varying foci. Here, I
will focus on the discussions on the neoliberal state and global governmentality,
which might be helpful in the examination of nation branding.
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Some critical scholars mainly from international studies have developed the
perspective called "global governmentality" that focuses on the transnational
regime of states (Brown, 2005; Fougner, 2006, 2008; H. K. Hansen & MühlenSchulte, 2012; Larner, 2000; Larner & Le Hern, 2004; Larner & Le Heron, 2002;
Larner & Walters, 2004a, 2004b; Löwenheim, 2008; Mühlen-Schulte, 2012). The
"global governmentality" perspective expands the analytic scope from the national
to the global, developing concepts such as "global economy" and "global
governance." Moreover, in association with the "governmentality" analysis, they
have paid attention to concrete aspects of technique, institutions, procedures, and
tactics, as well as aspects of knowledge, discourse, and representations (Larner &
Walters, 2004a, pp. 2-5).
These international studies scholars widely attend to neoliberal calculative
techniques such as benchmarking, global standards, indicators, and indices, which
are produced by transnational governance organizations (UNDP, OECD, IMF, World
Bank, etc.) as well as private institutions (WEF, IMD, etc.). Just as national statistics
constructed the national economy, these calculative, comparative, quantitative
techniques materialize global imaginaries. It is within these global imaginaries that
national economies are rendered comparable, and the global economic space is
made imaginable as a space for global comparison and competition (Larner &
Walters, 2004a, pp. 212-215).
From the perspective of global governmentality, Fougner (2006, 2008)
focuses on state form, and especially develops the idea of the "competition
state." Philip Cerny's idea of the “competition state" (Cerny, 1997, 2010) highlights
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shifting state forms in accordance with the changing political rationality of the
globalizing, neoliberal economy. He argues that nation-states, which put emphasis
on civic association and social cohesion, are replaced by competition states which
operate on quasi-enterprise association. The neoliberal competition state does not
retreat, but expands its intervention and regulation for openness and marketization
toward transnational competitiveness (Cerny, 1997, p. 251). While, at a global level,
the neoliberal competition state is bound by the rules and regulations disseminated
through transnational agents and institutions, it still operates strongly at a national
level as a promoter of market competition by exposing national enterprises and
citizens to the pressures of international competition (Cerny, 2010, p. 5).
From the perspective of the global neoliberal rationality of government,
Fougner (2006, 2008) focuses on how calculative, comparative techniques such as
benchmarking are disciplinary in reconstructing the nation-state as a marketcompetitive subject of the competition state. He examines how international
competitiveness has been constructed as a governmental problem in which the state
is framed as a competitive entity (p. 165). With regards to international
competitiveness, the state is constructed in two different ways. On the one hand,
international competitiveness designates “aggressiveness,” the capacities of
"national" enterprises to compete against foreign ones. In this term of
aggressiveness, the task of the state is to enhance the capacity of the enterprises. On
the other hand, international competitiveness implies “attractiveness,” which is
employed with reference to what "remain spatially immobile – such as the majority
of the workforce, citizens, the people, society, and so on." In this term of
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attractiveness, the tasks of the states are framed "as good landlords" from the
perspective of "globally footloose firms and capital" (p. 174). He concludes that
especially from the second notion of international competitiveness states are
increasingly constructed "as flexible and manipulable market actors" (p. 177).
In a similar vein, many commentators also point out how various country
indices, global competitiveness reports (such as those by IMD and WEF) and
sovereign credit ratings (such as those by Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch)
work as normalizing techniques with which the legitimacy and normalcy of the
especially Third World states are constructed (Buduru & Pal, 2010, p. 460; Fougner,
2008, p. 303; Larner & Le Hern, 2004; Löwenheim, 2008, p. 256).
The global governmentality perspective helps us to understand the
transformation of the state beyond the national frame. It conceptualizes the
problems of rule and power at a global level, and shows how at that level the state is
constructed as a manipulable, flexible, and competitive subject through the
discursive and technical means. The perspective is potentially advantageous in
grasping the transnational inequality and asymmetry in power between the
Western and the Third World countries.
However, this perspective has at least two shortcomings. First, it is rigidly
fixed on the division between the global and the national/local, and tends to assume
the simple dichotomy between the West and the rest. Second, the state is
conceptualized as a monolithic entity, blinding not just domestic but also translocal
dynamics. It seems the perspective uses an inflexible application of the Foucauldian
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notion of governmentality, so that the governable subject is fixed to the level of the
individual state.
Scholars mostly from anthropology provide a more productive way to
theorize neoliberalism and the state from a governmentality perspective. Aihwa Ong
(2006, 2007) defines neoliberalism not as culture or structure, but "mobile
calculative techniques" (2006, p. 13) that realign spaces and subjects in accordance
with market-driven calculation (p. 3). She avoids understanding globalization and
neoliberalism as totalizing logics, but instead, focuses on how the neoliberal market
logic intersects with the existing logics of sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship.
This modular understanding of neoliberalism as "assemblage" (2007, p. 3) enables
her to understand how neoliberal calculation fragments sovereign territories and
re-gradates them along transnational, subnational, translocal lines. Moreover, it
breaks up the national citizenship and realigns the gradated subjectivities of
citizenship variously connected with the capacities in global markets (pp. 4-5). She
adds that the neoliberal logic not only promotes market-oriented, entrepreneurial,
competitive, self-improving, self-branding, creative, cosmopolitan, calculative
subjects, but rearticulates them with patriotism, nationalism and other
heterogeneous values. In this way, she and other anthropologists, focusing on the
cases of governmentality in the Chinese context, show how government articulates
with sovereignty in a non-Western context (Hoffman, 2006a, 2006b; K. Mitchell,
1997; Ong, 1997, 1999; Rofel, 2007).
In line with this modular thinking of neoliberal assemblage, Collier (2009)
also shows how neoliberal government was redeployed to reinforce the state in

52

Russia or the response to neoliberalism led the mobilization of social welfare
project in Brazil. Ferguson (2010), on the other hand, shows how neoliberal
elements, as those in the basic income program, could work against neoliberal
regime in South Africa.
In sum, these scholars provide sophisticated understandings of neoliberalism
from a perspective of governmentality, avoiding sweeping claims which treat
globalization and neoliberalism as overwhelming “tsunami,” as well as avoiding
empty contentions that repeat the validity and viability of the nation-state in a
conventional way.
There have been quite a lot of debates on whether South Korea has turned
into a neoliberal society, especially since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s
(for instance, from the field of political economy, C.-j. Ch’oe, 2006; Chang et al., 2012;
Chi, 2007; H.-Y. Cho et al., 2013; Lim & Jang, 2006). But many agree that
neoliberalism, defined as the extension of the principles of market competition
beyond the economy into the whole society, has constituted a dominant governing
rationality in South Korea (for instance, Jun, 2012; H.-m. Kim et al., 2010; J. Song,
2010). In the neoliberal domination, commercializing logics overwhelm almost
every aspect of personal, social, political and cultural life beyond the business world.
The logic of the brand stands as a dominant discourse and technique in this
commercialization of society, extending its application to the state and the nation.
It is in this context in which nation branding and national prestige emerged
as a set of discourses and techniques of imagining and constructing the state as a
competitive market entity and as a location manager for transnational capital. It
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envisions a new globalizing economy and world order, redefining national identity
and shaping a new citizenship in a neoliberal manner. The discourses of nation
branding illustrate a concrete way in which the neoliberal transformation of the
South Korean state and the economy has unfolded. The dissertation explores how
nation branding has worked as part of neoliberal rationality, constructing a cultural
version of the “neoliberal competition state” in South Korea. Across the news media
discourses and public policies, I examine how the dominant practices of nation
branding re-imagined the nation as a neoliberal commercial entity in the global
market of competing images of nations in the name of the nation brand, national
image, and national prestige.
The global phenomena of branding and nation branding
In this section, I introduce relevant discussions on nation branding as a set of
discourses, institutions, and techniques from critical perspectives informed by
critical media and cultural studies and anthropology. For this end, I start with the
idea of branding, the business techniques out of which nation branding was
developed. The basic assumption of nation branding is that the techniques of
branding products and corporations are applicable to the state and the nation. Then,
I review the literature on nation branding by identifying four interrelated themes:
political economy, international politics, cultural identity, and citizenship.
Branding
Branding is an advanced marketing technique that adopts names, symbols
and design and applies them to products in order to stand out among the crowd of
products in the competitive market (Dinnie, 2008, p. 14). Branding, almost
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universally accepted in the world of business management, diverges from
traditional marketing in its emphasis on image and reputation which enable the
establishment of semiotic and emotional ties with consumers. According to van Ham
(2001):
Branding acquires its power because the right brand can surpass the actual
product as a company’s central asset. Smart firms pour most of their money
into improving their brands, focusing more on the values and emotions that
customers attach to them than on the quality of the products themselves (p.
2).
In this advanced form, brands are defined as “clusters of functional and
emotional values that promise a unique and welcome experience between a buyer
and a seller” (Chernatony, quoted in Dinnie, 2008, p. 14). Business practitioners and
critical observers of branding alike attend to branding in its aspect of producing
“extra value” or “premium value” from the intangible and the symbolic.
Critical scholars examine the phenomenon of brands and branding within the
context of a larger social transformation (Arvidsson, 2006; Banet-Weiser, 2012;
Holt, 2006). Attending to the cultural aspect of branding, the aspect in which
symbolic and affective practices are privileged, they view that branding is
symptomatic of the overarching social and economic transformation especially with
regard to the development of neoliberal globalization and information and
communications technologies.
In his examination of the historical relations between branding and
consumer culture, Holt (2006) argues that today’s branding transcends “cultural
engineering” of manipulative marketing communications and propagandistic public
relations. Branding began as early as the late 19th century and soon developed by
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American advertising agencies, but the contemporary development of branding is
indebted to the development of sophisticated marketing and consumer researches
in the late half of the 20th century. He argues that “branding is a distinctive mode of
capital accumulation” in that it “generates profits by creating and then exploiting
various sort of social dependency” (Holt, 2006, p. 300). The “postmodern branding
revolution” (Jansen, 2008, p. 125) consists in its emphasis on the meaningful and
affective nature through which brands come to exist in the social world of
experience. The shift from producer-centered to consumer-centered perspective, or
from modern to postmodern branding paradigm (Holt, 2006) is epitomized by a
famous dictum in business management, “brands exist only in the mind of the
consumer” (Kotler, quoted in Dinnie, 2008, p. 15).
Arvidsson (2006) relates the rise of branding to “a new economic logic” that
has been related to various ideas such as “sign economy,” “flexible accumulation,”
the aestheticization of the economy,” “knowledge economy,” “information
economy,” “cognitive capitalism” or “informational capitalism.” These concepts
highlight the increasing valorization of information, knowledge, design and style in
the production of value. Arvidsson (2007) asserts that brands “are paradigmatic of
the new informational mode of production” in which value creation is based on the
immaterial, the intangible of affect and experience. Major textbooks on marketing
and branding commonly emphasize the importance of “building strong brand
identity” and “managing brand equity” by constructing long and stable relationship
with customers through the symbolic and emotional dimension of brands (for
instance, Aaker, 1991).
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Indeed, brands are at the heart of the financialization of the global economy.
The notion of “brand equity” epitomizes the immaterialization of the global
economy accelerated by global reach of financial capital. Brand experts estimate
that as much as 40 to 60 per cent of a company’s worth comes out of its brand
equity (Jansen, 2008, p. 125). Anholt (2005) estimates that brand could be as much
as one-third of the total value of global wealth. According to the measurement by
Interbrand, a leading branding consulting agency, the intangible assets of the top
100 global brands are up to one trillion dollars, which is roughly equal to the
combined gross national income of all the 63 “low income” countries defined by the
World Bank.
Brand equity, the financial value of brand assets, suggests that the operation
of contemporary capitalism is increasingly dependent on the intellectual property
regime in which the immaterial, intangible value creation is crystalized in monetary
terms. The phenomenon of brands and branding suggests that the “extra-economic”
resources become the basis of economic value creation; in the same process, the
economy is increasingly dependent on culture. In this context, it is no surprise that
branding has become so pervasive that it is not limited to the business area; “the
brand seems to have become the natural model for the organization of a whole
range of different social formations” (Arvidsson, 2007, p. 9).
In South Korea, the term “brand” (which reads as “bŭraendŭ 브랜드” in South
Korea) itself has been used as a loanword without matching original Korean word,
and has become an everyday word in recent years. Indeed, branding has emerged as
a dominating discourse, practice and technique, overwhelming almost every aspect
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of personal, social, political and cultural life beyond the business world. The
publishing industry poured out numerous books on “self-development” that
encouraged individuals to “brand yourself,” “maximize your value” and “sell your
brand” (H.-m. Kim et al., 2010; Seo, 2010; J. Song, 2010).
Considering the overwhelming sweep of branding, it is no surprise that
places such as cities and countries are getting branding treatment to build powerful
brand images and brand identities in the competitive global market. If the logic of
the brand has become a dominant form of the way in which informational capitalism
works, how can this logic be extended to the state and the nation?
Nation branding
Nation branding has grown rapidly as a field since the late 1990s,
represented by several books7 and quasi-academic journals such as Place Branding
and the Journal of Brand Management,8 and as a burgeoning consulting practice led
by global marketing and branding consulting firms. Growing out of business
management of brands of products and corporations, the idea and practice of nation
branding emerged in close relation with those of destination branding, place
Representative books include Brand new justice (2003) and Competitive
identity (2007) written by Simon Anholt, a British consultant who claims that he
first coined the term, nation branding. The nation-branding paradigm was inspired
and advocated by Wally Olins, who has worked on corporate identity and branding
in his book, Trading identities (1999), and Peter van Ham, who came from
international politics. On the other side of the Atlantic, American professors at
business schools also have influenced the establishment of the paradigm with
related books: David Aaker (Managing brand equity, 1991), who is an expert on
corporate brand strategy, and Philip Kotler (Marketing places, 1993), who is called
“the Father of Modern Marketing” among his circle.
8 The journal, Place Branding was launched in 2004 and was renamed as
Place Branding and Pubic Diplomacy in 2006. Simon Anholt was the first editor of
the journal.
7
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branding and the “country-of-origin effect” in the field of tourism studies and
international marketing (Kotler & Gertner, 2003). Inspired by the business practices
valorizing symbolic and cultural branding of products and services, nation branding
emphasizes the growing importance of image, logo, design, symbol and reputation
for countries just like for goods and services.
Nation branding is not simply a communication strategy dealing with
symbols and logos. Kaneva (2011a) defines nation branding as broadly as “a
compendium of discourses and practices aimed at reconstituting nationhood
through marketing and branding paradigms” (p. 118). It encompasses a range of
discursive and institutional practices at the economic, political and cultural levels.
Furthermore, nation-branding practitioners ambitiously aim to establish the
paradigm of nation branding as a guiding principle for organizing the internal and
external public policy for economic development, national planning and governance
(Anholt, 2007, p. 23).
In the following section, I examine the basic arguments of nation branding by
critically reviewing its core literature. Most literature on nation branding comes
from the academic disciplines of business administration and international politics.9
It is not surprising that most of them focus on the promotional and functional
aspects of nation branding in which consultants and practitioners deal with the

Kaneva’s almost complete survey (2011a) shows that out of 186 samples of
scholarly sources on nation branding from 1997 to 209, 106 pieces came from
marketing and business administration perspectives and 66 publications from
international relations perspectives.
9
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principles and techniques for the more effective and efficient implementation of
nation branding.10
I subject these perspectives on nation branding to critical examination,
informed by cultural perspectives. The critical cultural literature, coming from the
fields of media and cultural studies, anthropology, and international relations
among others, is relatively small but growing.11 This critical literature commonly
regards the rise of nation branding as a cultural practice sitting in the larger political
structural context of neoliberal globalization. These authors raise the questions
about the assumption underlying the dominant paradigm of nation branding.
The review focuses on four key aspects of nation branding: first, how it is
entrenched within, and helps construct a specific global economic order; secondly,
how it envisions a version of international political order by relating itself to such
ideas as public diplomacy and soft power; thirdly, how it uses culture as an
instrument for nation branding and redefines national identity for economic effects
and; lastly, how it gives shape to a new form of governance by emphasizing publicprivate partnership and citizen participation.
The political economy of nation branding
The basic argument of nation branding is that countries are competing for
international attention to survive the market globalization. Nation branding
For the purpose of the review, I will focus on the literature which proposes
core arguments of nation branding, especially publications by leading consultants
Anholt (2005, 2007), Olins (2002) and van Ham (2001) as well as an introductory
survey by Dinnie (2008).
11 Kaneva’s survey (2011a) identifies only 14 sources, but the literature has
been growing rapidly since then. At this point of writing, I count ten times as many
journal articles and dozen books.
10
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advocates contend that the fierce global competition for internal and external
markets makes it inevitable for nations and places to engage in the working and
reworking of national image and reputation (Anholt, 2007, p. 1; Dinnie, 2008, p.
106). They argue that nations and places are basically playing the same game as
other products and companies in that they are exposed to global market
competition for political and/or commercial attention (Anholt, 2007, p. 125; van
Ham, 2008, p. 129).
Cultural critics point out that nation branding is predicated on the neoliberal
assumption that market globalization is an inevitable and natural process
(Dzenovska, 2005; Jansen, 2008; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). Anholt (2005) asserts:
I believe that we have little choice in the matter. Because [……] so much of the
wealth of nations in the globalized economy devise from each country’s
ability to export branded goods, and because so much of the wealth to
survive and prosper now comes from the “added value” of branded goods
and services, the competitivity of nations and the branding of countries is the
only way forward; it has become an immutable law of global capitalism.
Assuming that the capitalist globalization is an objective, law-like movement
from which no individuals and countries can be exempted, he valorizes nation
branding as the only way to foster the necessary national competitiveness and to
survive the global competition.
Based on this assumption in which neoliberal globalization is the law and
competitiveness is its norm, the necessity and benefits of nation branding are
presented exclusively in economic terms. In the context of market globalization,
practitioners argue, nation branding is a necessary strategy for nations to attract
tourists, inward investment and international talents, to boost exports (Dinnie,
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2008, p. 17). Temporal further enumerates the potential benefits of nation branding
as follows:
- Increase currency stability
- Help restore international credibility and investor confidence
- Reverse international ratings downgrades
- Increase international political influence
- Lead to export growth of branded products and services
- Increase inbound tourism and investment
- Stimulate stronger international partnerships
- Enhance nation building (confidence, pride, harmony, ambition, national
resolve)
- Reverse negative thoughts about environmental and human rights issues
- Help diffuse allegations of corruption and cronyism
- Bring greater access to global markets
- Lead to an improvement in the ability to win against regional and global
business competitors, and defend their own markets (quoted in Anholt,
2005, p. 141).
The list suggests that nation branding presupposes a specific understanding
of globalization, which is constructed specifically from the perspective of financial
capital. Nation branding assumes that countries are competing not just for economic
gains but more specifically for improving international financial credibility ratings.
In this vein, nation-branding practitioners offer the measurement of nation brands
especially in terms of their financial value. For instance, the Anholt Nation Brands
Index (NBI)12 incorporates the financial valuation of nation brands, which enables
“to put dollar value on the reputations of the countries in the NBI, giving the sense of
the real contribution of the brand to the nation’s economy” (Anholt, 2007, p. 44).
Measured with the methodology of “royalty relief,” the value of nation brand assets
well exceeds the amount of GDP, led by the USA’s 18 trillion dollars (Anholt, 2007, p.

Later, it was revamped as the Anholt-gfk Roper Nation Brands Index in
partnership with GfK Roper Public Affairs and Media.
12
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45). The practice of indexing from the financial perspective transforms the nationstate into “calculative space,” which is “constituted by marketing data and decision
making rather than conceived in terms of social relations or governance” (Jansen,
2008, p. 122).
Cultural critics further point out that nation-branding consultants not only
naturalize the neoliberal global economy by mythologizing it as natural and
inevitable reality to which nations should adjust (Aronczyk, 2009, p. 292); but they
are actively constituting part of the constructed reality of financial globalization,
operating as the “cultural circuit of capital” (Thrift, 2005). Nation branding
consultants normalize and constitute capitalist globalization by disseminating
specific managerial knowledge, constructing a specific image of world economic
order, and facilitating the movement of financial capital at a global scale.
In the framework of nation branding, the role of nation-states is reduced to
the management of image and reputation in order to foster competitiveness for a
business-friendly environment to attract free-flowing global financial capital,
technologies and elites (Kaneva, 2007, 2011a; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). As a
governing technology of global neoliberalism, nation branding urges nation-states
to participate in the global capitalist game of enhancing the rank of nation brands by
internalizing neoliberal norms of global standards.
Nation branding and international politics
Nation branding practitioners, especially those who are based in Europe,
emphasize that the role played by nation branding is not limited to the economic
aspect, but encompasses political and diplomatic aspects (Anholt, 2007; Olins, 2002;
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van Ham, 2008). These practitioners are eager to show internal and external
political benefits of nation branding. They attempt to link the idea of nation
branding to such concepts as “public diplomacy” and “soft power” (Gilboa, 2008),
arguing that nation branding is basically interchangeable with those concepts
developed from international relations and international politics.
Soft power, the concept introduced by Joseph Nye, describes the ability of a
nation to influence others not by military force and/or economic lure but by the
attractiveness of a nation’s values, culture and policies (J. S. Nye, 2008, p. 94). He
contends that soft power has become strategically as important as the hard power
of military coercion and economic inducement with the rise of information
communications technologies and the with the end of the Cold War (Gilboa, 2008; J.
S. Nye, 2008). Nation branding consultants contend that nation branding is virtually
equivalent to soft power in that both of them focus on image, reputation and
attraction. Anholt writes:
Soft power [……] is making people want to do what you want them to do.
Nation branding is about making people want to pay attention to a country’s
achievement, and believe in its qualities. It is quintessential modern
exemplar of soft power (2005, p. 13).
In this regard, Anholt (2007) argues that nation branding is an essential
component of the comprehensive art of statecraft. In fact, he and other practitioners
are eager to recommend the recipes of nation branding and nation image
management especially to under-developed countries as the overarching public
policy strategy for national development. He argues that the soft power strategy of
nation branding is the only viable option for “transitional” economies in the former

64

Second World and poorer countries of lower development, which lack hard power
instruments of military forces and economic power (Anholt, 2005, p. 13).
Similar claims are raised about public diplomacy. Gilboa (2008) defines
public diplomacy, “where state and nonstate actors use the media and other
channels of communication to influence public opinion in foreign societies” (p. 58).
From the perspective of international relations, it is presented “as an official policy
translating soft power resources into action” (p. 61). While it is observed that public
diplomacy and nation branding are distinguished in terms of their goals — the
former aiming at foreign policy outcomes and the latter at commercial benefits (p.
68), nation branders contends that they are converging in that public diplomacy
strategically adopts commercial techniques and practices to appeal to foreign public
audiences (Anholt, 2007, p. 3; van Ham, 2008, p. 135).
Nation branding is now regarded not just as a communication technique
adopted by countries, but a critical component of public policy that directs the
overarching orientation of internal and external state management. In this vein, the
idea of nation branding is increasingly linked with those of public diplomacy and
soft power. It is contended that the convergence between nation branding and soft
power or public diplomacy is inevitable because the role and position of modern
nation-states have changed in the post-Cold War era in which ideologies receded.
Nation branding posits a specific redefinition of the state and politics in the postCold War international order which is determined by the market logic. Van Ham
(2001) argues that the nation brand, or the “brand state” in his own term, implies “a
shift in political paradigms, a move from the modern world of geopolitics and power
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to the postmodern world of images and influence” (p. 4). He suggests that
“postmodern power, where soft power and public diplomacy have their place” (van
Ham, 2008, p. 127) is suitable in the age of globalization in which the ideological
confrontation gave way to market competition among nations. It is advised that
“smart states” put their collective energy into building an assertive international
images and reputations (van Ham, 2001, p. 3).
Furthermore, postmodern international politics is depicted as rather
“peaceful and humanistic” landscape that consists of individual freedom and
consumer power (Anholt, 2007, p. 125). It is soft power and public diplomacy which
are the instruments of this postmodern international politics for gaining economic
competitive advantage. And it is in this postmodern conception of world politics
which nation branding is celebrated as the only weapon that is possibly wielded by
the weak who are transitional, developing countries that “lie beneath” in the
hierarchy of nations (Anholt, 2005, p. 13).
At least two aspects of the nation-branding’s take on the international
politics can be put into critiques. On the one hand, the nation-branding
practitioners’ ambitions and motivations. The nation-branding consultants
repeatedly emphasize that nation branding cannot be equated with logos and
slogans, and communications techniques such as PR, advertising and campaigns;
they claim that it constitutes a core component of public policy by encompassing the
agenda of international politics. By claiming the convergence between nation
branding and soft power and public diplomacy, the nation-branding consultants
locate nation-branding at the center of public policy agendas as the overarching
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orientation of internal and external state management — therefore their own place
as consulting authority for the new panacea of nation branding (Kaneva & Popescu,
2011, p. 192) especially over the countries which are put at the lower side of
international hierarchy.
On the other hand, by dismissing modern nation-states and celebrating
postmodern brand states, nation branding depoliticizes international politics. It
presents the “brand state” pursuing “competitive identity” as a normative form of
states in the age of postmodern power (Anholt, 2007; van Ham, 2001). International
politics among brand states are depicted as dominated by soft power and public
diplomacy where peaceful competition and equal exchange among nations
characterize “postmodern power” (van Ham, 2008, p. 127).
Nation branding, cultural differences, national identity
Advocates of nation branding, either from economic or diplomatic
perspective, regard culture as an essential component of nation branding strategies.
Just like branding in general, nation branding emphasizes the immaterial dimension
of distinctive culture, symbols, logos, naming and design for strategic differentiation
in the competitive global market. Practitioners of advanced modern branding,
however, acknowledge that nation branding is not equivalent to symbolic
manipulation and propaganda which directly aim to influence other countries
because nation brands “are not directly under the marketer’s control” (Dinnie, 2008,
p. 108).
While this poses problems to some marketers and branders of nations due to
their complex nature ridden with history and traditions, it provides to others a rich
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ground for cultural nation branding because “nation-brands possess far richer and
deeper cultural resources than any other type of brand” (Dinnie, 2008, p. 14). In this
light, nation branding is essentially a cultural practice aiming to carve out the
culturally differentiated space for international economic and political competition.
In this cultural perspective, nation brands are broadly defined as “the unique, multidimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with culturally grounded
differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences” (Dinnie, 2008, p. 15).
Nation branding deals with culture in ways in which cultural resources could
contribute to the enhancement of national competitiveness. In this perspective,
unique local and national culture is regarded as essential to the effective nation
branding campaign. On the one hand, culture in the forms of either cultural heritage
or modern popular culture makes immediate economic contribution to the national
economy through tourism and cultural exports. The policy initiatives for promoting
the creative industries such as “Cool Britannia” and “Cool Japan” represent the trend
in which culture has entered the major realm of public policy (Clancy, 2009, p. 28;
Jansen, 2008, p. 122).
On the other hand, culture makes “intangible” contribution to the national
economy and international political influences by enhancing national prestige
(Anholt, 2007, p. 113). Anholt (2007) argues that culture is useful in constructing
“competitive identity” of nation brands simply because it is generally regarded as
“not for sale.” Culture, representing “a country’s true spirit and essence” could
mitigate the overtly commercial tone of branding. For instance, while Japan has
been pejoratively projected as “automata,” its graceful heritage and “cool” modern
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culture are effectively offsetting the stereotypical image. As culture is a truly unique
feature of its country, it provides “all-important quality of dignity which, arguably,
commercial brands can do without, but countries cannot” (Anholt, 2005, p. 136).
In these frameworks of nation branding, culture is effectively redefined as an
essential instrument for nation branding from the perspective of global
competitiveness. Culture is redefined as direct industrial resources for economic
development. The Anholt-Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index features the category of
“culture and heritage” as one of the six criteria measuring the value of nation brands
(the other five are exports, governance, people, tourism, and investment and
immigration). Culture is also conceived of as having symbolic consequences of
constructing national image and reputation in the global economy and politics by
enhancing nation prestige, dignity, quality and so forth (Anholt, 2005).
The redefinition of culture within the overarching policy orientation toward
global competitiveness has implications to the way in which the question of national
identity is raised in the nation-branding paradigm. If culture is essential to the
formation of national identity through the shared cultural traditions and
contemporary culture represented in the national media (Anderson, 1983;
Aronczyk, 2007), the particular rendition of culture by nation branding entails a
specific redefinition of collective national identity.
Its practitioners claim that nation branding is the project of representing the
essence of national culture and reflecting “something fundamentally true about the
place and people” (Anholt, 2007, p. 75). Dinnie (2008) suggests that “nation-brand
development is firmly rooted in the reality and essence of the nation” (p. 135). In
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this sense, they argue that nation brand and national identity are “virtually the same
thing” (Anholt, 2007, p. 75).
However, as a concept developed in relation with the international
marketing concept of “country-of-origin effect” (Dinnie, 2008, pp. 84-103), the
genuine interest of nation branding is to present national identity in a tradable form
which can be used as a “shortcut” (Anholt, 2005, p. 3) for an international purchase
or investment decision. In this sense, Anholt (Anholt, 2007) argues that “nation
brand is national identity made tangible, robust, communicable, and above all
useful” (p. 75).
Some advocates, arguing that the historical formation of nations is not
different from the contemporary practice of nation branding, attempts to present
nation branding as an extension of historical project of nation building. Wally Olins
(2002), a leading branding consultant, goes further to suggest that nation building
be the symbolic construction of nations through the process of branding and
rebranding. He argues that the process of historical nation building involved
recreated national myths and traditions, reinvented representations and new
symbolic systems that projected the regime changes in reality. Giving examples of
France, Germany, Spain and Zimbabwe, he contends that the historical construction
of nations by way of making up consistent and coherent images and narratives is
what amounts to his conception of contemporary nation branding and rebranding.
Adopting the constructionist view of nation building in academic discussions
(Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Ranger & Hobsbawm, 1983) in his own way, Olins’s
take on national identity reduces the historical-political process to a general process
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of symbolic makeover. Van Ham (2001) distinguishes between modern and
postmodern national identities. Whereas the modern national identity was deeprooted in the historical-political context and often fell into antagonistic nationalism,
the postmodern national identity is “cool brand” free from the deep-rootedness.
This “new and improved” version of national identity and nationalism is presented
as a solution to the global economic competitiveness:
In its ability to combine diverse motifs of heritage and modernization,
domestic and foreign concerns, and economic and moral ideologies, nation
branding is presented as a “2.0 version of nationalism, as a more progressive
form of patriotism than its chauvinistic or antagonistic counterparts
(Aronczyk, 2009, p. 294).
While some emphasize the “mining” of history, culture, geography, and
national identity for external display (Anholt, 2007, p. 75), others equally focus on
the internal effects of nation branding. Van Ham (2008) argues that “one of the key
targets of the branding process today is internal,”13 and emphasizes that nation
branding strategy provides a sense of belonging and self-confidence. However,
internal national identity formation, conceived within the nation-branding
framework, is less about building political community or sharing cultural values
than about sharing brand purpose which is similar to corporate identity.
He attempts to justify the practices of nation branding as a legitimate
instrument for elites to shape national identities in the context of global competition
for attention (Kaneva, 2011a, p. 121). From a cultural perspective, questions are

Comparing place branding and soft power, he argues that the former has
the aspect of the internal identity formation while the latter lacks it (van Ham, 2008,
p. 131).
13
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raised about the way in which culture and national identity are conceived of in the
nation branding paradigm.
First, nation branding treats culture and national identity as commodity and
instrument for economic purposes. It treats them only in terms of their usefulness to
the practices of nation branding management. Thus, it transforms culture and
national identity into “intellectual property” (Jansen, 2008, p. 136) according to
their economic utility and commercial value. The logic of nation branding ignores
the internal value of culture and makes national identity, transformed into
“competitive identity” (Anholt, 2007), subordinated to corporate interest.
Second, thus, nation branding presents national identity in an ahistorical and
depoliticized way. In this logic, national branding as “nationalism 2.0” (Aronczyk,
2009, p. 294) or “national identity lite” (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011) seemingly
emphasizes the historical process of national identity formation. Anholt (2007)
contends that nation branding’s “use of its history, geography, and ethnic motifs to
construct its own image” is a benign and peaceful version of nationalism. In this
way, nation branding put national identity in the postmodern play of differences
which erases historical and political implications (Halsall, 2008). While it
reestablishes the significance of nation-states and nation identity as key agents,
nation branding is only interested in its role in establishing a market position within
the global economic competition (Aronczyk, 2008b), which cannot be clearer than in
the redefinition of national identity as “competitive identity” (Anholt, 2007).
Third, nation branding constructs national identity in practical concerns;
thus, the narratives mobilized in the identity formation are highly selective.
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Commentators especially criticize that nation branding as a strategic display of
national identity reorganizes culture and redefines national identity in an
externally-directed fashion (Kaneva, 2007; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). Iordanova
(2007) criticizes the orientalism of nation branding where exotic stereotypes are
reproduced from the Western gaze. Moreover, the externally-oriented national
identity produces the effect of ignoring the internal differences within the nation
(Aronczyk, 2007, p. 122).
Finally, the way in which nation branding redefines internal national identity
brings about normative effects on collective national behaviors. Nation branding is
part of a continuing nation building project in the globalized, mediatized
environment, focusing on the management of external image and reputation and
enhancing internal national pride and social cohesion. The redefinition of internal
national identity produces the effect of regulating collective life of the nation
(Aronczyk, 2008a, p. 71). This normative, regulative aspect of nation branding is
related to theme of the next section: the nation branding’s governance of everyday
life of individuals and citizen.
Nation branding, governance and citizenship
In addition to the redefinition of national identity, nation branding has a
further cultural implication in terms of internal cultural politics which has a
regulatory and normative effect on citizenship. If culture not only designates
cultural artifacts and heritage but also shared customs and collective behaviors, the
lives of citizens themselves are regarded as a key source for nation branding.
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Practitioners argue that for the successful implementation of nation
branding, the “brand purpose” should be shared by “brand stakeholders.” The brand
purpose is defined as shared visions and values of internal culture. The stakeholders
of the nation brand in this context include not only various governmental
departments, but private business sectors and citizens alike (Anholt, 2007, pp. 612). Anholt (2005) explains his idea about the governance initiative of nation
branding:
The initiative has to be a major, nationwide, public-private partnership. The
government, tourist boards, airlines, major brands and corporations have to
agree on a common branding strategy (informed by a profound
understanding and objective evaluation of overseas markets), and stick to it
for many years (p. 130).
Adopting the idea of “governance,” a buzzword across the field of public
administration (Anholt, 2007, pp. 15-19), the nation-branding paradigm emphasizes
a public-private partnership and participation by “brand stakeholders” for a longterm commitment to the strategic nation branding. The implications of this
argument are that the nation branding paradigm advocates the reorganization of the
state public policy according to corporate principles. While Anhlot elevates nation
branding as a vital component for the long-term strategic plan for national
development and indeed a new model guiding statecraft (Anholt, 2007, pp. 18-22),
he suggests that the plan be set up according to principles which resemble
corporate branding strategy which proved to be superior in the global competition.
He argues for the reorganization of the states like private corporations:
[T]he fact is that governments now find themselves competing in ways that
they are scarcely prepared to deal with, and inhabiting a world of global
competition and mobile consumers where few of their traditional

74

approaches really work. This is a world that companies know well, and
where they have learned how to survive and prosper (Anholt, 2007, p. 16).
By emphasizing the government-business partnership and the participation
by brand stakeholders, what nation branding aims is to realign public policy to
corporate principles and put the state functions to the service of enterprises. Anholt
(2007) argues for setting up a governmental institution which works according to
corporate principles in order effectively and successfully to execute the nation
branding strategy with continuity and authority.
Critical media and cultural studies scholars characterize nation branding’s
claim for the public-private partnership within the larger context of neoliberal
transformation of the state governance.
The corporate principle extends to the regulation of citizens’ lives and
behaviors. The practitioners contend that the working of nation branding
presupposes the full engagement by national stakeholders including citizens
(Anholt, 2007, p. 14). Anholt (2007) emphasizes that the shared purpose of nation
branding should get unanimous support by the population enthusiastic about
enhancing national image and reputation. The assumption of nation branding that
citizens should embody specific customs and behaviors is well epitomized in the
rhetoric like “the people are the brand” (Anholt, 2007, p. 75), “live the brand”
(Anholt, 2007, p. 6; Aronczyk, 2009, p. 123), “brand ambassadors” (Dinnie, 2008, p.
72) and so on.
The emphasis on the participation by the ordinary citizens is frequently
related with the notion of public diplomacy. Anholt (2007) argues that public
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diplomacy implies that the “messenger” of the nation brand is a “substantial part of
population” which “is motivated and energized through a benign national ambition,
and instinctively seizes every opportunity to tell the world about its country” (p.
105). In this rationale, nation branding strategy urges citizens to internalize global
standards and meticulously recommends that children should be taught “how to be
welcoming to strangers” (Anholt, 2007, p. 108).
By emphasizing cooperation, participation and consensus for the singleminded purpose of nation branding, nation branding regards citizens as only a
component of nation branding and aims to constitute them as competitive market
subjects. Critical media and cultural studies scholars point out that, contrary to the
participation claim, nation branding actually limits or excludes citizen participation.
Widler (2007) criticizes that the nation branding’s analogy of nations with
corporations makes citizens as equivalent with employees. Kaneva (2007) shows
that the internal campaign for nation branding constructs citizens as consumers to
whom “individual choice” and “practical everyday gains” are presented. Volcic and
Andrejevic (2011) points out that the nation-branding rhetoric of “co-creation”
encourages the citizen “to identify state and economic imperatives as their own” and
puts the public interest in the hand of the private sector.
Emerging research trends
While these four themes constitute ongoing streams underpinning the
critical research on nation branding, I can identify in recent researches at least a few
emerging trends which point out gaps in the existing literature and propose new
research agenda.
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First, some scholars point out that the existing researches on nation branding
mostly focused on symbols, logos, representations, and discourses, relatively
neglecting the aspects of material and institutional practices (Kaneva, 2016). This
point does not necessarily imply that the material and institutional aspects were
completely ignored in this stream of research, but the focus was relatively narrow
and limited. In other words, the study of nation branding and other related practices
should pay more attention to the complexity of institutional and material process in
combination with symbolic, discursive, and representational aspects.
Secondly, while the media have been the natural focus in many critical
researches on nation branding, it was treated in a rather simple way as an outlet of
symbols, discourses, and representations. Scholars suggest that the multiple aspects
of the media should be more examined, including technological and organizational
aspects (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015). There emerged an increasing attention to the
agency of the international and domestic media in terms of financial, material, and
technological as well as symbolic circulation (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Kaneva,
2016).
Third, while the existing literature paid attention to the transnational nature
of nation branding, especially focusing on the activities of transnational brand
consultants (Aronczyk, 2008a; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011), the domestic aspects and
effects were analyzed in a rather simplistic way. The domestic process of nation
branding was treated as a black box, neglecting internal complexity and dynamics.
For instance, the domestic analysis usually focused more on the static aspect of the
government and the official public policy process, than on the dynamic involvement
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by the domestic media, the domestic consultants and think tanks, the NGOs, and
publics.
Fourth, the existing critical literature gives the impression that the business
of nation branding has been implemented and imposed to build a certain national
identity or to foster a certain citizenship in a rather successful manner. Yet, recent
researches focus more on the complex, fragmented, and contradictory nature of
nation branding campaigns. In this vein, recent researches have focused on the
agencies of publics and non-governmental organizations in the process of nation
branding and public diplomacy (Graan, 2010, 2013; Jordan, 2013).
Last, the critical literature on nation branding is characterized by the uneven
geographical distribution of research. The majority of critical literature focused on
the “post-Communist” countries in Eastern Europe (Poland, Latvia, Slovenia,
Ukraine, Romania, Estonia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and so on).14. Recently, critical
literature has been greatly expanded in geographic scope, and examined nation
branding in the context of Western Europe (Angell & Mordhorst, 2013; Christensen,
2013), Central Asia (Marat, 2009), and Middle East (Al-Ghazzi & Kraidy, 2013).
Besides, critical works on nation branding in East Asia are increasing as the
discourses and practices of nation branding have gained prominence among the
public policy and marketing circle in East Asia over the last decade.
These works in the East Asian context are characterized by at least several
traits as follows. First, these works mostly concentrate on the discursive and
institutional practices in China and Japan as these two countries are the most
14

This trend is represented by a recent anthology, edited by Kaneva (2012).
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powerful international players (de Kloet et al., 2011; Iwabuchi, 2015; Valaskivi,
2013, 2016).
Secondly, public diplomacy and soft power are as prominently examined as
nation branding as these terms are the major concerns in the public policy circles in
Japan and China (Chua, 2012; Cull, 2008; Heng, 2010; J. Nye & Kim, 2013; N.
Otmazgin, 2016; N. K. Otmazgin, 2012; N. K. Otmazgin & Ben-Ari, 2012; J. Wang,
2011).
Thirdly, many works embed these practices of nation branding in the context
of international politics and historical conflicts in East Asia. They can go back to
Japanese imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century, but are still thorny
issues, surfacing in the forms of territorial disputes, the conflicts around history
textbooks, the “comfort women” of the Japanese imperial forces (Callahan, 2006;
Gries, 2005). Besides, they are embedded in the contemporary nationalist tensions
in East Asia, especially among Taiwan, China, South Korea, and Japan (J. Lee, 2018;
S.-Y. Sung, 2010; Yang, 2008).
Lastly, the critical research on nation branding in East Asia is increasingly
connected with the stream of the study of the circulation of popular culture in the
region such as J-pop, K-pop, Japanese dramas and anime series, and Korean dramas.
(Huang, 2011; Iwabuchi, 2002, 2012; S.-Y. L. Sung, 2015).
These emerging trends as well as the ongoing themes in the research of
nation branding and other related practices greatly inform the present dissertation.
Especially, the following themes provide a starting point for my development of the
research: the incorporation of historical and institutional aspects to the analysis of
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nation branding and national prestige, the focus on the institutional role played by
the media in the establishing a national agenda, and the participation and
involvement by the NGOs and publics in the process of nation branding and public
diplomacy.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NATIONAL IMAGINARIES IN SOUTH KOREA’S MODERNITY: FROM
DEVELOPMENT TO COMPETITIVENESS
In this chapter, I provide the historical context of the rise of the discourses
and institutions of nation branding and national prestige. Especially, I attend to how
the social imaginaries of national development and modernization informed
modernity in South Korea. In this discussion, I identify the defining characteristics of
South Korean modernity as state-centered, economy-centered, and Westernoriented.
In the following section, I draw on literature on Western modernity, its
dominant forms and its critiques. Then I discuss how the ideas of modernization and
development were established as the defining discourses and programs in South
Korea during the Cold War era. Next, focusing on the historical formation of the
developmental state, I especially examine how the state and the economy have
taken the center in the social imaginaries of national development and
modernization.
Next, I examine the post-developmental transition to neoliberalism and the
rise of the competition state in South Korea. In this examination, I consider how the
neoliberalization of the state and the economy continued as well as changed the
national imaginaries of development in the context of the globalizing economy. I
especially focus on a series of state discourses which constructed the neoliberal
competition state toward the rationality of international competitiveness.
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In the last section, examining how the imaginary West continued to offer the
normative standard and the universal model for South Korea, I confirm the
Western-oriented nature of South Korean modernity.
The discursive and institutional practices of nation branding and national
prestige emerged against this backdrop of continuing as well as changing
characteristics of modernity in South Korea: the state-centered, economy-obsessed,
and Western-oriented characteristics.
Modernity
Modernity, from a dominant point of view, refers to the ensemble of
institutions, practices, norms and experiences which are distinctive from the
tradition. Charles Taylor distinguishes two approaches to modernity: acultural and
cultural (Taylor, 1995, p. 24). The acultural theory, which is the dominant
understanding, conceives of modernity in such terms as the rise of reason, the
progress of history, and the advancement of science and technology. Philosophically
built on the ideas of Reason and Enlightenment, the acultural theory explains the
social transformation in terms of the rise of individualism, industrialization and
mobility, the building of nation-states, the spread of liberal democracy, and market
economy (Luke, 1990, p. 212).
As Taylor points out, this acultural understanding of modernity presupposes
the “Enlightenment package,” that is, “one single universally applicable operation”
to be unpacked in a uniform pattern of progress of science, technology, and
industrialization (Taylor, 1995, p. 28). In this acultural understanding of the
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universal path to modernity, any and every culture and society is assumed to have
to go through more or less the same transformations (Taylor, 1995, pp. 24-25).
Many scholars have criticized this dominant view of modernity, especially its
linear formulation of temporality as Eurocentrism, privileging the particular
experience of Europe or the West and imposing it on non-Europe or the non-West.
Historically, it was through colonial rule that modernity spread from the West to the
rest of the world. In this historical process, thus, the dominant form of modernity
from the West established itself as the universal standard and norm which the nonWestern world should follow.
Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) characterizes the epistemology of Eurocentric
modernity as “historicism,” which presupposes global historical time in the
structure of “first in Europe, then elsewhere” (p. 7). Thus, historicism:
posited historical time as a measure of the cultural distance (at least in
institutional development) that was assumed to exist between the West and
the non-West. In the colonies, it legitimated the idea of civilization. In Europe
itself, it made possible completely internalist histories of Europe in which
Europe was described as the site of the first occurrence of capitalism,
modernity, or Enlightenment (p. 7).
Timothy Mitchell (2000) also calls into question the dominant narrative of
modernity by criticizing its temporal logic. He points out that it understands history
as having “only one unfolding time, the history of the West, in reference to which all
other histories must establish their significance and receive their meaning” (p. 7).
He emphasizes that the temporality of modernity as the uniform and singular
history of the West reorganizes dispersed geographies into the various stages of
Europe’s past (pp. 8-9). In this modern temporality, the past, laid out within the
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space of the present and co-present in the homogenous space of now, is none other
than the non-West colonies. In this definition of modernity as the “spatialization of
time,” he suggests that we can understand “the West as the product of modernity” or
modernity as being produced as the West, rather than modernity as the product of
the West (p. 15).
In this way, the idea of modernity provides legitimacy for the superiority and
dominance of the West over the non-West. In this sense, Walter Mignolo (2011),
following Anibal Quijano, points out that “coloniality” (pp. 2-3) is the underlying
logic of modernity and Western civilization. Escobar (1995) emphasizes that the
colonial discursive regime perpetuates “the hegemonic idea of the West’s
superiority” through the constructions of the “colonial/Third World subject” (pp. 89) as the object of knowledge and the exercise of power.
In a similar vein, Taylor (1995) criticizes the acultural understanding of
modernity, especially its inability to deal with modernity in the non-Western
context. According to him, modernity cannot be explained directly in terms of
technological rationality, but in terms of the changes in background understanding,
habitus, or “social imaginary” (p. 30). In this dimension of culture, a new option and
possibility for change can emerge beyond the existing horizon. In this sense,
Western modernity cannot be reduced to the universal, linear advance of
individualism, science and technology, instrumental reason, progress and
enlightenment and so on, and that it should be understood in the context of a larger
change in moral order and social imaginary. He relativizes Western modernity by
bringing up as an example the rise of the public sphere as a new repertoire beyond
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the existing social imaginary. It was the changes in the understanding of secular
time and the sense of contemporaneous that enabled the emergence of the public
sphere (p. 30).
The strength of this cultural understanding of modernity is that it allows us
to consider multiple paths to modernity or "multiple modernities" (Gaonkar, 2002,
p. 12), which are not reduced to the universal narrative of historical time. Different
cultures depend on different social imaginaries. Thus, for instance, the cultural
forms such as the public sphere are, when introduced in non-Western contexts,
“reconfigured both in meaning and function when placed within a social imaginary
calibrated by an image of a moral order different from that of the West” (p. 12).
In sum, Taylor’s approach relativizes Western modernity by identifying its
specificities, and provides a new frame for understanding non-Western modernities.
The latter should not be evaluated in terms of satisfying/not satisfying the criteria
derived from Western experiences; rather the task is to understand how nonWestern cultural forms are reconfigured in their own cultural context.
Modernization and development
To examine the contemporary formation of modernity in South Korea in view
of the discussion on the cultural theory of modernity, it would be fair to start with
the discourse and the program of development and modernization.
In the second half of the twentieth century, in mainstream social sciences in
the United States, the Euro-centric idea of modernity was reformulated into the
scientific theory and the policy program of modernization and development. The US
mainstream social scientists, supported by the US government, led the
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dissemination of the discourse and the program of modernization and development
throughout the anti-communist, liberalist bloc in the Cold War context (Escobar,
1992, p. 24; Leys, 2005; Luke, 1990, pp. 212-213).
The discourses and institutions of modernization and development
continued the dichotomy between the modern and the traditional, based on which
various aspects of non-Western societies are evaluated as to whether meeting the
criteria of modernity or not (Dirlik, 2002, p. 35). In that way, the program of
modernization and development was modeled after the historical experience of the
Western societies and imposed on non-Western societies.
Moreover, the formulation of modernization and development is important
in the sense that it was an explicit complex of “knowledge-power” between the
academia and the government in the United States and was more or less
systematically experimented and implemented in the so called Third World
countries. Instead of emphasizing the European ideas such as enlightenment,
civilization, and progress, as Timothy Luke (1990) points out, the discourse of
modernization and development put forward such notions as development,
economic growth, technological innovation, self-determination, democracy and so
on, which were in a more neutral and scientific appearance, yet embodying “the
cultural assumptions, political premises, and economic values of the United States”
(p. 213) or “American myths” (p. 213). In the formulation of modernization and
development, non-Western societies are diagnosed as being in different stages of
development in terms of aggregate economic growth, extensive industrialization,
democratization, and so on. The statistical indicators are devised to measure the
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stages in development and to engineer the programs for the “takeoff” (p. 217).
However, as Escobar (1995) emphasizes, development is never severed from the
colonial discourse in the sense that it is “regimes of discourse and representations”
and “apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the
Third World” (pp. 9-10).
Under the anti-communist regime in the post-war era, it was the program of
modernization and development that defined the nature of modernity in South
Korea. Like many postcolonial societies, modernization and development epitomize
the politics, economy and society in the post-liberation South Korea, especially since
the 1960s when General Park Chung-hee seized the power in a military coup. The
socio-economic program was received and deployed in a wholesale way, greatly
shaping modernity in South Korea. In the modern history of South Korea,
development and modernization have provided a template by which state public
policies were legitimated, and economic activities and socio-cultural lives were
predicated on.
Modernization and development can be understood as a social imaginary (cf.
Watts, 2006, p. 48). In the following discussion, I characterize the social imaginary
of development and modernization in South Korea as state-centered and economycentered: the state, standing above society, led the development and modernization,
and the economy became the most significant object of development and
modernization. I also characterize the social imaginary of development and
modernization rested on a certain image of the world in which the state strived to

87

“catch up” with advanced countries by harnessing the growth of the national
economy.
The developmental state
There are many theories that try to explain development and modernization
in South Korea and East Asia in general in the late 20th century. Critical intellectuals
in South Korea in the 1980s, who were influenced by the world-system theory
and/or dependency theory, emphasized the outer limit of (under)development
imposed by the imperialist center on the peripheral economy of South Korea. But
they were faced with an explanatory conundrum when South Korean economy
seemed to break through the supposed outer limit. Liberalists, on the other hand,
explain it as a natural process of the evolutionary expansion of capitalist market
principle. For instance, Daniel Chirot (2005), a truthful advocate of the original form
of modernization theory, explains that South Korea has successfully implemented
modernization because it followed the capitalist path to modernity pioneered by the
West. However, this liberalist view is also in contradiction with historical reality,
especially about the authoritarian state and state-led economic development. The
South Korean economy was not developed according to the liberalist principle of
free-market and free-enterprise in a straightforward way, but in a mercantilist
fashion led by the “plan-rational” state (Cumings, 1999, p. 64; Pieterse, 2010, p. 23).
The prominence of the state is central to the understanding of modernity in
East Asia and South Korea. The state played a major role in development and
modernization, which constituted dominant social imaginaries among South
Koreans since the 1960s, as in other post-colonial states. In modern South Korea,
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the state is “capable of setting the direction of social and economic changes and
molding the behavior of individuals and groups in society” and “therefore the most
critical variable explaining virtually all major aspects of historical change in Korea”
(H. Koo, 1993, p. 11). In this sense, the process of development and modernization is
largely conterminous with state formation (K. J. Kim, 2007, p. 69).
The concept of the “developmental state” emphasizes the role played by the
state in economic development and modernization in East Asia (Woo-Cumings,
1999). In this aspect, modernity in East Asia can be understood as a “state project”
(Ong, 1997, p. 172), driven toward the national goal of techno-economic
modernization by the nationalist state elite. The South Korean state under military
dictatorship has been widely analyzed as a prominent case of the “developmental
state” (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999). The concept highlights
how the state took the leading role over the course of rapid economic growth and
industrialization among East Asian capitalism (especially, Japan, Korea and Taiwan).
The developmental state with a high level of capacity and autonomy did “get the
price wrong” (Amsden, 1989), “govern the market” (Wade, 1990), or play a
“transformative role” (Evans, 1995, p. 6) in the state-led economic growth and
development.
State-centeredness, central to South Korean modernity, takes root in the
continuum of a long-term historical imaginary in South Korea. It is debatable how
far we can go back to find the root of state-centrism. Some go back to Confucian
bureaucracy in the Chosŏn Dynasty (Woodside, 2009). In fact, it is suggested that
throughout the history of Korea, the state have been central to the “politics of
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vortex” in which every automized individual in homogenous society was pulled
upward toward a highly concentrated political center (Henderson (1968), quoted in
K. J. Kim, 2007). At least, the centrality of the state in South Korea could go back to
the Japanese colonial state in Korea, the Government-General of Korea (1910-1945)
or the US Army Military Government (1945-1948), both of which were highly
concentrated, bureaucratic, and repressive.15 In any case, the dominant topological
imagery is that the state stood above society, with overwhelming military and police
force, well-equipped bureaucracy, and institutional apparatuses.
In the 1960s, the developmental state was established by modeling after the
colonial regime of war-time mobilization. The developmental state has been
explained by borrowing theoretical terms such as the ”overdeveloped state” (C.-j.
Ch’oe, 2002, p. 45) or imagined as “standing above civil society” (Ferguson & Gupta,
2002, p. 985). Within the historical context of state-centered social imaginary, the
developmental state led the way to rapid economic growth. It led other parts of
society toward developmental mobilization, disciplining and regulating population
with coercive measures, as well as controlled finance and distributing monopoly
and competition among big capital. The developmental state played a central role in
the formation of the large capital-led, export-oriented national economy, which was
constructed as the object of state intervention (Jessop & Sum, 2006b, p. 169).

Or it can go back to Manchukuo (1932-1945), a puppet state by Japanese
Empire in Northeast China and Inner Mongolia, which experimented a militarist
state-driven, speed-oriented mobilization for modernization, which in turn inspired
President Park Chung-hee for the bulldozer-like drive toward modernization (cf.
Duara, 2004; Eckert, 2016; S.-c. Han, 2016).
15

90

The imagery of the state standing above society was reinforced in the
geopolitical environment of the Cold War, which shaped and limited the national
imaginary. The Cold War discourses of national security and regime competition
against North Korea led to greater concentration of force and power on the state.
The “security state” or “garrison state” (Em, 2016, p. 52) imposed violence on the
population on the everyday basis and organized it as in a military-style mobilization.
It was in this environment that the South Korean “developmental state” emerged as
a way of national survival and winning over North Korea in the regime competition
(Cumings, 1987; Pempel, 1999). The export-driven “catch-up” strategy, which the
South Korean developmental state adopted for of “late industrialization” (Amsden,
1989), was made possible within the hierarchic international division of labor. In
this setting, the US provided military and economic aids and opened the domestic
market to industrializing countries with a strategic consideration in the Cold War
environment.
State-centrism lies closely related with other enduring features such as
authoritarianism, familism, collectivism and nepotism that were historically formed
as well as central to explaining “social psychology” (H.-g. Song, 2003) or “cultural
codes” (S.-b. Chŏng, 2007) of South Koreans during the rapid growth era. In this
broader sense, state-centeredness in South Korea’s modernity not just concerns
institutions, but refers to the central position of the state in thinking and behaving in
everyday life and in the social imaginary among Koreans. Song (2003) points out,
“In Korea, it is commonplace to think that nothing can be done without the state,”
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and “the state stands central to every standard of judgement and pattern of
behavior” (pp. 145, my own translation).
Development of the national economy
Coupled with state-centeredness, what characterizes the formation of South
Korean modernity is economy-centeredness. In fact, the developmental state
established itself through the state-centered building, development and growth of
the national economy. In that sense, state-centeredness and economy-centeredness
cannot be separated in modern social imaginary in South Korea.
In terms of the social imaginary of modernity in South Korea, economycenteredness can be examined in various aspects. First of all, economy-centeredness
is apparent in the sense that development meant and was reduced to economic
development (K. J. Kim, 2007, p. 25), or more precisely economic growth (Lie, 1998).
Accordingly, all socio-economic institutions and programs were concentrated and
mobilized for the development and growth of the national economy. Yi Sang-rok
(2011) investigates how the idea of economy rose to top priority in the 1960s. He
shows how polyphonic popular desires and needs were rendered into the
“monotone of ex-backward modernization” (p. 129), and modern productive
subjects were produced through disciplinary discourses and apparatuses. Ko Wŏn
(2006) also shows how Saemaŭl Undong (New Village Campaign) in the early 1970s
morally encouraged farmers into modern national subjects toward the “revolution
of modernization” (p. 181). In this sense, modernity of South Korea meant a
capitalist state project for the building of national economy (cf. Dirlik, 2002, pp. 3536; Ong, 1997, p. 172).
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Hwang Pyŏng-ju (2008) shows how the emergence of the notion of
“economic development” in social imaginaries in the 1960s was possible by
problematizing poverty. Based on the dichotomy between modern/premodern,
advancement/backwardness, and civilized/uncivilized, the discourse of “exbackward modernization” reconstituted backwardness exclusively as the problem
of economic poverty. Backwardness was constructed as an evident matter of fact
through the comparison techniques such as GNP and the narratives of the West such
as travelers’ diaries and American popular culture. Through this problematization of
poverty, the idea of economic growth and development of the national economy
emerged as the most prominent concern, and in turn the state emerged to lead the
way to development and modernization.
In this state project of the building of the national economy, the
developmental state established itself in a special relation with the large industrial
capital sector of conglomerates through the export-oriented drive. The state
controlled the conglomerates not just by way of distributing the finance but by way
of using violent measures. In the process, large conglomerates (chaebŏls) grew very
rapidly and pursued a favored relation with the government by providing secret
political money. For this chaebŏl-oriented economic growth, the state created a
specific sociopolitical condition in which the military regime violently repressed
labor in the name of national development, but in effect, in favor of chaebŏls. Kim
Tŏk-Yŏng (2014) argues that the reduction of development solely to economic
growth and, in turn, solely to the growth of chaebŏls, characterize the “reduced
modernity” in South Korea.
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At the socio-political level, the developmental state mobilized the population
and repressed labor in the name of “national survival” and “national security” in the
context of the post-Korean War regime competition against the Communist North
Korea. The paternalist state discourse such as the “modernization of the Fatherland”
articulated collective desire for survival and development.
In the capitalist state project of development, modernity was deemed a socioeconomic reform for material improvement of standard of living (Chirot, 2005). On
the one hand, the developmental regime was repressive in the sense that different
ideas from state ideology for developmental mobilization were not allowed and
suppressed with violent measures in the name of national security against
communists. On the other hand, however, it was also hegemonic in the sense that it
was based on popular desire for the escape from poverty and the raise of standard
of living. This hegemonic project of modernity for development and modernization
depended on the expectation of a “good life,” which was imagined on the basis of
techno-economic rationality. Mahbubani (2013) comments on modernity, defined in
Singaporean context, but also relevant in other East Asian countries:
Modernization means that you want to have a comfortable, middle-class
existence with all the amenities and attributes that go along with it — clean
water, indoor plumbing, electricity, telecommunications, infrastructure,
personal safety, rule of law, stable politics and a good education system
(2013).
In the modern social imaginary of South Koreans, it was impossible to
separate the improvement of economic life with the growth of the national
economy. The developmental state established its role in the “embedded autonomy”
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with society as “fostering economic transformation and guaranteeing minimal level
of welfare” (Evans, 1995, p. 5).
Mignolo (2011) points out that this developmental promise of a good
material life could not reach beyond the middle class due to the colonial restriction
and the lack of necessary relation between the improvement of material life and
modernity. Dirlik (2002) also indicates that “the power of developmentalism lies in
its ever-receding promise that the good life is right around the corner,” but that
promise of modernity is “not likely for the majority” (p. 43). While the promise of
developmentalism is not sustainable, it is also true that its promise of “a good life”
has worked quite effectively as long as it has been carried out on a relatively equal
ground in South Korea until the mid 1990s. The developmental legacy does not lie in
the state institutions themselves, but might remain in the way in which the
population imagined and aspired their good lives mostly in developmental terms of
standards of living.
Economy-centeredness is the dominant trait of South Korea’s modernity. It is
not only the product of development and modernization since the 1960s and has
affected how the population imagined their own lives and the world around them; it
has also formed the basis of the enduring social imaginary among South Koreans
and shaped the basis of the state project of development and facilitated it. Chŏng Subok (2007), for instance, regards “secular materialism” as one of the “fundamental
cultural codes” among Koreans, which regards material wealth “of this world” as
forming basis of a good life (pp. 110-115). Or, social Darwinist idea of taking
extreme competition for survival for granted has been around at least for a century
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in Korea since the late nineteen century (Tikhonov, 2010). In fact, the economycenteredness has been so dominant that it was almost impossible to think a good
life imagined outside the developmental limit. Arguably, alternative voices, which
fundamentally problematized economic growth and development, have been hardly
influential even among the intellectuals, the political left, the civil movement, and
the trade union. The status of a developed and advanced country, defined in terms
of economic growth, has been an obsession among the intellectuals for decades. It
was only recently that alternative voices emerged gained in a substantive way
(which is at least partly examined and discussed in Chapter 6).
Like state-centrism, economic-centrism in Korea might go back to different
historical eras, but it needs here to note that it constituted the core of
developmental modernity, predicated upon material, secular, economic orientations
which have defined the social imaginaries among South Koreans.
Post-developmental transition to neoliberalization
In this section, I follow the way in which a series of state discourses shaped
the post-developmental transformation of the state and the economy since the early
1990s. I have two points to emphasize in this discussion. On the one hand, these
grand state discourses, with the normative imperative of “international
competitiveness” as a dominant discursive frame, facilitated the neoliberal
transformation of the state and the economy. The neoliberal normative imperative
of international competitiveness dominated political discourses and public policies,
facilitating the transformation of the developmental state into the neoliberal
competition state, a competitive entity in the global economy.
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On the other hand, these top-down state visions and discourses were
predicated on, as well as continued and reinforced by, the state-centered and
economy-centered nature of collective national imaginary in South Korea. The
neoliberal rationality of international competitiveness put a new layer on, rather
than replaced, the developmental rationality. The ideas of competition and survival
have been central to collective national imaginary of development. Moreover,
neoliberalization was driven by the state in the language of national interest and
national survival. The continued state-centered and economy-centered nature of
collective national imaginary characterizes the process of neoliberalization in South
Korea.
Neoliberal competition state
The transformation of the South Korean society can be understood as a rapid
transition from a developmental regime to a neoliberal one. By the late 1980s, the
developmental state became ineffective and unsustainable due to great domestic
and international structural changes (H.-y. Cho, 2000). First, the collapse of the
Soviet and the end of the Cold War heralded a new phase of geopolitics. In this
changing geopolitical environment, the United States put pressure on South Korea
to open market for goods and service. Second, the June Uprising and the subsequent
Great Labor Action in the summer of 1987 made it unsustainable to repress labor to
maintain low-wage policy in favor of export-led economic growth. Last, large South
Korean conglomerates began to grow into major global capital and demanded
neoliberal deregulation and market liberalization (H.-y. Cho, 2000; Jessop & Sum,
2006a). The transformation geared toward double movement toward liberation: the
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one from the authoritarian political repression and the other from the state’s tight
grip of the business into a neoliberal “advocacy of free enterprise” (Harvey, 2005, p.
37).
The South Korean national economy, until then firmly nationally bounded
relatively closed except for exportation, began to be reconstructed within this
changing international and domestic setting. The techno-economic master
narratives of globalization and the knowledge-based economy (KBE) provided a
sweeping discursive frame to reconstruct the national economy and reposition the
South Korean state, emphasizing the normative imperative of international
competitiveness (Jessop, 2002, p. 133). It was in this context that successive South
Korean governments from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s presented and
promulgated a series of top-down grand state visions and strategies with slogans
such as “New Korea,” “segyehwa,” “Rebuilding Korea,” “Knowledge-based Nation
(KBN),” “Northeast Asian financial hub country,” and so on. These series of topdown state visions constructed and re-imagined the South Korean economy and
state in the emerging space of globalizing economy.
The Kim Young-sam government (February 1993-February 1998), the first
civilian government in South Korea, proclaimed the grand state vision of segyehwa,
literally meaning “world-ization” (Armstrong, 2007, p. 4). It marked the beginning of
South Korea’s aggressive take on globalization beyond the developmental strategy
of “catching-up.” The state vision of segyehwa defined the global economic
conditions as “limitless competition” (Y.-s. Kim, 1994), which in turn demanded the
bounded national economy to be liberated and exposed to international
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competition. In this discursive frame, the South Korean state repositioned itself as
the facilitator to foster international competitiveness of the national economy. The
narratives of information technology and the “new economy” were also emphasized
as a way for restructuring the national economy to a higher level. The neoliberal
policy measures such market opening, financial liberalization, deregulation and
labor flexibility were widely introduced in the name of meeting the global standard.
The segyehwa drive toward international competitiveness was legitimized as
an imperative to survive, to continue economic growth and to become a “top-tier
advanced nation (illyu seonjin gukga)” in the world (Y.-s. Kim, 1995b). The Kim
Young-sam government pursued the membership of the OECD (Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development) and the 10,000 dollar mark of GNP per
capita as the symbolic evidence of South Korea’s “top-tier advanced” status.16
As the progress of political democracy and the confidence in economic
growth created national optimism, the segyehwa discourse aimed to orient “all
aspects of national life” toward globalization (G.-W. Shin, 2006, p. 212). It urged
Korean people to be “a Korean in the world” and to live up to the “global standard”
by paying attention to world affairs, looking for travel abroad, and engaging in
computer skills and intensive English learning (Y.-c. ŏ. Kim, 1999, p. 30).

In fact, the pursuit of the OECD membership and the mark of 10,000 dollar
of GNP-per-capita contributed to the financial crisis in 1997. The Kim Young-sam
government hastened to abolish the Economic Planning Board, the headquarter of
developmental planning, in order to facilitate the gaining the OECD membership
within his presidential term. The government also tried to maintain the exchange
rate at a higher level to adjust the 10,000 dollar mark.
16
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The financial meltdown in November of 1997 made a deep impact to every
corner of the Korean society. The financial crisis and the intervention by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) overdetermined the conservative-neoliberal
transformation ventured in the mid 1990s. The crisis constituted a critical
conjuncture in which the existing ideas of the nation-state and the national economy
were put into serious question and a fundamental transformation of the Korean
economy and society was demanded. The IMF intervention marked a turning point
where the drive toward neoliberalization was unidirectionally pushed as social
resistances against neoliberal reform, especially by labor, were effectively muted.
The Kim Dae-jung government (February 1998-February 2003), newly
elected in the aftermath of the crisis, launched the “Rebuilding Korea” campaign
(제 2 의 건국운동)17 and drove a nationwide reform of the state, economy and
society. Kim Dae-jung, known to be an advocate for fair market competition, tried to
balance economic growth and the provision of “productive welfare.” He declared the
“parallel development of democracy and the market economy” as the governing
principle (D.-j. Kim, 1998, p. 13). However, demanded by the IMF as a condition for
the relief bailout loan as well as by neoliberal bureaucracy and the domestic big
business sector, the actual policy orientations and implementations were geared
toward the neoliberal direction, in favor of establishing market principle. In fact, the
extensive neoliberal reform programs, so called the “IMF plus package,” were
inserted by the neoliberal force in Korea rather than one-sidedly imposed upon by
Literally, it can be translated into English as the “Second Nation-Building
Movement.”
17
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the IMF and the US government, the package which included the complete opening
of financial market to foreign investors, the accelerated liberalization of the trade of
goods and services, the privatization of public enterprises, and the labor market
reform by introducing flexible layoffs and labor dispatching (Chi, 2007, p. 8). In
other words, the radical neoliberal reform was chosen and aggressively sought after
rather than simply imposed on (C.-j. Ch’oe, 2006, p. 138).
The post-crisis reform towards neoliberalization was driven in the name of
establishing global standards and enhancing international competitiveness, which
were deemed essential to overcome the crisis and to accomplish the ultimate goal of
getting into the rank of “world’s first rate nation” (C. Sŏ & Kim, 2013, pp. 168-170).
As a way of enhancing international competitiveness, the Kim Dae-jung
government pushed technology-related policy, including IT policy and cultural
policy for the post-crisis economic boost for the next developmental step of the
national economy. The Kim government declared the vision of the “knowledgebased nation” as a state program for “Rebuilding Korea.” Kim presented it as
“transforming the industrial nation which is based on materials into the knowledgebased nation which is based on creative knowledge and information” (D.-j. Kim,
1998, p. 422). It was a statist version modified from the “knowledge-based
economy,” the vision of which was recommended as a new engine for economic
growth and transformation by various transnational organizations including the
World Bank, the UNESCO and the OECD (S.-t. Hong, 1999, p. 33; P.-j. Kim, 2007, p.
266).
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The subsequent liberal Roh Mu-hyun government (February 2003-February
2008) brought the project of the “Northeast Asian economic hub country” into the
central state reform agenda. The Roh government defined the international reality
of South Korean economy as a “nutcracker situation” between superpowers and
proposed the project as a future economic growth engine. While the state project of
the Northeast Asian economic hub country caught up with the geo-economic trend
of the regional integration of the national economy and put in mind the geo-political
issue of North-South Korean relations, it implied the deepening of the full-scale
market-oriented reform and financial liberation of the South Korean society and
economy (K.-K. Lee, 2004; Woo-Cumings, 2003). In the same vein, the Roh
government also pushed the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, among others, under
the pretext of enhancing international competitive capacity of South Korea by
exposing financial and service sectors to advanced competitors and securing the US
market for industrial products such as automobiles and mobile phones (C. Sŏ & Kim,
2013, pp. 171-172).
The subsequent conservative Lee Myung-bak government (February 2008January 2013) drove the full-scale neoliberalization without reserve. With the
catchphrase of “Global Korea,” the “corporate state” of the Lee government took
aggressive, pro-business moves in the name of achieving the status of an “first-rate
advanced country” (Kalinowski & Cho, 2012, p. 246; T.-c. u. Kim, 2010, p. 263). The
public policies discourses under the Lee government, which set the backdrop for the
discursive and institutional practices of nation branding and national prestige
(NBNP), will be closely examined in the subsequent chapters.
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Continuity and change
Through the examination of the state discourses and visions from the early
1990s to the 2000s, we can identify several points that could give insight to the
discussion of NBNP in the following chapters. I highlight these points especially
focusing on the historical continuity and change in terms of social imaginaries of the
state and the economy.
First of all, the grand state visions and the policy frameworks from “New
Korea” to the “Global Korea” declared by the consecutive governments commonly
showed neoliberal orientation. To different degrees, they drove the neoliberal
policies such as market opening, financial liberalization, privatization of public
goods, labor flexibility, and deregulation of business. These policies transformed
South Korean society into a neoliberal one in quite a short period. The whole
societal area was reorganized toward a “corporate society” (T.-c. u. Kim, 2010),
dominated by the principle of market competition. This does not mean, however,
that the “developmental legacy” was cleared away and “fair” principle of market
competition was established in South Korea. Rather, the neoliberal principle of
market and competition was superimposed on the existing customs and practices
such as bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, cronyism, excessive governmental
regulation, collusive links between politics and business and so on. This
combination resulted in an unprecedented gap between the rich and the poor,
widening rent-seeking practices among the rich, and precarious life conditions for
the poor.
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Second, it was the post-developmental state that led the process of the rapid
neoliberal transformation, accelerating the incorporation of South Korea into the
global financial order. The “neoliberal competition state” repositioned itself as an
agency to drive the neoliberal reform of the whole society (K.-i. Yi, 2008). In fact, the
rapid neoliberal transition was enabled by the powerful, often top-down and
authoritarian, initiatives by the state with developmental legacy. We can identify the
continuity from the developmental, strategic competition state to the neoliberal
competition state (Cerny, 1997). The South Korean developmental state was already
closely tied to the world capitalist regime with the outward export-oriented project
of economic development. Without any alternative political forces, it is not allowed
to imagine the South Korean state breaking from “path dependency” (K.-i. Yi, 2008,
p. 38).
While the developmental state itself was dissolved in the 1990s and
transformed into the state orienting toward market integration into global economy,
the state remains central to social imaginary in South Korea. Political scientist Ch’oe
Chang-jip (2006) emphasizes the continuity of the state form during the liberal
transition:
It seems that democratization in Korea did not bring about a change in the
perception or attitude of the Korean people as well as the structure and the
operation of the state. In other words, a high degree of continuity has been
maintained in relation to the nature of the state. The notion that there is little
change in the perception and attitude among the citizens means that even
after the democratization, strong state-centered attitudes and values and
statism-nationalism still remains the dominant ideals. The result is that the
state that exercises widespread influence over society through its welldeveloped bureaucratic administration system remains under democracy
(my own translation pp. 99-100).
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Third, we can also understand the rapid neoliberal transformation in terms
of the effectiveness of the normative principle of international competitiveness,
which emerged as a dominant discursive framework. The neoliberal discourse of
international competitiveness dominated political discourse and state public policy,
constructing the state as a competitive entity within the neoliberal global order.
While the “aggressive” version of international competitiveness continued
throughout the grand state visions, the “attractive” one gradually developed
alongside, facilitating the imagining of the state as a competitive entity, as the
manager of territorial assets of national economy for the global economy. While
supporting export-led economic growth represents the international
competitiveness in the former take, successful attraction of transnational capital
investment represents the priority of the state.
Fourth, the imagery of the economy became more central not just to the
function of the state but also to all aspects of life. In that sense, economy-centrism
became more dominant feature of social imaginary in neoliberal South Korea.
National security became less significant as a national task as the developmental
difference between North and South became too wide to compare; instead, national
economic growth was reinforced as the supreme national task especially in the
context of globalizing world economy. In relation to collective economic life, it is
notable that the neoliberal transition toward international competitiveness was
driven in the languages of the nation such as national interest, national survival,
enhancing national capacity, national reform, reinforcing national competitiveness,
and so on. In this discursive frame of geography, the global economy was imagined
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from the national economic perspective. For instance, segyehwa was imagined as the
advance of Korean firms and Koreans into the world, and the FTAs were promoted
in the geographical imagination of the “expansion of economic territories” of the
nation (C. Sŏ & Kim, 2013, p. 174). We can identify the continuity from the
developmental discourse in the sense that the neoliberal emphasis on international
competitiveness was imagined with the imagery of national economy at the center.
Further, the imagination of the prospect of South Korea as a “first-rate, advanced
country” has underlay the series of grand state visions. The status of an advanced
country has been idealized and imagined as an ultimate collective goal of the nation.
Fifth, the goal of becoming an advanced country has been predicated on
technological discourses such as information and knowledge economy. In the state
discourses, technological advancement in ICT, automobile, and so on dominated the
imagination of the present and future nation. Technological advancement was
regarded as crucial for a techno-economic leap forward beyond the developmental
catching-up. The growth and expansion of national economy became dominated by
techno-economic imagination, predicated on the techno-centric idea of linear
development and progress.
Last, the imagination of a technologically advanced, international competitive
country is bound by the Western-oriented modernity. The normative imperative of
international competitiveness urged the acceptance of global norms and standards,
which were in practice set on the basis of the Western criteria. The Western
perspective in effect dominates the assessment of international competitiveness and
national capacities.
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Post-developmental social imaginaries in Western-oriented modernity
In the discussion of this section so far, I examined how South Korean
modernity has formed with the state and the economy at the center of the social
imaginaries in the discourse and program of modernization and development. This
“developmental modernity” seems to constitute a dominant social imaginary in
South Korea even after the official demolition of the developmental state in the late
1990s. Thus, any post-developmental social imaginary is necessarily engaged with
developmental modernity.
State-centrism and economic-centrism, which are crucial to developmental
modernity, are still central to social imaginary among South Koreans. They are also
key elements in the questions and debates about the current status and future
direction of South Korean modernity in the twenty-first century. To put it in a
simplified way, we can identify two contrasting positions concerning South Korean
modernity.
The first one affirms the modern development of South Korea especially in
terms of its economic accomplishment. From this position, modern Korea in the
second half of the twentieth century has marched successfully toward the universal
progress of human civilization, characterized by market capitalism, democratic
institutions, and individualism (Y.-h. Yi, 2007). This position, represented by the
South Korean “New Right,”18 diagnoses that South Korea successfully achieved
industrialization as well as democratization (with the emphasis on the former), and

In the mid 2000s, they emerged as a powerful voice in the public sphere,
shaping conservative public agenda for the Lee Myung-bak government.
18
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proposes that the next task is “advancedness” (sŏnjinhwa 선진화, which literally
means being/making advanced) (S.-i. Pak, 2006), the last stage of the universal
model of modernity. They contend that the urgent task for South Korea is to widely
reform political systems and institutions, and social and cultural customs, which
were deemed “backward” and not in sync with the advanced business world, and
thus, standing in the way to economic growth and sŏnjinhwa. In sum, this position
continues the developmental narrative of economic growth with “ever-receding”
promise of improvement. This position represents the politics of the so-called
“industrialization generation” who went through rapid economic growth in the
1960s to 1980s.
The second position regards South Korean modernity as “distorted” and
falling short of the universal standard. This position acknowledges past economic
growth but criticizes state-centrism and economic-centrism and the consequential
state-conglomerates alliance, which is deemed to have made South Korea deviate
from the “normal” course of modernity and stand in the way to sŏnjinhwa and “true”
modernity. State-centrism and collectivism have organized the whole life around the
state, and deterred individualism and social differentiation, the organizing
principles of modernity (T.-y. Kim, 2016, p. 15). Economy-centrism has reduced
modernization to economic growth, and the whole life to abstract economic indices
(T.-y. Kim, 2016, pp. 138-144), resulting in South Korea’s “reduced modernity” (T.-y.
Kim, 2014). To achieve the status of true modernity, this position contends, South
Korea needs to improve in terms of “universal values” such as individualism, human
rights, equality, democracy, environment and ecology, and so on (T.-y. Kim, 2016, p.
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211). This position is widely shared by the “democratization generation,” younger
than the “industrialization generation,” who observed and experienced the widening
of democracy and individual freedom since the 1990s.
In real politics, these two positions are in stark antagonism to each other,
especially on the historical and current issues such as the authoritarian regime and
the big capital (chaebŏl) system. It is obvious that while the first position is
business-oriented, the second prioritizes welfare, equality, and democracy. Despite
this obvious antagonism, we can identify a convergence between them concerning
the past, present, and future of South Korea. First, both acknowledge South Korea’s
remarkable economic development in the past. Second, they evaluate the current
status of South Korea as falling short of the desired level of modernity. Last, most
importantly, both positions aspire to South Korea’s attaining of an “advanced” status
in terms of “universal” values of modernity although they appreciate different
aspects of the universal. More generally, both positions implicitly and explicitly
imagine the West as the universal model of modernity.
At this point, one is reminded how the discourse and program of
modernization and development were predicated on the Western ideal. Thus, in
addition to state-centeredness and economy-centeredness, we need to consider the
Western-oriented nature of South Korean modernity. The idea of “compressed
modernization” (Chang, 1999), which describes the historical formation of
modernity in South Korea, epitomizes not just the speed at which it achieved
economic development, but the way in which it attempted to “catch up” “advanced”
or “developed” Western countries. Further, it implies that the West has become the
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normative standard of modernization and development for South Korea through
sped-up imitations and adaptations.
Notably, in the Western orientation of South Korean modernity, cultural and
social aspects, rather than political and economic aspects, have gotten increasingly
prominent across different positions. Although the two positions emphasize
different social and cultural aspects, they commonly emphasize such social and
cultural aspects as civility, manners, public behaviors, “global citizenship,” and so
on, the reference of which usually comes from the comparison between the
idealized West and South Korea. In this context, the idea of a “culture-advanced
country” (munhwa sŏnjinguk 문화선진국) has emerged as a vision of modernity in
South Korea. Now it is culture that is regarded as an indicator of modernity and
civilization and being advanced as a nation and in the international rank of
advanced countries.
It is in this context of the rise of the vision of a “culture-advanced nation” in
which the discursive and institutional practices of NBNP emerged in the early
2000s. It is in terms of the nation brand and national prestige that a cultureadvanced country as a truly advanced, modern country is specifically presented and
imagined beyond the status of an economically-advanced country.
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CHAPTER 4
THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE RISE OF THE DISCOURSES OF NATION BRANDING
AND NATIONAL PRESTIGE
In this chapter, I examine how nation branding has emerged as a dominant
political discourse in South Korea during the first decade of the 2000s. In the midst
of the rising concern about the international status and national image among the
news media and political elites, nation branding became an essential part of the
major political vision for state management. The Lee Myung-bak government (20082012) set up the Presidential Council for Nation Branding (PCNB) in January 2009
and instituted the idea of nation branding as the key public policy agenda. Indeed,
the idea of nation branding became a discursive framework, in reference to which
the implementation of other key public policies was justified and legitimized.
Beyond the official public policy discourse, the talks of nation branding, in
combination with a neologism “national prestige,” became a staple vocabulary in the
news media as well as in the popular political discussion on a wide variety of
political, social and cultural issues in South Korea.
The emergence of nation branding and national prestige into the policy
discourse did not happen within a vacuum. In this chapter, I examine the rise of
nation branding and national prestige (NBNP) in a larger discursive and
institutional context in which the imperative of political, economic, social and
cultural reforms have been increasingly cast in light of enhancing the nation brand
and national prestige. In the course, the emerging discourses of NBNP imbued a new
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way of imagining the state and the nation from a business standpoint as a
competitive entity in the global economy.
I especially attend to the institutional and discursive role played by the
mainstream national news media, along with domestic public and private think
tanks, in importing and disseminating the idea of nation branding since the early
2000s. The examination of the news media highlights the discursive and
institutional formation of NBNP prior to the official institution of government public
policy in the late 2000s, and better illustrates the wider discursive and institutional
terrain in which multiple actors were involved, often in contesting ways, in the
reconfiguration of the state and the nation in South Korea.
My focus on the role played by the domestic news media addresses the
ongoing academic discussions and debates in terms of the agencies of nation
branding.
First, the existing critical literature has greatly focused on the agency of
transnational branding consultants in the proliferation of the discourses and
techniques of nation branding. (Aronczyk, 2008b; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). For
instance, the idea of the “transnational promotional class” highlights the role played
by diverse transnational experts and professionals in marketing, branding, and
advertising whose profit-seeking interests have been driving the boom of nation
branding around the world (Aronczyk, 2013, p. 38). While the presence of
transnational consultants has been apparent in the practices of nation branding, the
agencies of diverse domestic actors, including the news media, have played a critical
role in disseminating and establishing the discourses and institutions of nation
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branding in South Korea. The chapter aims to keep track of the domestic actors,
especially the news media, which played a critical role as agencies of nation
branding and to examine the domestic dynamics of the political economy and the
cultural politics of nation branding.
Second, I especially focus on the distinctive role played by the news media as
a crucial actor for the promotion of nation branding in discursive as well as
institutional terms. While the media has been the natural focus in many critical
researches on nation branding, it was treated in a rather simple way as an outlet of
symbols, discourses, and representations. It was only recently that the critical
literature has taken notice of the multiple aspects of the role played by the media
(Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Kaneva, 2016). This literature suggests that the agency of
the media should be addressed in terms of financial, material, and technological as
well as symbolic circulation.
Situated in the academic context, this chapter examines the agency of the
news media in establishing nation branding in two distinctive aspects.
First, I examine how the idea of nation branding was imported and
domesticated in the early 2000s, by keeping track of diverse actors and their
institutional and discursive practices. With the rising concern about the
international status and image of the nation, the news media introduced and
mediated the idea of nation branding among political and business elites. They set
nation branding at the center of public policy agenda, relying on the authority of
Western experts and working with domestic think tanks and governmental
agencies. The idea of nation branding grew out of a marketing concept into a
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political discourse on the state with larger implications along with related terms
such as soft power, public diplomacy, the attractive nation, and the advanced
country. The news media especially contributed to the political visibility of the idea
of nation branding as they translated it into “nation prestige.”
Here, the use of the term “agenda setting” is rather descriptive than analytic
although the examination of the role played by the news media in the institutional
and discursive formation of nation branding and national prestige is partly informed
by the theory of agenda setting in mass media (those of agenda building and policy
agenda setting for that matter, Rogers & Dearing, 1988). Agenda setting theory
refers to “the creation of public awareness and concern of salient issues by the news
media” (Kleinnijenhuis & Rietberg, 1995). In the sense that the theory emphasizes
how the media shapes the perceptions on public issues, this chapter shares the core
assumptions underlying agenda setting theory of agenda.
However, it does not aim to apply agenda setting theory, that is to test the
media effects by examining the correlation between the salience of agenda in the
news media reports and the perceptions among publics or voters (agenda setting
theory) or among public policy makers (policy agenda setting theory). Rather, this
chapter attempts to explore a wider formation in a historical context, focusing on
the agency of the news media in institutional, political economic and discursive
terms. Thus, this chapter focuses on how the news media institutions mediated
various actors such as transnational consultants, governmental and private research
institutes, and politicians and facilitated the circulation of emerging discourses of
nation branding and national prestige among elites.
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Second, following the examination of the institutional role by the news
media, I analyze how the media discourses of nation branding and national prestige
form a particular social imaginary of the state, the economy, and the nation. I
especially attend to the historicized form of narratives of the past, the present, and
the future of the nation (C.-i. Kang & Sŭng-hyŏn, 2011; Wyatt, 2005a, 2005b). The
news media narratives problematized the nation brand deficit in economic terms,
and presented the state-wide reform for enhancing the nation brand and national
prestige as a solution to continuing economic growth. While evoking collective
discontent and anxiety about the weak international status, the news media
discourses brought up as nation branding resources the national pride in the rapid
economic growth and the transnational popularity of Korean popular culture. I
examine how the historicized narratives of the nation directed toward a particular
re-imagination of the nation as standing at the threshold of entering the ranks of
first-class, “advanced” countries, competing on the world stage.
Based on the examinations of the process and narratives of nation branding,
the chapter concludes with the discussions of the nature and implications of the
news media’s drive for NBNP. The campaigns attempted not just to align the state as
a neoliberal manager of the national economy, but to mobilize the national citizen as
responsible for enhancing the nation brand. The news media campaigns for NBNP,
setting the ultimate national goal of entering the rank of the advanced countries,
constantly evoked the international framework of comparison and imposed the
Western measures of global standards on the behavior of citizens in terms of culture
and civility.
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Before entering the main subject, it is necessary to situate the South Korean
news media within the historical context. The South Korean news media became
liberated from the tight control by the state after the 1987 Great Democratic
Struggle. Since the 1990s, the direct involvement in the news media has been greatly
reduced; conversely, the major news media has increased their influence on the
political process and the formation of public opinion. In particular, the three major
conservative newspapers (Chosŏn Ilbo, Chung’ang Ilbo, and Tong’a Ilbo —
collectively called “Cho-Chung-Tong”) have increasingly exercised great power.
Despite the increasing influence of broadcasting media,19 the three conservative
newspapers have exercised excessive political power. Compared to “Cho-ChungTong,” the influence of liberal-progressive newspapers — Hangyŏre, Kyŏnghyang
Sinmun, and others — has been minuscule.
The power of “Cho-Chung-Tong” comes from their close networks and
relations with large conglomerates (chaebŏls) and the conservative political party.
Chung’ang Ilbo used to be an affiliation of the Samsung Group, the largest
conglomerate, and became formally separated by clearing the equity relationship in
1999. However, it is no denying their close relationship, tied through marriage (C.
Kim, 2016). Chosŏn Ilbo and Tong’a Ilbo, family-owned newspaper companies,
formally independent from the state and large capital, have been strengthening their

For the news broadcasting media, major players had been two major
public broadcasters (KBS and MBC), one commercial broadcaster (SBS, established
in 1990), and one cable news broadcaster (YTN, established in 1995). Four general
programming broadcasters newly opened in 2011, which were licensed to the three
conservative newspapers (“Cho-Chung-Tong”) and one economic newspaper (Maeil
Kyŏngje).
19
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ties with conservative politicians and chaebŏls through marriage and human
networking (Y.-i. Kim, 2005). “Cho-Chung-Tong” have shared conservative political
interests as many of their senior journalists entered politics through the
conservative parties (M.-J. Park, Kim, & Sohn, 2000, p. 101). Economic newspapers
have either been owned by the chaebol coalition (in case of Han’guk Kyŏngje) or
have exclusively defended the interests of large corporations. In this regard, the
conservative news media have been the actual player in the political power process.
They were in fierce conflict with the liberal governments (the Kim and Roh
governments) and put efforts to support the conservative presidential candidate in
the presidential election in December 2007. The conservative news media are
considered to have played a crucial role of “making” conservative presidents (M.-J.
Park et al., 2000, p. 101) in the next two elections.
From a broader historical perspective, the news media have played an
important role in the imagination and the formation of the nation-state through
deploying public campaigns for enlightenment and education. Going back to the
early 20th century, Taehan Maeil Sinbo (1904) participated in the Patriotic
Enlightenment Movement by organizing the National Debt Redemption Movement
(C.-m. Kang, 2019; M.-g. Kang, 2013). After the liberation, the public enlightenment
campaigns for development and modernization continued to be considered part of
the inherent role of the media. An exemplary case is the Gold Collection Movement
led by KBS in January-March 1998 in the aftermath of the financial crisis ("The IMF
Economic Crisis and Gold Collection Movement," 2017). In this historical context, it

117

is a common practice for the news media to take lead in the public campaign to
enlighten and mobilize publics.

South Korea’s struggle for international recognition
Throughout modern history, South Koreans have been conscious about
gaining international recognition. However, gaining international recognition has
been a long shot for South Korea, which remained occupied by Japan for the first
half of the twentieth century and best known for a long time for the Korean War in
the early 1950s.
It was only recently that South Korea started to carry out effective policy
actions in terms of international recognition. Until the 1980s, South Korea had been
a relatively unknown, closed, and isolated country from the world, except for its
high level of dependence for economic growth on international trade with the US
(export) and Japan (import). South Korea had been known to the world for its
negative images associated with the Korean War, the division of the nation, the
image of poverty, and the military dictatorship.
The Olympic Games in Seoul in the summer of 1988 marked a crucial turning
point at which South Korea asserted its international presence as a newly
industrializing and democratizing country. The Olympics indeed marked a “coming
out party” (Bridges, 2008; Manheim, 1990) for South Korea in which it took a
chance on the enhancement of its international status. Subsequently after the
Olympics, South Korea (the Republic of Korea) was admitted to the United Nations
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simultaneously with North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) in
1991, and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet and China.
The news media emphasized the Olympics not just as a celebration of
economic accomplishment and democratization, but an international breakthrough
in terms of national image. One newspaper column valued the successful hosting of
the Olympics in diplomatic terms in which South Korea dusted off the image of an
“unstable, divided country” and “war-torn, poor country” (S.-h. Hong, 1999).
Another newspaper article summarized the economic benefits of the Seoul Olympic
Games such as rising investment, employment, tourism and so on, and emphasized
its long-term effect of producing the image of a “capable country” (Paek, 1996).
The public concern about the international image and status of the country
increased throughout the 1990s. The official state visions such as the “New Korea”
and segeyhwa (Korea’s take on globalization), declared by the Kim Young-sam
government in 1993-1994, were predicated on the national awareness and
aspiration for the nation’s presence on the international stage. Since the mid 1990s,
improving “national image” (kukka imiji 국가이미지) began to be put on the list of
public policy agenda and regarded as a crucial part in enhancing national
competitiveness to the level of the “advanced, first-class country” which since has
become an underlying priority for the public policy in South Korea.
Indebted to the economic boom for a decade, South Korea gained a
membership in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
in 1996, which was widely known in South Korea as a “club among world’s most
advanced countries” (Ŭ.-s. Kim, 1996). This development was widely regarded as
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South Korea’s entering the rank of “advanced, first-class countries” in the world, and
an optimistic and euphoric mood dominated South Korea.
However, a hurried market opening and liberalization which the government
aggressively drove with the purpose of gaining the OECD membership led to a
disastrous financial crisis. The Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 was perceived as
a “national disgrace” that ruined national confidence and pride built on past
economic development (I.-s. Kim, 1997). Indeed, Koreans regarded the bailout by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the loss of economic sovereignty,
equivalent to “Kyŏngsul Kukch’i” (1910 national disgrace) in 1910 when Korea lost
its sovereignty to Japan.
The subsequent Kim Dae-jung government called for harnessing the drive for
enhancing national competitiveness to overcome the national crisis and regain
international status. The 2002 FIFA World Cup, co-hosted by South Korea and Japan,
was regarded as a chance to enhance the international status and national image of
the country just as the 1988 Olympic Games were presumed to have done. The
successful co-hosting of the event and especially the showing of South Koreans’
passionate street cheering were regarded as giving a positive impression to the
world that South Korea was a young, dynamic, and successful country (cf. Jeon &
Yoon, 2004; Joo, 2006; H. Lee & Cho, 2009).
Besides the co-hosting of the World Cup, in the early 2000s, there emerged a
couple of stories of global breakthrough achieved by South Korea: the international
market success of the export of South Korea-originated high-value products such as
Hyundai vehicles and Samsung mobile phones and the growing popularity of South
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Korean popular culture throughout East Asia, the so called “Korean Wave.” Put
together, these moments were constructed as contributing to gaining global status
and competitiveness of South Korea. In the following, I will show how the news
media called for a heightened drive for enhancing national image and the national
brand of South Korea.
The rise of nation branding
Nation branding as a Western-originated idea
In this historical context, the idea of nation branding emerged as a major
political discourse and a public policy agenda since the early 2000s. The South
Korean news media brought up the issue of nation branding by referring to globally
circulating knowledge and expertise. The first talk of nation branding in South Korea
came with the names of Western experts. These Western experts played a crucial
role in getting the idea of nation branding introduced both in public discourse and in
the actual process of public policy in South Korea.
In 2001-2002, a few news media introduced Peter van Ham’s article, “The
rise of the brand state,” published in Foreign Affairs, and brought attention to the
issues of nation branding and national image. Han’guk Ilbo, a national newspaper, in
two editorial pieces, paid attention to the significance of national image and symbols
and their political management (S.-j. Kim, 2001; S.-h. Yi, 2001). A newly established
internet news press, Pŭresian (Pressian), published an abridged translation of van
Ham’s article, and emphasized the nation brand as crucial on the way to the rank of
the advanced countries (S.-s. Yi, 2002).
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In the same year, Maeil Kyŏngje (Maeil Business Newspaper) invited Philip
Kotler to South Korea, widely praised as the “father of marketing” in the business
management circle. Marketing consultant and professor of the Kellogg School of
Management at Northwestern University, Kotler preached cutting-edge business
techniques such as customer relationship management (CRM) and the importance
of branding elements such as names, logos and slogans. Although his speech did not
necessarily focus on nation branding, the newspaper highlighted the part of his
speech in which he mentioned the importance of building Korea-originated global
brands (C.-h. Kim, 2001).
Another Western figure central to the promotion of the idea of nation
branding was Guy Sorman. Having passed as an expert on Korea, this French
intellectual has published books, written columns on South Korea, and frequently
visited South Korea since the early 1990s. Invited to an international symposium
held by the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) in 2000, which represented the
big business interest in South Korea, he emphasized the utility of culture for
enhancing the brand of Korean exports. In his speech, he urged the South Korean
government and business to build a strong national cultural image to secure
international competitiveness in the world market (C.-k. Yun, 2000).
Arguably, the most significant figure was Simon Anholt, who influenced the
development of nation branding in the transnational circuit as well as in South
Korea. British brand consultant and author of Brand New Justice (2003), Anholt was
credited for the coinage of the term nation branding. He caught instant attention in
South Korea with the first publication of Nation Brands Index (NBI) in 2005.
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Presented as a way to measure and rank the image and reputation of countries,
Anholt’s NBI was widely reported across the news media, which made a fuss about
the low rank and weak “nation brand power” of South Korea (ninth out of eleven
countries in the first quarter report, and twentieth out of twenty-five in the second
quarter report) (Kong, 2005; O, 2005).
The publications presented a full-fledged idea of nation branding in the form
of index and ranking, measured by “scientific” data collection and analysis. These
publications were notable by their emphasis not just on the importance of national
image, but their assumption that the nation brand and nation image were
measurable by Western expert knowledge and the implications that they were
manageable by policy intervention.
These Western figures frequently visited South Korea as evangelists
advocating for the need for nation branding. Some of them, as well as branding
consulting firms such as Interbrand, got involved in the public policy process related
to nation branding and beyond.20
Thus, we can understand the development of nation branding in South Korea
as the process in which the news media mobilized the authority of Western
transnational brand consultants in scientific and rationalized knowledge and
expertise on nation branding. The news media’s attention to Anholt’s NBI could
illuminate their utilization of Western authority in promoting nation branding. In
fact, a similar nation branding report, with similar “scientific” methods and ranked
Commissioned by the Korea Tourism Organization, Simon Anholt devised a
tourism brand campaign, “Sparkling Korea” in 2006, which turned out to be a huge
failure.
20
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representation, was published by a domestic institution as early as 2002, but did not
attract as much attention by the media as Anholt’s NBI.
Domestic think tanks and nation branding
While the Western experts propagated the idea of nation branding, it was
multiple domestic agents which actively promoted it in South Korea, including
public policy think tanks and the news media. These agencies actively imported and
successfully domesticated the Western-originated idea of nation branding.
One of the first domestic agencies to promote nation branding was the
Institute for Industrial Policy Studies (IPS). As a public policy think tank affiliated
with the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MoCIE) (reorganized to the
Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) in 2008), it had been working to develop the
idea of the international competitiveness of the nation and business. Since 1999, it
has published “The National Competitiveness Report,” based on a worldwide survey.
It was advertised as comprehensive and prestigious as the IMD’s and the WEF’s
reports on international competitiveness. Since 2002, the IPS has extended its
research to cover nation branding by publishing its calculation of the “national
brand value (NBV).” This calculation expanded the previous “national
competitiveness” by taking into consideration additional intangible factors such as
“national image” and “national brand strategy.” Based on this calculation, the IPS
reported that South Korea ranked ninth among sixteen countries surveyed. IPS
avidly promoted the idea of nation branding and their own brand of nation branding
report: the IPS held the annual Korea Brand Conference since 2002 and Cho Tongsŏng, the IPS director and dean of the Business School at Seoul National University,
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contributed to various news media, trying to propagate the idea of nation branding
and their own calculation of NBV (T.-s. Cho, 2002a, 2002b; M.-k. Chŏng, 2002).
Subsequently, a number of private think tanks, university research institutes,
government agencies, and the national news media worked together to host a series
of events and to publish policy reports related to nation branding. For instance, the
Hyundai Research Institute (HRI), affiliated with the Hyundai conglomerate,
published a series of reports on national image and nation branding (Hyundai
Economic Research Institute, 2002, 2006), in which the HRI especially argued for
the nation branding campaign driven by the public rather than the government. The
National Brand Management Institute at Sungkyunkwan University, commissioned
by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), published a report on nation
branding in 2003 (“Strategies for the Enhancement of the Nation Brand Value
through Culture”). Based on a worldwide survey, the report measured the national
image of South Korea in the world and suggested culture-inspired public policies
(National Brand Management Institute, 2003). Korea Trade-Investment Promotion
Agency (KOTRA), also affiliated with the MoCIE, established the Center for Nation
Brand Management in 2006. It composed the “Korea Brand Map” to locate the
Korea’s brand image and launched the campaign of “Premium Korea” (H.-j. Yi,
2007).
These agencies greatly contributed to the domestication of the idea of nation
branding. However, the influences of their activities were limited as their circulation
was mostly limited to business newspapers and expert circles. A wider circulation of
the idea of nation branding was indebted to NBI by Simon Anholt rather than NBV
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by the IPS, although both claimed their production of expert knowledge through
neutral and scientific methods. As discussed above, the differentiated influence
could be due to the intellectual authority ascribed to the Western expertise.
The news media and the discourse of nation branding
Since 2005, the idea of nation branding has rapidly proliferated through the
concerted engagement by government institutions and agencies, the news media,
and private think tanks. In the face of impending presidential election in 2007, the
news media and think tanks attempted to increase their political influences by
presenting grand political visions and “state management strategies,” in which
nation branding emerged as a crucial agenda. The term nation branding began to
earn a wider public appeal beyond the expert circle and business newspapers.
Although nation branding drew a certain interest from the incumbent government,
it was prepared as the national agenda for the next government, which was
expected to be conservative, by the conservative news media and think tanks.
The national mainstream news media actively promoted the discourse of
nation branding, set forth by Western experts and domestic think tanks. The news
media widely reported the nation branding publication by Simon Anholt and
supported the promotion of nation branding with op-eds. The nation branding
promotion by the news media far exceeded the conventional media activities such
as publishing news reports and op-ed columns. The mainstream national news
media across the political spectrum published a long-term series of reports and
analyses related to nation branding. Many of them launched nation branding-related
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public campaigns, working closely with government agencies and private actors
engaged in the business of nation branding.
Through these all-out efforts for setting nation branding as a public agenda,
the news media greatly expanded and popularized the idea. Before examining the
narrative of nation branding, I attend to the institutional agency of the news media
in popularizing the idea of nation branding. Nation branding, a rather technical
jargon in marketing, enriched its meanings in relation to existing and emerging
political ideas on the state and nation. In the course of the news media campaigns
and events, nation branding became variously associated with other related ideas
such as the “attractive nation” and “soft power,” translated into a more intuitive
neologism, “national prestige,” and connected to a renewed image of an “advanced
nation.”
Attractiveness and soft power
With the rising concern about the international image and status of the
nation, the news media and think tanks suggested various concepts to articulate the
public concern.
Most notably, the Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) published a
public policy report, “Attractive Korea: Strategy for Entering the Rank of 10 Most
Advanced Countries by 2015” (Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2005a). The
SERI, affiliated with the largest conglomerate in South Korea, Samsung Group, has
been the most influential private think tank. The SERI played a major part in the
institutional establishment of nation branding at the governmental level, when it
was involved in the launch of PCNB in January 2009 under the Lee Myung-bak
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government. Especially, the SERI took the responsibility of devising a new nation
brand index, aiming to replace the NBI by Anholt.
The 2005 report continued the SERI’s ongoing efforts to articulate the grand
state vision and state management strategies, emphasizing international
competitiveness from a business-centered perspective.21 The report continued to
emphasize innovation and knowledge, human capital, market environment and
openness to “upgrade the system.” The report simply adopted the term of
“attractiveness” to replace the former slogan for the state vision, “GNP per capita of
twenty thousand dollars,” and repackaged the market-friendly plan for state
management oriented toward international competitiveness. The notion of
“attractiveness” that the report suggested originated from the business idiom as in
“investment attractiveness” or “competitiveness to attract foreign direct
investment” (Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2003); thus, it focused less on
the issue of national image than capital investment. Regardless, the idea of
“attractive Korea” became a buzzword within the public policy circle and widely
circulated by the news media (Son, 2006).

Since the late 1990s, SERI has published a series of comprehensive public
policy reports on the matters of “state management,” including “State Strategy and
Reform Agenda in the 21st Century” (1998), “Realities and Policy Methods of
National Competitiveness” (2002), “Agenda for State Affairs and State Management”
(2003), and “The Road to Twenty Thousand Dollars of GNP per Capita” (2004).
These massive and comprehensive policy reports contributed to placing the concept
of “national competitiveness” at the center of the state vision and put forward
keywords such as “business-friendly country,” “growth engine,” “innovative
capacities,” “selection and focus,” “competition and openness” and so forth, which
were widely adopted as the guiding vocabularies of public policy under the Kim
Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun governments.
21
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While the SERI introduced the idea of “attractiveness” into the discourse of
state management from the perspective of transnational capital, approximately at
the same time, the same term was also developed from another direction, more in
relation to the ideas of “soft power,” national image and nation branding.
Tong’a Ilbo, a major national news media, promoted the idea of “attractive
nation” in association with the term, soft power. The 21st century Peace Foundation,
affiliated with Tong’a Ilbo, held a conference on June 2, 2005, titled, “Attractive
Nation: Future Strategy for Soft Power.” At the closed-door conference, about two
dozen university professors (majority of whom came from political science at Seoul
National University), private institute researchers, journalists, government officials
and one business man22 participated in the discussion on state strategy for
enhancing the international status of Korea. The idea of “attractive nation” or
“attractive state” was developed by the professors at the SNU who combined their
own idea of the “network knowledge state” and Joseph Nye’s idea of “soft power”
(S.-b. Kim & Ha, 2006). The conference especially focused on the contribution by the
Korean Wave and the IT development to the enhancement of South Korea’s
international “attractiveness” (21segi P’yŏnghwa Porŏm, 2005). Compared to the
SERI’s proposition of “Attractive Korea,” which was embedded in the interest of

The sole businessperson who was invited to the conference was Kim Yŏngmin, president of SM Entertainment, a leading company of the Korean Wave.
22
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transnational financial capital, the idea of “attractive nation” brought to the fore the
cultural appeal in the enhancement of the international status of South Korea.23
The term soft power earned a wider circulation than the related term
attractiveness. The term, soft power, was used to conjure up the “soft” side of the
state, especially the cultural aspect, as opposed to the “hard” side, that is, military
and economic capacities of the state. The term was used in a simple and casual way
in which the term “soft” was immediately associated with culture. In 2005, the
SERI’s report, “The Road to Soft Power” (Samsung Economic Research Institute,
2005b) emphasized “soft industries” including cultural, fashion, advertising, and
design industries as leading economic growth in the 21st century. It argued that
South Korea had potential to lead the trend, based on the specific combination of the
presumed collective sensibilities such as chŏng (정; affection) and sinparam
(신바람; excitement), traditional culture (“culture archetypes”), and advanced
information technologies and infrastructure.
An article from Han’guk Ilbo, sponsored by SK Corporation, regarded cultural
value as the resource of soft power, and emphasized that “cool” popular cultural
products could create a positive and friendly nation brand, which in turn could
contribute to making Japanese soft power ("Looking back at Japan 3: Soft Power
Powerhouse Japan," 2004). In 2007, in a series, “Toward Soft Power Korea,” Seoul

The Korean word for attractiveness could be either yuin (유인; lure or
draw) or maeryŏk (매력; charm or appeal). Only the latter has a strong affective
connotation, meaning the “power to pull people’s mind and heart.” Both “attractive
Korea” and “attractive nation” used the term maeryŏk for attractiveness instead of
yuin, emphasizing the affective aspect of the term.
23

130

Kyŏngje also emphasized collective sensibilities, knowledge, culture, and creativity
as resources of soft power, and suggested a set of wide social reform for an
advanced nation (H.-u. Ch’oe, 2007). It is noticeable that the soft power discourse
focused on the reform of the domestic system, rather than external projection of
national image and power.
The attention to the ideas of attractiveness and soft power illustrates a
widening concern about the international status and image of the nation. The terms
were frequently associated with the nation brand and invoked the necessity of
nation branding, especially from a cultural term.
National prestige and the advanced nation
The idea of nation branding expanded its implication in association with such
ideas as soft power and attractiveness, but it was in association with the idea of
national prestige that it was widely disseminated. Since 2005, the term, national
prestige or kukkyŏk 국격, was frequently used side by side with, or in place of, the
term nation branding. The news media effectively translated the business marketing
jargon of nation branding and national image into a tongue-in-cheek neologism in
Korean language, kukkyŏk. The translation into kukkyŏk or national prestige marked
a significant discursive moment for the development of nation branding. It was not a
simple linguistic translation, but a crucial discursive expansion with wider
implications.
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The term, kukkyŏk, means the prestige, dignity, class, or grace of a nationstate.24 While the term was a neologism that was rarely used in Korean until the mid
2000s, the meaning of the term was intuitive for Korean speakers as it was easily
associated with the term inkyŏk (인격; the class or character of a person, or
personality). The term kukkyŏk was easily understood as the abbreviation of kukka
ŭi p’umkyŏk 국가의 품격, literally the prestige, dignity, or grace of a nation-state.25
In 2007, Han’guk Ilbo, a national newspaper, featured a series of special
articles and launched campaigns for national prestige and nation branding, “ImageUp Korea: let’s raise national prestige.” The series, composed of over thirty articles,
raised a wide range of issues related to national image. The series introduced the
efforts to enhance national prestige by advanced countries and made a
comprehensive suggestion for national reform. It is worth noting that the campaign
was launched in collaboration with, and sponsored by, the Korean Foundation and
the SERI.

24

English.

Kukkyŏk has conventionally been translated into “national prestige” in

The term kukkyŏk had not been used frequently, but there exited
noticeable precedents. Kim Chin-hyŏn, former editor-in-chief of Tong’a Ilbo
newspaper and then the Minister of Science and Technology, used this term in his
book, Where is Korea headed: The second independence movement for national
prestige, national power, and advancedness (1993). Maeil Kyŏngje also adopted the
term when it launched the year-long campaign for “Vision Korea: Practicing the 21st
century” in 1997. It declared that the campaign aimed to “build a new dignity of the
state [kukkyŏk] by changing everything from government, politics, institutions, and
business to every individual of the population” ("Vision Korea, Practice the 21st
Century," 1997). The wider use of the term might be related to and influenced by the
book, The Dignity of the Nation 國家の品格, a huge bestseller in Japan. The book was
25

written by a Japanese conservative writer, Fujiwara Masahiko 藤原正彦 in 2005 and
translated into Korean in the next year.
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The series focused on the problems regarding the poor national image that
were presumed to undermine the international competitiveness of South Korea. The
series attributed it not just to the ineffective use of public relations by the
government, but widely to the institutions, customs and behaviors of the whole
nation, including corruption, poor institutional system, pervasive street
demonstration and labor strikes, lack of ethnic tolerance, and the overseas
behaviors of “ugly Koreans” (Y.-s. Yi, 2007). The series then paid a visit to seven
countries — Japan, the US, the UK, Germany, China, Russia, and Hungary — and
introduced the efforts to enhance national image by each government. The series
concluded with a set of comprehensive suggestions for enhancing national image,
such as “setting up the institutional system for the management of the national
brand and image,” “becoming global citizen,” “reviving the dynamism,” “eliminating
the image of instability,” “promoting the Korean Wave content,” “strengthening the
image of digital power,” and “promoting tourism.”
Similar campaigns for national prestige followed, at the time of the
institutional launch of nation branding (“Enhance National Prestige” series by Maeil
Kyŏngje in 2008, and “Let’s Enhance National Prestige” series by Seoul Kyŏngje,
2008), and at the time of hosting the international event of G20 summit in Seoul in
2010 (“National Prestige Campaign” by Tong’a Ilbo, 2010).
These campaigns illustrate how the term national prestige became central to
the news media’s efforts to build the public agenda of nation branding. In the
process, the news media widened the nation branding agenda, encompassing
government reform, social control, and especially the moral qualities of citizens
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within the framework of the dominant economic discourse of international
competitiveness.
With the rise of the discourse of national prestige, the image of the advanced
nation took widened implications. Becoming an advanced nation had been an
ultimate national goal at least since the state project of segyehwa in the mid 1990s,
but national prestige was imagined as a necessary condition for realizing the goal of
becoming an “a, first-class” nation. In the context of the campaigns for national
prestige, the advanced, first-class nation was imagined not just as a country
developed in economic terms of GNP per capita or trade values. It was also imagined
as advanced with in wider terms including governance and civility, specifically
defined in narrow terms of business interest.26
In 2007-2008, the political agenda and policy recommendations of nation
branding by the news media took a concrete shape, encompassing wide domestic
reform plans and international public relations. The official public agenda of nation
branding by the PCNB in 2009 took up most of the political agenda promoted by the
news media. Some propagators of the agenda of nation branding in the news media
went straight into the government. Indeed, the news media’s promotion of nation
branding was part of their ongoing attempt to increase political influence and shape
state management.
The discussion so far focused on the institutional agency of the news media
in the rearrangement of political discourses and the establishment of the discourses

26

This aspect of actual public policy will be examined in detail in the next

chapter.
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of NBNP as the central political agenda. In the following section, I will further
examine the narrative of the media discourses of NBNP and identify their wider
political implications.
The narrative of the news media’s nation branding campaign
In this section, I examine how the news media’s campaign for NBNP
constituted a specific narrative of the state and the nation. The news media’s
narrative centered on the notion of global competitiveness of the nation, predicated
on a specific economic metanarrative of globalization. Existing literature shows how
economic narratives contribute to the imagination of the nation state (Cameron &
Palan, 2004; Crane, 1999; Deshpande, 1993; Wyatt, 2005a, 2005b). In this analysis, I
focus on how the discursive construction of national competitiveness was
predicated on a particular economic narrative about the past, present, and future of
the nation-state of South Korea.
The news media discourse on NBNP glorified rapid industrialization and
economic development out of poverty as a source of national pride. Fussing about
the low international ranks in the nation brand and image, the news media
discourse ascribed the present economic crisis not to the business sector, but to the
government, political parties, labor, and the citizen. The news media urged the
whole nation to make efforts to create a business-friendly climate in order to
enhance the national brand and national prestige. The news media portrayed the
business as leading the road to the ultimate national goal of becoming an advanced
nation. The IT industry and the cultural industry were highlighted as enhancing the
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nation brand and national prestige and envisioning the future of technologicallyand culturally- advanced South Korea, as is analyzed in the following section.
The news media’s nation branding campaign illustrates how the discourses
of NBNP contributed to constructing the nation as a neoliberal competitive entity.
The news media problematized the poor international image of South Korea in
economic terms, presented a specific neoliberal solution to address the problem,
and regulated the population as resources for the goal of achieving the status of the
“culture-advanced country” by enhancing the nation brand and national prestige.
The past glory: the miracle of rapid economic growth
The media discourses of NBNP shed light on the past of South Korea in a
particular way. The history of modern South Korea was portrayed as a self-made
success story of overcoming the extreme poverty from the wreckage of war and
achieving the “unprecedented” rapid economic growth, often called the “Miracle of
Han River.” This particular story exclusively focused on the rapid economic success,
while relatively disregarding the dark side of extremely rapid economic growth and
the political achievement of a democratic regime. The rhetoric such as
“unprecedented” or “miracle” evoked the economic development as the source of
national pride, especially when the “New Right” claimed to celebrate the 60th
anniversary of the “state foundation” (e.g. K.-y. Chŏng, 2008; "Korea to be a new
starting point for 60 years," 2008; Y.-o. Yu, 2008). For instance, a renowned
economics professor, Chŏng Kap-yŏng, clearly linked the economic success and
national pride in his column, “The hero of a successful history”:
Let's open the world map. Except for a few countries belonging to the OECD,
how many countries are more affluent than we are? If you look for a country
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that has achieved democratization as well as the economy, it gets smaller. If
you are looking for a country that has succeeded in industrialization and
democratization in the least developed countries since the 1960s, Korea is
the only one.
Koreans should not just be enthusiastic about the Olympic gold medal, but be
proud of our 60 years of history! There are so many reasons we should
straddle our shoulders on the world stage. In a recent Tong’a Ilbo survey,
only 64.9% of Koreans rated "Korean history as proud." Positive appraisals
are up 10 percentage points higher than five months ago, and it is fortunate
that 72.9% of the younger generation are proud of it. But how can we build
confidence in the future if we disregard ourselves and evaluate our past
history negatively (K.-y. Chŏng, 2008).
In the media discourses which glorified the past, certain historic figures were
illuminated in terms of the nation brand and national prestige. For instance, in the
campaign article, Seoul Kyŏngje featured a survey in which Park Chung-hee (who
seized power through a military coup and ruled South Korea from 1961 to 1979),
Chŏng Chu-yŏng (Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyundai Group), and Yi Pyŏng-ch’ŏl
(Lee Byung-chul, the founder of Samsung Group) were chosen as the top
contributors to the enhancement of the nation brand and national prestige (C. Son,
2008). These figures had been celebrated as the protagonists who led
industrialization and achieved the economic miracle, but, in the article, they were
retrospectively related to the nation brand and national prestige. It illustrates how
the news media related the past glory of rapid economic development with the
nation brand and national prestige from the economic, business-centered
perspective.
The glorifying of the past economic success in the nation branding campaign
needs to be understood in relation to the rise of the “New Right” in the 2000s. The
New Right emerged as a political and intellectual project for the conservatives to
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regain political power from the “leftist” governments (the Kim Dae-jung and Roh
Mu-hyun governments) and to establish a conservative government. They started a
movement against the so-called “self-depreciating” view of history and for the
positive rewriting of the history of the proud state foundation. Assuming the
teleological view of history, the New Right appraised the successful industrialization
of the “Taehan min’guk” (대한민국; Great Nation of Korea)27 as the triumph of the
capitalist market economy (Y.-h. Yi, 2007). The nation branding campaigns partly
shared the New Right’s view of history, predicating on a particular national
imaginary which centered on the nation’s past economic success.
The present crisis: Problems, responsibilities and solutions
Political scientists Kang Chŏng-in and Chŏng Sŭng-hyŏn (2011) characterize
the languages in modern Korean politics as those of national decay, solution and
reform, and the future imagery of a developed country. The news media discourse of
nation branding used similar languages: problems and crisis, responsibilities and
solution, and the future of a “truly” advanced country.
The news media diagnosed the present status of South Korea as a crisis,
failing to inherit the glorified success of industrialization and to proceed to the road
to “sŏnjinhwa” (becoming advanced). It is notable that the news media’s definition of
the crisis depicted the current status of Korea through various numerical

“대한민국” is the official title of South Korea. It can translate into the Great
Nation of Democratic Korea. This title had not been used beyond official
governmental occasions until the 1990s. But since the early 2000s, especially during
and after the 2002 World Cup, the title Taehan min’guk became a vernacular
vocabulary, especially in the media discourse, in South Korea.
27
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representations of the national economy. The news media articles frequently cited
indexes such as GDP, export volume, and trade value as shorthand for the
international status and economic achievement. These figures indicated that South
Korea ranked 13th in terms of GDP and the 11th in terms of trade volume mostly in
the first decade of the 2000s.
In contrast to the international economic status as one of the largest
economies in the world, according to the diagnosis by the news media, South Korea
was suffering a poorer international recognition than it deserved. The poor marks in
international rankings and indexes related to national competitiveness and nation
branding were regarded as an epitome of the present crisis that plagued South
Korea.
Especially, the NBI reports by Simon Anholt triggered the sense of crisis, in
which South Korea marked at 25th in 2006 and 32nd in 2007 in terms of the nation
brand, falling behind China, Russia, Hungary, Brazil, and Argentina (H.-u. Ch’oe,
2007; K.-s. Ch’oe, 2006; "Korea brand falls short of its economic power; the problem
is national prestige," 2008). The report shocked the political elites and the public,
who believed to have achieved a spectacular economic growth and successfully
overcome the recent economic crisis in the late 1990s.28

In fact, the seemingly lower rank of the South Korean nation brand than its
size of the national economy might not be something to fuss about, considering that
it would not be surprising if Western countries with smaller economies (such as
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, and so on)
marked a higher score by the measure of international image, recognition, and
reputation. Yet the news media rarely raised this point.
28
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The Korea discount
The concern about international recognition was apparent in such terms as
the “Korean discount.” Initially designating the under-valuation of the Korean stock
market, the term epitomized the way in which the problem of the nation brand
deficit was conceived of from the economy- and business-centered viewpoint. It was
explained that the products originating from South Korea did not get the right price
due to the poor national image and recognition. Due to the Korean discount, for
instance, Samsung cell phones and Hyundai automobiles were sold at a lower price
than their similar quality competitors. Kyŏnghyang Sinmun cited the IPS’s survey,
“Nation brand map” and reported:
When asked how much they are willing to pay for a same product or service,
the respondents answered that they were willing to pay 155 dollars for
German ones, 148.7 dollars for Japanese ones, and 148.6 dollars for
American ones compared to 100 dollars for Korean one (B.-y. Chŏn, 2007).
The news media frequently brought up a famous anecdote: Samsung was
frequently misrecognized as a Japanese company, which was actually not bad for
selling the products because of the high nation brand value ascribed in Japanese
electronic products:
That is why even global enterprises such as Samsung and LG do not display
the nation brand, that is “Made in Korea,” when advertising their products
overseas. It is understandable because it is in the way of their exports (S.-w.
Kim, 2005).
This anecdote suggests that the South Korean business, especially large
export-oriented conglomerates, had a high stake in the promotion of the nation
brand.
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The term Korean discount represented the perceived gap between the
nationally based but transnationally growing business and other parts of the society.
Accordingly, the problems of the Korean discount and the deficit of the nation brand
were ascribed not to the business, but to other parts of the society: the inefficient
government, backward political parties, violent and militant labor unions, and
uncivilized citizens. 29 The latter was deemed to undermine the deserved value
created by the business and thus weaken national competitiveness and undermine
the nation brand value, and ultimately get in the way to the rank of advanced
nations. Accordingly, the government and other parts of society should learn from
business:
The government is to blame for the [low] nation brand that contributed to
the “Korea discount.” We cannot help but to think that the lack of
international public relations led to the failure to favorably appeal to the
people around the world. Although the status of our nation has improved
through the events such as 1988 Olympic Games, 2002 World Cup, and Pusan
APEC, it is reported that the foreigners, especially businesspeople, are
reminded of negative terms such as “North Korea nuclear threat” and
“hardline labor unions” when they think of Korea. These negative images
have crucially weakened the nation brand. It is urgent to turn it into positive
images. The government, at least, should not be an impediment to the
corporate business activities. It should devise strategies to enhance the
nation brand to a premium brand. It is a good way to benchmark corporate
brand strategies adopted by national enterprises with world top 100 brand
names (S.-w. Kim, 2005).

The blaming of the government, politics, and labor resonates with the
famous statement made by Lee Kun-hee, chairman of Samsung Group, in 1995, who
graded Korean politics as fourth class, its government as third class, and its business
as second class. The news media repeatedly reminded his statement. For instance,
see two op-ed columns in Maeil Kyŏngje and Kyŏnghyang Sinmun, which are
regarded as representing pro-business conservatives and progressive liberals
respectively ("Lee Kun-hee's aggressive deregulation appeal," 2007; C.-s. Pak, 2006).
29
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The news media blamed the inefficiency of the government and the excessive
economic regulation by the government not just for hampering the business
freedom of the nationally based business, but for turning away foreign capital
investment. The physical violence in the National Assembly was to blame for
degrading national prestige by being the object of international ridicule of the
backwardness of South Korea. The street demonstrations and militant labor
struggles were also to blame for driving away foreign capital investment by
reinforcing the anti-business image of South Korea ("Advanced Korea in the 21st
century is difficult to acheive with 20th century country image," 2008; H.-j. Cho,
2005; T.-k. Cho, 2009).
The news media also problematized behaviors of citizens as lacking "civil
consciousness” and blamed them for undermining the nation brand and national
prestige. The PCNB and the SERI published that South Korea ranked at 18th in terms
of the nation brand, but at 27th in terms of “citizenship” among 30 OECD countries.
The news media widely reported the publication, specifically blaming the lack of
civility for undermining the nation brand. In this vein, Maeil Kyŏngje launched a
campaign for “G20 global citizenship,” asking to “raise civil consciousness if we want
to be treated in the world” (H.-h. Chŏng, 2009).
The news media launched campaigns that urged ordinary citizens to follow
public etiquette and keep public order in the name of the nation brand and national
prestige, including keeping traffic signals, treating fellow citizens kindly, showing
generosity to foreigners, and so on ("To enhance the quality of Korean power,"
2008).
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The news media especially pointed fingers at behaviors of “ugly Koreans.”
The Korean tourists in Southeast Asia were accused of the behaviors such as
excessive drinking at the airport, underage prostitution, disregarding locals, and so
on. Lacking “global citizenship,” these behaviors were blamed for making the nation
“shameful” and detrimental to the nation brand and national prestige ("We Need to
Take Action on Ugly Overseas Tourism," 2007). The news media even pointed out
the labor exploitation and maltreatment of immigrant workers as the problems of
the nation brand and national prestige ("Foreign labor exploitation is a matter of
national prestige," 2012; S.-r. Son, 2008).
The nationwide reform and social capital
In this way, the news media raised concerns about the nation brand and
national prestige in wider terms of politics, government, labor dispute, and the
citizen’s behavior. In this context, it is notable that the news media often brought up
the notions of social capital and social trust as a key to the nationwide reform
toward the status of an advanced country.
The low marks of nation brand value and national prestige were explained in
terms of lacking social capital and social trust. The comprehensive concept of social
capital was used variously to encompass the perception of governmental and
corporate corruption, the degree of trust toward the government and among
citizens, and the social community networks of citizens. As a kind of “capital,” like
human capital and material capital, social capital is conceived of as contributing to
productivity and economic growth. The idea of social capital has been actively
promoted by the World Bank as a new developmental panacea for solving various
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problems such as economic growth, poverty, crime, environmental issues, and so on
(Fine, 1999; C.-y. Kim, 2008).
The news media discourse actively utilized the notion of social capital in
association with NBNP. The notions of social capital and social trust operated as the
mediating concepts for the abstract ideas of the nation brand and national prestige,
providing concrete imagery for national reform agenda. The news media promoted
the idea of social capital in conservative terms of maintaining and reinforcing law
and order. For instance, working with the Ministry of Justice, Maeil Kyŏngje
launched a campaign for “establishing law and order” in the name of “enhancing
national prestige of Korean power” (P.-d. Chŏn, 2008; "To enhance the quality of
Korean power," 2008). In the campaign, the newspaper blamed “the trend of
ignoring law” as well as labor struggle not just for being “illegal” but for
undermining social trust and further national prestige.
The news media mobilized social capital and social trust for disciplining and
conservatively controlling civic life. The NBNP campaigns, centered on social capital
and social trust, oriented toward conservative social control, especially the control
of political opponents and labor, and social regulation of the mundane civic norms.
The campaigns ignored the historical formation of Korean modernity. The national
problems of the nation brand deficit and the ugly Koreans phenomenon were not
discussed and analyzed in depth within a historical understanding, but presented in
fragmented and caricatured ways. It illustrates the nature of nation branding
campaigns that aimed to control, regulate, and mobilize the population, rather than
to facilitate deliberative discussions on these social issues.
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The future of a “truly” advanced country
The political discourses of NBNP constructed a particular future imagery of
South Korea as a member of the (imaginary) “advanced countries’ club.”
Since the 1960s, the future imagery of becoming an advanced country has
been a major part of the dominant political discourse of development in South Korea
(C.-t. Kim, 2014, p. 172) in the sense that modernization has been conceived as
becoming a developed, advanced, industrial country (Hwang, 2008, p. 256). The
vision of becoming an “advanced, first-class country” has continued to be the
ultimate goal set by political elites since the declaration of the “New Korea” in the
early 1990s. Notably, since the 1990s, the imagery of becoming an advanced country
was reinforced as the advance of the nation implied the international
competitiveness of the nation in the world stage.
The image of an advanced country has been represented mainly in economic
terms, especially in terms of national income. The national income index was used
to signify the advanced status of South Korea. The Kim Young-sam government set
the goals of increasing GNP per capita to 10,000 dollars and obtaining the
membership of the OECD as the signposts of becoming an advanced country (both
were achieved in 1996 at the expense of the financial crisis in the next year). In
2003, the Roh government also set up the goal of GNP per capita of 20,000 dollars as
a state agenda (as suggested to the government by the SERI) ("Roh asks to renovate
the country to open up the era of 20 thousand dollars," 2003).
The government and the news media perceived that the elusive goal of
becoming an advanced country was near at hand in economic terms, considering the
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size and volume of the South Korean economy. Especially, particular future-oriented
industries were conceived of as providing a concrete shape to the future image of
advanced South Korea. For instance, technology-oriented industries such as the IT
industry (represented by Samsung Electronics) were regarded not just as the future
engine for continued economic growth,30 but also as envisaging the desirable future
of advanced economic development. The world-leading IT industries, reinforced by
the futuristic image, provided not just a source of national pride, but a national
sense of being competitive and taking the lead in the world.
The cultural industries, leading the Korean Wave, also emerged as
envisioning the competitive and advanced Korea in economic terms. The Korean
Wave was cast on in terms of its economic effects. In 2004, Segye Ilbo cited the study
by the HERI and reported the tangible and intangible effects of the “Yonsama”
phenomenon was estimated to generate as large as 3 trillion won31 in Korea and
Japan. In 2005, Yonhap News cited the study by the IPS and reported that the overall
economic effects of the Korean Wave all over East Asia (including Japan, China,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong) was estimated as high as 4.5 trillion won (Hong, 2005).
Aside from the point that the calculation of the figures was on a vague and
exaggerated ground, and the measurement was widely inconsistent across the

Since the 1960s, science and technologies have been emphasized as
essential to reach the advanced level of economic development (Hwang, 2008; K.-b.
Kim, 2008). The strong emphasis on science and technologies can be found in the
slogan, “being late in the industrialization, let’s take the lead in the way to
informatization” under the Kim Young-sam government, and the state vision of
“knowledge-based nation” under the Kim Dae-jung government.
31 Since the financial crisis in 1997, the rate between the Korean won and the
US dollar exchange rate has been fluctuated between 1,000-1,200 won per dollar.
30
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reports, the nation branding discourse cast on the events and phenomena
exclusively from the economic and monetary terms. The monetary calculation of the
nation brand had effects on the conversion of “intangible” and not necessarily
economic phenomena into calculable economic entities.
These industries were conceived of as going beyond the developmental
strategy of “catching up” and leading the way to “world class” Korea. Products such
as mobile phones and the popular culture projected the prestigious nation brand
(“Korean premium”). In this context, national prestige and prestigious nation brand
was equated with the market premium value (high value added) created by
prestigious national brands.
Further and more importantly, the Korean Wave was cast in the cultural
terms beyond the economic terms of future growth engine. The Korean Wave was
celebrated as the first historical instance for Korean culture to spread widely in the
world. With the development of the Korean wave, the state vision was frequently
presented as entering the rank of “munhwa sŏnjin’guk” (문화선진국; cultureadvanced countries). The news media emphasized the Korean Wave as a road to
becoming a “truly” advanced country. The advancement of the nation was
increasingly conceived of not just in terms of achieving high levels of economic and
technological development and scale, but in terms of having refined culture.
In this context, since the 2000s, the imagery of an advanced nation has
expanded to include not just economic status of the nation, but comprehensive
political, social, and cultural terms. Nation brand index as well as other international
indices and rankings published by various transnational private and public
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institutions contributed to this expansion of imagery of an advanced nation.32 These
international indexes and rankings provided a rationale for wider social reform
oriented toward the future of a “truly” advanced nation.
The image of the culture-advanced nation was also projected in terms of civic
norms of public behaviors and manners, which were narrowly defined as abiding by
law and order. The successful hosting of the 2002 World Cup football was cast on in
terms of its economic effects, but was highlighted in terms of projecting the image of
public order to the world. Against this backdrop, the public behaviors of citizens
were projected as a great improvement and achievement, illuminating a bright
future of the nation as a true advanced country.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined how the news media institutionally and
discursively engaged in the promotion of nation branding and national prestige as
the national public agenda, which got elevated to the status of the central public
policy agenda by the next government. Since the late 1990s, the news media have
made serious attempts to provide grand state agendas, manifesting their own stake
in the political process of state management. As one of the recent attempts, the
discourses of nation branding and national prestige exemplify how the news media
played a crucial role in the post-developmental transition to neoliberal governance

They include Human Development Index (HDI) by United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by
Transparency International (TI), Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) by World
Economic Forum (WEF), World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) by International
Institute for Management Development, among others.
32
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in South Korea. The process illustrates how the news media actively mediated the
interest of big capital in the promotion of the state agenda of nation branding.
As a conclusion of the chapter, I will sum up and discuss the implications of
the news media’s institutional and discursive engagement in the promotion of NBNP
and discuss the social imaginary of the nation-state provided by the discourses of
NBNP in a wider context of the social transformation of South Korea.
First of all, the chapter examined the domestication of the transnational
discourse and institution of nation branding by domestic players. It was
transnational practitioners in the business of marketing/branding consultation that
invented and disseminated the idea of nation branding since the late 1990s. They
were quick to introduce the idea and technique of nation branding to national and
local governments across the world. The governments in Eastern Europe, in
particular, were quick to adopt and apply nation branding as part of their transition
to global capitalism. The existing critical studies of nation branding mostly
emphasized the role played by the transnational practitioners. They introduced and
disseminated neoliberal rules and market-oriented norms through the technique of
nation branding which rendered the nation-state as a market entity. By contrast, I
emphasized the domestic dynamics of nation branding and identified multiple
domestic players which were involved in the introduction and dissemination of the
transnational idea of nation branding. The introduction of nation branding in South
Korea was less of a process in which transnational brand managers took advantage
of the national government and prescribed a neoliberal prescription of managing
the nation brand; it was a process in which domestic elites proactively adopted and
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promoted nation branding as a state management agenda. The public and private
think tanks and the major news media were quick to introduce the idea of nation
branding, to circulate among government and business elites, and to translate and
popularize in relation to a neologism of national prestige. The news media played a
mediating role in the institutional and discursive domestication of nation branding
among experts, government, and publics in favor of the interest of capital.
It should also be added that I do not disregard the role played by the
transnational branding experts all together, but evaluate their role in South Korea
from a different perspective. Their involvement in the institutional process of nation
branding seemed limited in South Korea although the transnational branding
consultants landed some branding contracts with the governmental agencies and
local governments. Rather, they were more significant in terms of their sheer
presence and status in the discourse of nation branding. In the domestication of
nation branding, the international authority and global status of the discourse and
their transnational agencies seemed crucial for the domestic players such as the
news media and the policy experts. The news media summoned the Western media,
Western intellectuals, and Western experts as the authoritative source of speaking
the language of nation branding. It seemed that the intellectual and symbolic
authority of the Western intellectuals, experts and the media were indispensable to
the domestication of nation branding; but they were instrumental and selectively
appropriated by the domestic agency of nation branding. The actual
institutionalization of nation branding worked for the benefit of the domestic
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players — conservative politicians, bureaucrats, news journalists, and the capital, as
we will see in the next chapter.
Secondly, the news media’s promotion of nation branding predominantly
operated in favor of the interest of large capital and for the neoliberal discipline of
the state, the nation, and the citizen. The news media narratives of nation branding
prioritized the building of a business-friendly environment to attract foreign
investment and tourists and to continue the export-led economic growth, favoring
domestically-based but globalized large conglomerates. The neoliberal political
nature of the campaign is apparent in its condemnation of labor as detriment to
international competitiveness and its mobilization of the citizens in favor of
business. By urging the government to manage the whole nation in the prospect of
enhancing international competitiveness and the overall nation brand value, the
campaigns constructed the state as a neoliberal manager of the competitive brandstate. The priority put on the business sector suggests that the discourses of NBNP
were aligned with the neoliberal reorganization of the government and the
population. In line with the normative imperative of international competitiveness,
the news media’s call for nation branding put priority on attracting transnational
capital and tourists and creating a business-friendly climate. The nation branding
campaigns, in this sense, attempted to regulate and discipline the citizens with
respect to the neoliberal globalization in the name of a continued economic growth
of the national economy.
It should be added that the news media’s promotion of nation branding
spoke mostly to the incoming government, rather than to the soon-to-be-retired
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liberal government. As early as 2005, the next government was strongly expected to
be a conservative one led by a successful businessman-turned-politician. It was the
Lee Myung-bak government that greatly instituted and drove the nation branding
campaign, which will be examined in the next chapter.
Thirdly, the news media’s campaign for nation branding can be
contextualized with regard to the re-imagination of the post-developmental state
and nation following what seems the end of the developmental era in South Korea.
The news media’s narrative of nation branding drove a particular rendering of the
post-developmental imaginary of South Korea toward the neoliberal orientation.
What is striking in this aspect is that the discursive construction of the neoliberal
brand-state is predicated on a particular geographic imagination of South Korea’s
standing in the global stage. The news media discourses invoked the imagery of an
“advanced nation” through the affective activation of collective developmental
sentiments. It fed on the national confidence on the past achievement of rapid
economic growth and the national pride on the present global success of Koreaoriginated manufactured products and popular culture. While the developmental
“catching up” mobilization for economic growth had fed on the collective national
desire for “survival,” the neoliberal construction of the competition state thrived on
the developmental desire for the prestigious status of the “top-tier, advanced
country” standing in the world stage not just in terms of economy but also culture
and civility.
Additionally, the globalized re-imagination as an advanced country put South
Korea in the framework of perpetual comparison with the West as an invariable
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point of reference. The news media discourses of NBNP depended on the invocation
of the Western authority and the “advanced” nature of the Western knowledge and
expertise. Moreover, the news media campaign selectively mobilized the aspects of
culture and citizenship in the name of global standards from the perspective of the
Western (investors’) standpoint and thus reinforced and perpetuated the Westerncentered perception of international hierarchy. The news media campaign for NBNP
exposed the paradox of Korean modernity in which the collective anxiety,
discontent and insecurity underlie national pride and confidence.
The last point I raise in this chapter concerns the increasing importance of
the idea of culture with regard to nation branding and national prestige. The news
media’s discourses of NBNP obviously centered on the economy and favored
business, but they entailed increasing attention to the idea of culture. The attention
to culture, especially in relation to the imagery of an advanced nation, not only
assumed the developmental idea of West-centered, staged progress from the
economy to culture, but also was based on the reflection on the one-sided emphasis
on the economy. The attention to culture was accelerated by the rising popularity of
the Korean Wave and K-pop, Korean modern popular cultural products in Asia and
around the world.
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CHAPTER 5
CONTINGENCIES OF THE PUBLIC POLICY OF NATION BRANDING
In this chapter, I examine how nation branding policy unfolded under the Lee
Myung-bak government, focusing on the policy activities by the Presidential Council
for Nation Branding (PCNB). The Council took the responsibility for coordinating
public policies across different governmental departments and agencies and
implementing various publicity-oriented activities with regard to nation branding.
In coordinating and implementing the public policy for nation branding, the Council
emphasized the key principles: the cooperation between government and business
on the one hand, and the participation by citizens on the other hand. The principles
of cooperation and participation sound positive and ideal, implying potentially
democratic values. However, these policy statements cannot be taken literally
without questions. That is, what do they really mean when they are applied to the
government-led campaign for nation branding? What forms did cooperation and
participation take? How were the values realized in the actual deployment of the
public policy for nation branding? I will examine the deployment of the public
policies for nation branding, focusing on how these principles actually played out
and what implications they had in a wider social and cultural context in South
Korea.
In the first section of the chapter, I examine previous governmental efforts to
institute the concerns about the international image of the nation before the term
nation branding got currency. Throughout the first decade of the 2000s, public
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policy toward national image has developed until it was shown in full shape with the
establishment of the PCNB in 2009.
Then I examine the major task of the PCNB which put together and
coordinated related policies that had been scattered across different governmental
departments and agencies. The PCNB was defined as the “control tower” of related
public policies that were executed by respective departments and agencies. In this
setting, I get a glimpse of a wide range of public policies that were related to nation
branding and coordinated by the PCNB: from international aid and the promotion of
Korean popular culture to domestic public campaigns for “multicultural Korea” and
“global citizenship.” In this examination of the public policy for nation branding, I
will focus on how the government-business relation on the one hand and the
government-citizen relation on the other hand were conceived of and arranged in
the public policy scheme for nation branding.
In addition to the coordination of the related policies that had been executed
by respective departments and agencies, The PCNB actively deployed a range of
promotion and publicity activities, especially in preparations for the upcoming
international event of G20 Seoul Summit in 2010. In the second part of the chapter, I
will examine public campaigns for nation branding developed under the
commission of the PCNB, including the public campaign ads and the public
participation campaign. In particular, I take a close look at the public service ad
campaign operated by the PCNB in tandem with the big business companies on the
one hand, and the citizen participation programs which utilized digital
communications on the other. In this examination, I will make two points of
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observation. First, I will focus on how the nation branding campaigns were
predicated upon a particular government-business relation in which the
government mobilized the business on the one hand, and the governmental
authority was utilized for business benefit on the one hand. Second, I will focus on
how marketing and branding techniques of “participation” were utilized for the “cocreation” of the nation brand in the post-developmental mobilization of publics.
In the concluding section, I will discuss how the nation branding policy
constituted the re-imagination of the nation as a brand in which the state was
constructed as a quasi-enterprise entity. I argue that the policy campaign for nation
branding was part of the neoliberal program of governance that aimed to construct
the space of the competitive brand-nation and produce the subjects of brandcitizens in the context of neoliberal globalization.
The institutional establishment of nation branding
In response to the aggressive promotion of the nation branding agenda by
the business sector and the mainstream news media, which we have examined in
the previous chapter, The Lee Myung-bak government (February 2008-January
2013) pushed the public policy initiative for nation branding. In his speech on
August 15, 2008, President Lee declared that he would “raise Korea’s nation brand
value to the level of advanced countries within his presidency,” and “establish a
governmental organization to promote Korea’s nation brand” (PCNB, 2013a).
Accordingly, the PCNB was set up in January 2009 at the Ministry level. The
government announced that the PCNB was the world’s first and the only
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governmental institution that was dedicated to the integrated task of nation
branding (C.-i. Yun, 2010).
The public policy for “national image”
The PCNB was not the first governmental institution devoted to the
promotion of the nation brand and national image in South Korea. Even before the
term “nation branding” was introduced in the early 2000s, the government was
gradually concerned about the promotion of national image.
It is fair to note that the government exerted efforts to promote nation image
with the hosting of the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988,33 but it was in the early 1990s
that the nation image promotion was taken seriously and systematically as part of a
larger national reform when the Kim Young-sam government pushed the policy
initiative for segyehwa, Korea’s take on globalization. For the enhancement of the
external national image, the government set up the Committee on Overseas Public
Relations in 1995. It was acknowledged that given the rapid economic growth and
political democratization, the international recognition of Korea stayed low due to
unstable national security and a series of disasters (such as the collapse of Sŏngsu
Taegyo bridge, one of the Han’gang river bridges in 1994, and the collapse of
Samp’ung department store building in Seoul in 1995). The Committee, presided by
the Prime Minister, was set up to coordinate the work of disseminating information

It should be noted that the “politics of gaze,” that is, the implementation of
the promotion of national image entailed violence especially under the military
regime facing the 1988 Olympics. Preparing the event, the regime wiped out the
shack in Seoul, especially, the shack visible on the road from the airport to
downtown Seoul (H.-n. Pak, 2016).
33
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internationally and managing national image among government departments
(Bureau of Public Information, 1995).
Subsequently in 1997, the Korea International Broadcasting Foundation
launched Arirang TV, an English-language satellite broadcasting station, aiming at
fostering a good international image of Korea through broadcasting. It was called a
“spearhead” of Korea’s globalization and expected to function as “Korea’s friendly
face toward the global neighbors” (Y.-s. Kim, 1995a). Arirang TV embarked on its
overseas broadcasting to the Asia-Pacific region in 1999 and its worldwide
broadcasting to Europe, Africa and the Americas in 2000.
Despite the grand policy claim for Korea’s globalization, the governmental
efforts for enhancing national image were regarded as insufficient. One
governmental document pointed out that the overseas publicity functions were
uncoordinated as they were scattered around different governmental departments
and agencies such as the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, and the Korea Foundation (K.-h. Chŏng, 1998). The major
shortcoming was the fact that the matter of national image was limited to overseas
public relations.
The government’s efforts to improve national image advanced when Korea
co-hosted with Japan one of the biggest world events: the 2002 FIFA World Cup. In
preparation for the event, the government planned to set up a slogan for the World
Cup which symbolized the country in English (K.-h. Yi, 2007a). In December 2001,
with the international event several months ahead, “Dynamic Korea” was selected as
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the English slogan to publicize Korea to the world (K.-h. Yi, 2007b).34 The slogan
was used during and after the event for the promotion of national image.
In this atmosphere, the government attempted to institute a systematic pangovernmental campaign for enhancing national image by setting up the Council on
National Image (CNI) in July 2002. The Council was an intra-governmental
coordinating board, presided by the Prime Minister and composed of ten cabinet
members. The Action Council on National Image, which supported the Council, was
presided by the Ministry of Public Relations and composed of ten Vice-Minister level
officials (K.-h. Yi, 2007b).
For the next few years, the Council proposed comprehensive plans for
enhancing national image. In 2002, the Council included wider diplomatic and
economic concerns into the national image agenda. For instance, the Council
suggested to repair systems and customs according to global standards by enacting
the Animal Protection Act and regulating “dog eating,” arranging protection of
foreign sex workers, tidying up utility polls, billboards and road signs, and the like
(P.-s. Kim, 2002).

Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), the public broadcasting organization,
conducted an online poll to select the slogan on its website. With 6,084 participants
to the poll, “Dynamic Korea” took the most votes with 24.6 per cent, followed by
“Fantastic Korea” (24.5 per cent), “Peaceful and Safe Korea” (21.4), “Experience
Korea” (17.3), and the “Hub of Asia” (12.2). Based on the result of the online poll as
well as international and local expert opinion, the Blue House led the deliberation
on selecting the slogan for the World Cup. As a result of the deliberation, “Dynamic
Korea” was selected as the basic slogan with the “Hub of Asia” as the sub (K.-h. Yi,
2007a). Subsequently, the Interbrand, a leading transnational marketing and
branding consulting company that also worked for the emblem for the 1988 Seoul
Olympic Games, worked on the emblem for the slogan for the World Cup Organizing
Committee (National Strategy Institute, 2006).
34
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The Council decided to expand Official Development Assistance (ODA) from
59 million dollars in 2002 to 72 million dollars in 2003 and to resume contribution
to the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), which had been
suspended due to the financial crisis in 1997. It also aimed to increase the world’s
first-class products from 220 items to 500 items by 2005, and to produce more
Korean brands among the world’s best 100 corporate brands.
In November 2005, the Council planned to develop the National Image Index
of Korea (NIIK), an index to measure national image for its systematic management.
The Council announced that it would measure five elements of nation image –
natural and geographical environment, politics, economy, culture and society – in
terms of three criteria of human resource, system and process, and content. The
measurement would reflect existing internationally authoritative indices such as the
World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) published by the International Institute for
Management Development (IMD), the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) published
by the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by
the Transparency International (TI), sovereign credit ratings evaluated by major
credit rating agencies such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, which were in
great circulation with transnational authority (P.-s. Pak, 2005).
The Council also appointed five world-famous Koreans as honorary
ambassadors in four different fields – culture and arts (classical music singer Cho
Su-mi and film director Kim Ki-dŏk), sports (professional golfer An Si-hyŏn), “worldclass products” (vice president Yun Jong-yong of Samsung Electronics), and science
and technology (professor Hwang U-sŏk). The meeting also decided to reinforce the
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Action Council and to install the Committee on National Image Development, an
advisory board composed of civil experts on public relations (H.-Y. Kim, 2005).
The development of the official policy toward national image suggests that
the plans were not limited to the repair of national image and the establishment of
national slogan; the Council took charge of the establishment of visions and
strategies as well as the comprehensive policy suggestions in regard to national
image issues. It shows that the diplomatic and international political economic
issues and internal reforms encompassing laws, systems and customs were viewed
from the perspective of the national image enhancement.
However, despite the great breadth and depth of the plans written on paper,
the Council was not able to implement most of its proposed policies. Established in
an “on-the-fly” manner by the time of hosting the mega international event, the
Council fizzled out without consistent policy implementation and visible
performance outcome. The Council was criticized as “mere nominal” for its
inactivity and the lack of action strategies. In fact, the Council meetings were held
only twice, in 2002 at its launch and in 2005 for the preparation of the 2006 World
Cup (T. Kim, 2006; N.-h. Yi, 2004).
The lack of policy implementation despite a rather comprehensive plan was
partly ascribed to the problem of the organizational structure within the
government, where cooperation and coordination were hard to expect.
The establishment of the PCNB
Against this historical backdrop, the Presidential Council for Nation Branding
(PCNB) was established with a strengthened status in the governmental
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organization. It was set up as a Presidential Council at the Ministry level, elevated
from the status of the CNI, which was set up as a Prime Minister’s Council. In fact,
the new government strategically established or reorganized five Presidential
Councils, including the PCNB, which played a central role in propelling the core
policy agenda of the new government.35
The PCNB claimed that it was the world’s first governmental organization on
nation branding. It was a dubious claim suggesting Korea’s obsession with the
“world’s first,”36 but it was clear that it was promoted from the previous
organizations.
Despite this institutional promotion from the previous government, however,
the status of the PCNB was ambiguous and contingent on domestic politics. The
character of Euh Yoon-dae (Ŏ Yun-dae), Chairperson of the PCNB, illustrated the
ambiguity. On the one hand, he symbolized the elevated status of the organization;
he was known as a powerful insider of the new-elected President, Lee Myung-bak.
He was a professor in business management and served as president of Korea
University, which President Lee attended. The high-profile figure contributed to the
elevation of the status of the organization. On the other hand, as powerful as he was,

The other four Councils were the Presidential Council on National
Competitiveness, the Presidential Council on Green Growth, the Presidential Council
for Future and Vision, and the Presidential Committee on Regional Development.
36 Precedent examples are identified in Britain where the Public Diplomacy
Strategy Board (2002) and the following-up Public Diplomacy Board (2006) dealt
with the task of nation branding in relation to public diplomacy.
35

162

he took the position almost by accident, as he was dropped from the nomination of
the Minister of Education and Science.37
A year later, he was appointed as Chairperson of the PCNB. The anecdote
hints that the PCNB was established as a trophy for the powerful insider rather than
according to the consistent purpose for the enhancement of the nation brand.
In this arrangement, the agenda of nation branding was able to carry more
weight than before. Set up as a pan-government, co-operative body, the PCNB
claimed to assume the role of “control tower” for nation branding, taking charge of
the coordination among related government departments and between government
and business (The Ministry of Culture, 2009).
However, it is important to understand the role and the status of the Council
in a balanced way. The PCNB was misunderstood as a “powerful” organization
taking responsibility for nation branding policy that the Lee government
ambitiously drove. In fact, however, the “control tower” role of the PCNB implied
that its role was limited to putting together and coordinating mostly pre-existing
governmental policies in relation to nation branding. Most policies put together
under the name of nation branding continued to have been implemented by
individual executive governmental bodies.
As a coordinating body, the Council was composed of 16 heads or personnel
of relevant governmental departments involved in nation branding and 31 experts

He was unofficially nominated as the first Minister of Education and
Science under the Lee government but was dropped hours before the official
announcement due to the suspicion that his wife speculated in real estate (H.-u. No,
2008).
37
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on nation branding from civil society and academia (The Ministry of Culture,
2009).38 The institutional arrangement reflected the special emphasis on the
cooperation between government and business. In addition to the coordinating role,
the Council carried on its own projects for nation branding such as holding public
forums, contests and campaigns. For this task, the Council was staffed with about 30
employees and was allocated a small budget of 8 billion won.39 Additionally, the
Council asked eight large conglomerates to send their working-manager-level
employees to the Council with salary on their part. This unusual organizational
arrangement symbolized the status of the Council as a cooperative body between
government and big business.40
The contingent nature of the PCNB is apparent throughout its institutional
existence. For one thing, the PCNB subsisted only under the Lee government for four
years. For another, the focus of the organization dramatically shifted with the

The 16 Council members representing the governmental departments and
agencies included the Minister of Strategy and Finance (MOSF); Minister of
Education, Science and Technology (MOEST); Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(MOFAT); Minister of Justice (MOJ); Minister of Public Administration and Security
(MOPAS); Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST); Minister of Knowledge
Economy (MKE); Minister of Land, Transport and Maritime Affair (MLTM); Minister
of the Prime Minister’s Office; Chief of the Korea Communications Commission
(KCC); Mayor of Seoul; Secretary to the President for Executive Planning and
Management; Secretary to the President for Speech and Records; President of Korea
Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA); President of Korea International
Cooperation Agency (KOICA); and the CEO of Korea Tourism Organization (KTO).
39 Eleven public servants were dispatched from the relevant governmental
departments, and five employees from the relevant governmental agencies. The
Council independently recruited six employees specializing in promotions and
research.
40 They were Kolon, Asiana Air, Korean Air, Posco, SK Telecom, Hyundai
Motors, LG Electronics and Samsung Electronics. Hanhwa joined the next year (C.-i.
Yun, 2010,23).
38
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change of the head. In the first term (January 2009-July 2011, Chairperson Euh), the
PCNB mainly focused on the preparation for the impending G20 Seoul Summit,
emphasizing the government-business cooperation and the citizen participation for
nation branding. In the second term (July 2011-October 2012), the PCNB focused on
the promotion and commodification of traditional Korean culture. The shift in focus
to traditional Korean culture was partly due to the personal interest of the new
Chairperson, Lee Bae-yong (Yi Pae-yong), who was a professor in Korean history.
The policy activities for nation branding
In this institutional arrangement, the PCNB set up a set of extensive plans,
ranging widely from public diplomacy to the Official Development Assistant (ODA)
to the domestic campaign for global citizenship.
The PCNB referred to the fact that Korea’s nation brand lagged behind at
mere 33rd according to the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (NBI) of 2008. It
is notable that the diagnosis of the nation brand problem in terms of dichotomy
between economic and non-economic aspects. The PCNB diagnosed that despite its
“hard edge” of economic size and technological advancement, Korea’s international
status stayed at a lower position due to insufficient activities and publicity on “soft
edge.” The PCNB set the goal of enhancing Korea’s ranking from 33rd to 15th by
2013.
The PCNB put together pre-existing and new policies and rebranded them
into five major policy focal areas under the banner of nation branding. The five
areas were identified as: (1) “contributing to the international community,” (2)
“promoting advanced technology and products,” (3) “promoting culture and
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tourism,” (4) “embracing multiculture and foreigners,” and (5) “cultivating global
citizenship” (Choi & Kim, 2014, p. 354; PCNB, 2013a).
In addition to this coordinating task, the PCNB also carried out their own
roles of PR and communications with regard to nation branding and the role of
devising the index and criteria for evaluating the nation brand. In fact, the publicity
and communications activities seemed central to the organization as the substantive
nation branding policies were executed by the respective governmental
departments and agencies. Considering the various roles which the PCNB assumed,
in practice, it operated as an intra-governmental agency for publicity and promotion
in relation to nation branding.
Five areas of nation branding policy
In this section, I give a glimpse at a range of public policy put together under
five areas for nation branding policy and consider the nature of the policy in terms
of the relation between government, business, and citizens.
The first focal area for nation branding policy emphasized the international
contribution and responsibility and included various international cooperation
plans.
Previous overseas volunteer programs were integrated and rebranded as
“World Friends Korea.”41 The policy assumed that Korea’s international volunteer
services were underestimated in light of reality that Korea was sending over four
The plan suggested the integration of government-sponsored international
volunteering activities to a single brand. They were Korea Overseas Volunteers
(KOV) Program by KOICA under MOFAT, Korea University Volunteer Program
(KUV) by MOEST, Korea IT Volunteer Program by KADO under MPAS, Korea Techno
Peace Corps (TPC) Program by KICOS under KOEST.
41
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thousand volunteers abroad, third largest number next to the US and Japan.
However, due to the lack of integrated brand, the contribution had not been
appreciated. Accordingly, modeled after Peace Corps (US) and JICA (Japan) (PCNB,
2009e), the existing volunteering activities were bundled and rebranded as “World
Friends Korea.”42
Also emphasized were the expansion of developmental assistance (ODA) and
the participation in international peacekeeping operations (PKO). Acknowledging
the insufficient contribution to the international community, the policy suggested to
increase the ODA to the level of OECD average.
It is striking that the policy emphasized the difference in the ODA program
between Korea and other advanced countries. Highlighting Korea’s unique
experience of turning from an aid-recipient to a donor country, the policy proudly
emphasized that Korea could pass on intangible know-hows for economic
development as well as material aids. Often called the “economic Korean wave,” the
policy included the exportation of Korean model of economic development in the
name of the “Knowledge Sharing Programs” (KSP). The KSP was advertised as
offering comprehensive consulting for economic development. Especially, the policy
The programs were also expanded and diversified: the existing
volunteering activities, usually youth-based, IT-centered, were reorganized, but also
the WFK included “advisers program” and “senior experts program,” which
recruited those with expert knowledge and experience within various public and
corporate fields. The latter programs were explicitly linked to the international
development assistance programs as they aimed to provide expert knowledge of
public administration and policy consulting to developing and underdeveloped
countries. The plan assumed that the overseas volunteering activities would
enhance friendly and giving image of Korea and potentially open the way into the
respective overseas markets (PCNB, 2009e). Especially, current public servants
were encouraged to participate in the programs.
42
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promoted the exportation of the Saemaŭl campaign as a successful model of
modernization.43
The first area of nation branding emphasized international cooperation and
assistance, but we can identify underlying motives behind the policy. Underlying
was the self-pride on the past achievement of rapid economic development and the
self-confidence on the advanced level of economy and technologies, discussed in the
previous chapter. Further underlying was economic ambition to open up business
opportunities for Korean enterprises in large-scale civil engineering and
construction as well as in various other industries such as information and
education.
For instance, with regard to developmental support and consulting, the plan
especially emphasized the merit of the e-learning system. Highlighting the advanced
information technologies and the experience of education information system, the
policy explicitly aimed to export the Korean e-learning system and further establish
it as the global standard in the global education industries (PCNB, 2009c).
The business-centered approach to nation branding was more explicit in the
second policy focal area, which was branded as “advanced technology and design
Korea.” It emphasized the overcoming of “Korea discount” and the promotion of
Korea-originated products and brands for “premium Korea” (PCNB, 2013a, pp. 6869). This focus area basically featured various support schemes for the Korean
small-to-medium-sized business home and abroad by putting up the established

The KSP was launched in 2009 with Vietnam as the first country to get
developmental consulting.
43
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national image of technological advancement. For instance, the plan included the
promotion of select high quality products by utilizing the brand and logo, “Advanced
Technology and Design Korea” (AT & D Korea) (PCNB, 2009a).
In the third policy focus on culture and tourism, the PCNB policy scheme
emphasized the dissemination of Korean culture and the use of cultural resources
for tourism.
Major policy efforts in this focal area of culture and tourism included the
dissemination of Korean language and Korean alphabet (han’gŭl). The PCNB
coordinated the reorganization of previously-scattered efforts for the international
education of Korean language and culture into the single brand of Sejong Hakdang
(the King Sejong Institute). It aimed to make it as prominent as those institutions
such as the British Council (UK), Goethe-Institut (Germany), Confucius Institute
(China), or Alliance-Française (France).
In addition, the PCNB was directly involved in the efforts to enlist sŏwŏn
(private Confucian academies in the Chosŏn Dynasty) and Buddhist temples as the
World Heritage sites of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) (PCNB, 2013a, pp. 124-138).
Especially in its second term with the historian Lee Bae-yong as Chairperson
of the Council, the PCNB greatly focused on the promotion, branding, and
commodification of traditional culture. This focus on traditional culture was on
promoting and publicizing the presumed excellence of Korean culture, the value of
which was assumed to have not been known to the world.
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The fourth and fifth focal areas, “embracing multicultural family and
foreigners” and “cultivating global citizenship,” were more directly related with the
issues of nation image and reputation than the previous aspects, and thus involved
various public campaigns targeting the domestic public. These campaigns aimed to
educate and mobilize the domestic public toward the building of internationallyfriendly, business-favorable socio-cultural environment, especially in the
preparations of the G20 Seoul Summit.
Concerning the policy support for multicultural families, assumed by the
Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, the PCNB deployed public campaigns and
media publicity that aimed to educate the domestic public toward multicultural
families. For instance, the PCNB helped to produce a public service advertisement
video material featuring “Rainbow Singers,” which were composed of children from
multicultural families, helped to launch a television program, “We are Koreans” on
MBC (PCNB, 2013a, p. 166). It is noteworthy that the campaigns did not include
immigrant workers as the subject of understanding and hospitality.
Concerning the policy for global citizenship, the PCNB was involved in the
launch of a series of public campaigns urging the domestic public to learn global
etiquette and behave in globally proper manners. Most of these campaigns were
executed by related government departments and agencies: MCST, Korea Tourism
Organization (KTO), Visit Korea Committee, Korea Broadcasting Advertising Corp.
(KOBACO) and so on, but some public service advertisements for global etiquette
were produced under the commission of the PCNB in cooperation with private
enterprises (that is, the private parties bore the production cost and advertising
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expenses) (PCNB, 2013a, pp. 152-159). These campaign ads will be examined in
detail in the next section. Before turning to them, I would like to add a few
comments on the nature of the public policy of nation branding.
First, the PCNB extended the framework of nation branding quite widely,
coordinating a wide range of public policies from ODA to global citizenship. It is
worth noting that many of these policies had been promoted by the news media and
considered in the policy framework under the CNI in relation to nation image.
Second, the nation branding policies were planned and operated from the
perspective of business: while the first three aspects explicitly and implicitly aimed
to support the domestically-based business and promote exports, the remaining two
were more or less involved in attracting transnational business and capital by
providing a socio-cultural climate that were deemed friendly to international
business and capital.
Last, the public policy on nation branding was keen on mobilizing citizen
volunteers or making especially the youth involved in nation branding. Overseas
volunteer programs, branded “World Friends Korea,” naturally involved a lot of
citizen volunteers of various ages. Additionally, concerning the promotion of
traditional Korean culture, the nation branding policy plan recruited and supported
the youth activities for the conservation of UNESCO world heritage sites (PCNB,
2013a, pp. 139-145). The PCNB adopted various open prize contests, and recruited
citizens under various names such as communicators, reporters, and bloggers for
the promotion and publicity activities of the nation brand of Korea. The aspects of
the government-business relation and the citizen participation will be further
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discussed in the examination of the publicity and promotion activities for nation
branding in the next section.
Publicizing and communicating nation branding
In addition to substantive policies that were coordinated by the PCNB and
executed by the respective governmental departments and agencies, the PCNB took
responsibility for publicity and communications in relation to nation branding. In
these terms, the PCNB covered various policy activities including overseas as well as
domestic, conventional as well as unconventional publicity activities.
The PCNB policy report book, published in 2013, shows how much weight
was given to these publicity and communications activities. The report summed up
the outcome of their policy performance through four years before its termination
months later. In this 350-page report (excluding appendix), the PCNB spared almost
half of the book to the publicity and communications activities in great detail while
summing up in 70 pages all the substantive nation branding policy activities that
were executed by other governmental bodies (PCNB, 2013a).
In this section, I examine the actual policy activities of publicity,
communications and promotion of nation branding by the PCNB. I focus on three
activities: first, the development of the nation brand index in cooperation with the
SERI; second, the PCNB’s publicity activities, exemplified by the public campaign ads
produced by LG Group; third, various “participatory” publicity programs, which
induced citizens’ involvement in nation branding, especially through digital
communications technologies. In this examination, I consider how the PCNB
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conceived and conducted the government-business cooperation and the citizen
participation.
SERI-PCNB NBDO
The PCNB made the development of the nation brand index one of its duties.
In cooperation with the SERI, the PCNB developed and published the result of the
nation brand index since 2009 (It was discontinued with the abolishment of the
PCNB with the launch of Park Geun-hye government in 2013). Dissatisfied with the
NBI developed by Simon Anholt, the Council aimed to replace it with their own
brand of nation brand index to indicate the changing position of South Korea more
effectively.
The nation brand index, called the SERI-PCNB NBDO (nation brand dual
octagon), aimed to measure the dual aspects of nation brands — substance and
image — in eight categories — economy/corporations, science/technology,
infrastructure, policy/institution, heritage, modern culture, people, and celebrities.
(D.-H. Lee, 2013; C.-u. Yu, 2013, pp. 82-86).
The SERI-PCNB NBDO conceptualized that the nation brand was composed of
the dual aspects of “substance” and “image.” The SERI argued that as existing nation
brand indexes such as Anholt’s NBI (The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index)
measured only “image” and “soft” aspect of nation brands through surveys, they
only reflected subjective perception of the nation brand and lacked objectivity. Thus,
the newly developed index combined a “soft,” “image” aspect, and a “hard,”
“substance” aspect. For the former, the index conducted a worldwide survey of
about 13,500 “opinion leaders” from 26 countries (D.-H. Lee, 2013). For the latter, it
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incorporated extensive 125 “hard” statistical data already published by
organizations including international competitiveness indices by IMD and WEF,
other statistical data from the World Bank, UNESCO, and others. The index also
divided the items of measurement of nation brands into eight categories. The SERI
insisted that the “octagon” of the eight categories referred to David Aaker’s brand
identity model and Machiavelli’s state theory, but did not mention Simon Anholt (T.h. Yi, 2009). However, it is highly likely that the “octagon” was devised in reference
to the “hexagon” in the Anholt-Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index (the hexagon is
composed of the following six elements: export brands, foreign and domestic policy,
investment and immigration, tourism, culture and heritage, and people).
The formulation of the SERI-PCNB NBDO took a neutral look, based on
technical expertise, but it illustrates the business-oriented bias of nation branding. It
is notable that the SERI took the lead in the composition of the index. As was
examined in Chapter 4, the SERI, as a subsidiary of Samsung conglomerate,
presented the grand state vision in the direction of the interest of big business. The
formulation of the nation brand index is a continued intervention into the state
strategy by the SERI, following reports such as “Attractive Korea: Strategy for
Entering the Rank of 10 Most Advanced Countries by 2015” (Samsung Economic
Research Institute, 2005a). Especially, the “substance” side of the dual measurement
in the nation brand index points to the continuity between the previous reports
which emphasized the “substantive” aspect of international competitiveness.
The SERI-PCNB index also confirmed the continued perception that South
Korea was undervalued in terms of the nation brand (image) in comparison to its
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substantive value. The annual reports continued to identify non-economic areas
such as culture, heritage, government and policy and people as weak points in
comparison to a higher mark by economy, corporations, and technology. This
dichotomy continued to suggest that the nation brand problem came from the noneconomic sectors, not from economic sectors. Thus, the index further implied that
the nation branding policy was not limited to campaigns and public relations of
national image, but oriented toward a wider social reform from the business point
of view, as examined in Chapter 4.
The PCNB announced that during its tenure, South Korea achieved a gradual,
but impressive improvement in terms of nation branding ranking. The SERI paper
reported that South Korea marked 13th in terms of substance and 17th in terms of
image in 2012, a gradual increase from 19th and 20th in 2009 (D.-H. Lee, 2013). South
Korea’s position in this ranking is significantly high marked in comparison to other
major related indices (22nd by IMD’s, 19th by WEF’s, and 27th by NBI’s index), which
the PCNB disregarded as not suitable to South Korea. It is interesting that the
Council report (PCNB, 2013b) emphasized a different aspect of the same data. The
report did not mention the numeric ranking at all. Instead, the success of the
performance by the PCNB is illuminated in terms of a different index: it proclaimed
that South Korea passed the mark of the OECD average (100) in both terms of image
(101) and substance (103) of the nation brand by 2012. The report added that the
figures indicated a significant improvement from 2009 (89 to 101 on image and 97
to 103 on substance). Moreover, the gap between the two aspects was significantly
narrowed (8 to 2).
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The SERI-PCNB NBDO turned out to be a convenient tool for the PCNB.
Rather than depending on the Western authority of well-known indices, the PCNB
devised their own index as a nation brand measurement at the SERI’s suggestion.
This notable decision to replace the Western authority by a Korean alternative,
Samsung, suggests a domestically oriented, politically-embedded nature of the
public policy for nation branding. The SERI, with the power of Samsung Group in the
background, exerted a significant influence and authority among South Korean
elites but not necessarily outside South Korea. The invention of their own index
suggests the domestic-oriented nature of nation branding in South Korea despite
the PCNB’s declaration that it would raise the index as an internationally recognized
indicator. In fact, the SERI terminated the publication of the index as the PCNB was
abolished in 2013. Moreover, the invention of its own indicator for the nation brand
suggests an increased control over how South Korea was represented in the nation
branding ranking. Moreover, holding the indicator in hand also suggests control
over how the PCNB and the South Korean government performed was represented.
Not necessarily implying a manipulation, the SERI and the PCNB were able to make
expedient use of the scientific- and neutral-looking index in a flexible and
convenient way to their own advantage.
Public campaign ads on nation branding
In terms of international publicity, the PCNB aired spot commercials on
international media such as CNN, Euronews, BBC, and so on, publicizing the
“advanced technology and design Korea” (PCNB, 2013a, p. 299). The Council also
hosted the international nation branding public event called the “Korea Week.” The
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showcase public events were aimed to facilitate the bilateral international economic
cooperation and cultural exchange.44 Also included in the international nation
branding activities by the PCNB were the hosting of annual nation branding
convention event since 2011 and the setting up a publicity booth at the 2012 Seoul
Nuclear Security Summit.
However, the majority of the PR activities by the PCNB targeted domestic
citizens, rather than overseas audiences, especially in the first term when it devoted
its activities to the preparation of the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit. In 2009 and 2010, a
series of public service advertisements were aired under the commission of the
PCNB. Notably, these public service ads were commissioned by the PCNB, but
actually produced by major private conglomerates.45 These campaign ads, produced
in Korean language and mostly aired on domestic media, suggest the domestic focus
of the nation branding campaign. The PCNB boasted these ad series as successful
outcome of their activities (PCNB, 2013a, pp. 320-326).
Among these campaigns, Asiana Airlines produced a couple in-flight public
campaign ads. These short animation ads aimed to educate Korean tourists going
abroad on the proper behaviors on the plane and in places like museums. Korean
Air followed by airing a public service advertisement on global etiquette on the
three major television networks (KBS, MBC, and SBS). This ad campaign also

These events were held in Viet Nam (2009), Indonesia (2010), Kazakhstan
(2011), France (2011), and China (2012).
45 The included Samsung, Hyundai Motor Company, LG, CJ, SK, Korean Air,
Posco, Asiana Airlines, Woori Bank, Korea Development Bank, and KB Financial
Group. The list looks similar to that of the companies that dispatched their
employees to the PCNB.
44
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featured global etiquette in various situations (for instance, using “please” when
placing order in the restaurant). The ad ended with the onscreen message “You are
little Korea,” evoking Korean tourists as representatives of the nation (Y.-k. Kim &
Chŏn, 2010).
While these airline companies were natural fit for the public campaign for
global etiquette, other public campaign ads covered wider themes in relation to
nation branding, encompassing the contribution to the international community
(Samsung Group, POSCO), the celebration of the successful hosting of G20 (Woori
Bank, KDB), the nation pride of Korea (DB Financial Group, Hyundai Motors Group),
and global etiquette (LG Group, CJ-affiliated tvN). These themes also suggest the
domestic nature of the nation branding campaign, mobilizing nationalistic pride and
aiming to educate domestic audiences on globally-desirable etiquette.
Probably, the most successful was the public campaign ads by LG Group. LG
Group produced a series of public campaign ads in regard to nation branding. Early
2010, the PCNB released a “global etiquette” campaign ad in collaboration with the
LG conglomerate Group (in this context, “collaboration” meant that LG got the ads
produced and covered the expenses). Indebted to the success of the campaign ad in
attracting public attention, LG Group continued to release three additional campaign
ads, focusing on “multiculture” in 2010-2011 (LG Group Blog Administrator, 2012).
In the following section, I analyze the “global etiquette” campaign ad by LG.
This ad is interesting not just because it was well received by advertising experts as
well as the general public, but also it could provide an interesting case that suggests
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intertwined relations between the government and the private sector concerning
nation branding.
“Saranghaeyo, Korea”
This advertisement was aired to raise the public awareness for “global
etiquette” and the hospitality toward foreign visitors with the G20 Seoul Summit
near at hand. The event, a gathering of financial ministers and central bank
governors of 20 major economies, was publicized on a large scale by the
government as “a crucial opportunity to enhance Korea’s nation brand and national
prestige” (PCNB, 2009b). This ad was aired for two months on major television
networks.
The computer-graphic-based animation featured various Korean and
Western characters from famous Korean and Western masterpiece paintings. These
characters were in contact with each other in different imaginary situations. The 40
second ad is composed of five main scenes as the following:
Scene #1: The ad begins with a bird-eye-view on an old Chonsŏn town. The
camera zooms in and cuts to a gentleman and a lady in modern European
costumes looking at the map of Korea (Figure 1). They are from A Sunday
Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte (1884) by Geoges-Pierre Seurat. A
group of gentlemen wearing Korean traditional costumes and Confucian hats
approach and ask, “May I help you?” (The dialog is muted but is shown on
screen as a caption in both English and Korean. This applies also to the other
following scenes of encounters). They are from Appreciation of Painting (late
18th century) by Korean painter Kim Hong-do. Then they look at the map
together and one of them points the way with his folding fan. The couple nod
with gratitude and go their way.
Scene #2: The couple are watching Korean traditional wrestling (Figure 2).
The scene is from Ssirŭm (late 18th century) also by Kim Hong-do. A boy
hawker is back-stepping and bumping into a bearded man in a postman
uniform. The man is from Portrait of the Postman Jeseph Roulin (1888) by
Vincent Van Gogh. The boy bows saying, “I’m sorry,” and the postman
responds with a gesture of appreciation.
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Scene #3: Two young ladies are riding horses led by a young man and they
are all in Korean traditional costumes (Figure 3). The scene is from Yŏnso
Tapch’ŏng (Youths go spring picnic) (late 18th century) by Korean painter
Sin Yun-bok. He picks up a flute and gives back to a boy in a Western uniform,
saying “Here you are.” The boy is from The Fifer (1866) by Édouard Manet.
They bow to each other in a polite manner.
Scene #4: A gentleman in Korean costume is holding the door for two women
in “ethnic” costumes carrying baggage with both hands (Figure 4). He says,
“After you, ma’am,” and they pass through nodding their heads with
gratitude. The man is from Two Lovers Under Moonlight (late 18th century)
by Sin Yun-bok, and the women are from Tahitian Women on the Beach
(1891) by Paul Gauguin.
Scene #5: In the transitional shot, a Korean phrase, “For Korea to be loved by
the people of the world” is shown, synchronized with the narration (Figure
5). Then the camera cut to two gentlemen smiling with each other. The one is
from Self-portrait (late 17th century) by Yun Tu-sŏ, and the other is also from
Self-portrait (1889) by Vincent van Gogh. Then the camera cut to the two
getting on a boat. The image of getting on a boat themed from Boat-riding on
the River (late 18th century) by Sin Yun-bok. An onscreen message
“Saranghaeyo, Korea” shows on top, and the logos of the PCNB and LG show
side by side on the bottom (Figure 6).
Throughout the ad, theme music plays. The main melody is played by
gayagŭm, Korean zither, accompanied by Western percussion and bass. From
scene #4 to the end, a female voice narrates over theme music, saying “Your
impression is Korea’s impression. For Korea to be loved by the people of the
world. Saranghaeyo, Korea. This campaign is brought by the Presidential
Council on Nation Branding and LG.”
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Figure 1: "May I help you?" (screenshot from “Saranghaeyo, Korea” ad)

Figure 2: “I’m sorry” (screenshot from “Saranghaeyo, Korea” ad)
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Figure 3: “Here you are” (screenshot from “Saranghaeyo, Korea” ad)

Figure 4: “After you, Ma’am” (screenshot from “Saranghaeyo, Korea” ad)
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Figure 5: “For Korea to be loved by the people of the world” (screenshot from
“Saranghaeyo, Korea” ad)

Figure 6: End title (screenshot from “Saranghaeyo, Korea” ad)
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The ad is interesting in many aspects. First of all, the ad is interesting in
terms of the production. For Korean viewers, the ad looked and sounded familiar,
not just because it featured characters from the familiar Korean and Western
masterpiece paintings that they learned from the high school textbooks, but because
it modeled after a well-received ad series for LG products that also featured
masterpiece paintings.
In 2007-8, the LG Group launched a series of ads. Those ads parodied famous
Western and Korean masterpiece paintings within which LG products such as
television, air conditioner, shampoo, notebook computer, mobile phone, and so on,
were “placed” in a PPL (product placement) style. The ad series were successful and
highly praised within the advertising community and regarded as contributing to
the premium image for LG products and brands (Y.-k. Kim, Pak, & O, 2009).
The public service ad for nation branding by LG was developed on the basis
of the themes and visual templates of the LG brand advertisements. HS Ad, an inhouse ad agency for LG Group, which had produced the LG corporate branding
campaign ads, took charge of the production of the public campaign ad for nation
branding. Thus, the seamless continuity between the corporate brand ads for LG and
the public service ad for the nation brand Korea is striking in terms of overall
themes and visual elements. The continuity is also apparent in terms of sound. The
nation brand ad adopted one of the signature theme music pieces of LG brand
advertisements. It slightly changed the original mid-tempo chamber music style
piece by adding Korean traditional instruments.
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Even the awkward phrase in the public service ad, “Saranghaeyo, Korea” was
a direct adaptation from a famous signature phrase for the LG brand, “Saranghaeyo,
LG.” The phrase “saranghaeyo” literally means “I love you,” but the LG Group had
used the expression “saranghaeyo, LG” in their long-lasting corporate branding
campaign.
As a result of all these intertextual and institutional continuities, the nation
branding ad looked and sounded like a typical LG corporate brand ad. This effect
may or may not be intended, but reveals a specific relation interwoven through the
practices of nation branding between the government and the private conglomerate.
The PCNB claimed to be the “control tower” for nation branding, but in fact, it
depended on private conglomerates for its human, financial, and creative resources.
It asked major conglomerates to dispatch their marketing staffs and to produce
public service advertisements for the nation branding campaign. In this way, the
government asserted its public authority without expanding the organization.
Moreover, the nation brand and identity depended on, and were seamlessly
conflated with, the corporate brand and identity. The private conglomerates
provided corporate resources to the governmental work with a national cause. For
the production of the public service advertisement discussed above, the LG
conglomerate utilized their resources in a time-saving and cost-efficient way
because they used their in-house ad agency and utilized their own pre-existing
creative templates. It was a profitable business for LG because they not just
inscribed their corporate brand in the nation brand but also earned the reputation
for “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) (Y.-k. Kim & Chŏn, 2010; Y.-k. Kim et al.,
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2009; C.-y. Yun, 2013). In this way, the LG-produced nation branding campaign ad
illustrates an interwoven relation between the government and business.
The ad is also notable in terms of how it represented South Korea and the
world and educated citizens on global etiquettes. It is based on a familiar theme of
the encounter between the West and the East (Korea) in a witty way. The tradition
and culture of Korea seemed on a par with those of the West in this face-to-face
encounter. The ad gently evoked the participation and hosting of the G20 Summit as
something for Korean citizens to be proud of. Thus, the appeal of the ad hinged on
how it evoked the public of the developmental aspiration for the status of an
advanced country.
The characters coming out of famous masterpiece paintings interact with
each other in polite manners following globally-accepted etiquette. They also seem
to exchange Korean greetings such as bowing for a couple of times, but the manners
and expressions mostly follow the Western customs of politeness. Aired on Korean
television networks, the public service ad apparently aims to educate the Korean
public to learn a global (Western) way of being hospitable and polite, especially in
preparation for the international event of the G20 Seoul Summit.
It is also worth pointing out that the famous paintings originated in Western
Europe although the G20 encompassed various countries, not just Western
European countries, but also the BRICs and other mid-to-large economies (Turkey,
Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, and Indonesia). The “world”
according to the ad was configured exclusively to the West, tailored to the
developmental aspiration of South Korea. Reminding the aspiration, the ad
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attempted to persuade the citizens to learn global etiquettes within the hierarchic
imagination of South Korea and the world.
Digital media and citizen participation
The PCNB adopted a wide variety of promotion and publicity campaigns,
which notably involved citizen participation and the use of digital communications.
Especially, The PCNB utilized various online and digital media platforms as a “costefficient” method of publicity and promotion (C.-i. Yun, 2010, pp. 120-121).
First of all, for the publicity of Korea’s positive image, the PCNB set up its
own website (Koreabrand.net), blogs (at Naver.com and Daum.net), and other
online channels (YouTube, twitter, Facebook, etc.) in multiple languages (PCNB,
2013a, p. 251).
More notably, the PCNB recruited internet users, especially college students,
to produce online content that promoted Korea’s positive image. For instance, as
part of the effort for “public diplomacy,” the PCNB operated “World Students in
Korea” program from 2009, in which international students residing in Korea were
selected to write blog posts on their own languages about various aspects of Korea
on their own blogs (PCNB, 2013a, p. 247).
Later in 2010, the PCNB also launched the “Korea Brand Bloggers” program
in which Korean web users (called as “Korea brand blog supporters” and later
“Korea brand content reporters”) were recruited to publicize Korea’s various
aspects on their own blogs and/or contribute to the PCNB publicity website (PCNB,
2013a, p. 264). The PCNB provided the bloggers or reporters with a small amount of
writer’s fee as well as an access to various events and camps to experience Korean
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culture and society such as visits to industrial facilities and historic places (PCNB,
2009d).
The PCNB also organized online contests and events in collaboration with
major global or domestic commercial online services such as Flickr, YouTube, and
Pandora, and encourage net users to participate in nation branding. For instance, in
2009, the PCNB launched the “Korea image making campaign,” in collaboration with
Flickr.com, encouraging net users to upload images and photos positively
representing Korea. The PCNB argued that the campaign successfully changed the
search result of the keyword “Korea” on Flickr, reducing North Korea-related
images from 72 percent to 39 percent (PCNB, 2009b).
For another example among many others, the PCNB held a series of “UCC”
(user-created content) contests on the YouTube channel. Under the broad theme of
“Experience Korea,” the PCNB asked domestic and international net users to upload
their own video clips on the YouTube, describing “Digital Life in/with Korea,” “My
Korean Food Recipe,” “My vacation in Korea,” “My G-20 Agenda,” “Hangul in the
World,” and so on (PCNB, 2013a, p. 274).
Within the marketing and business circle, such ideas as “consumer
participation marketing,” “customer participation marketing” and “consumerbusiness collaboration” emerged as a leading trend (Ku & Na, 2009). Especially the
rise of digital media technologies was regarded as facilitating the “participatory”
trend of marketing in the age of “marketing 3.0” (Kotler, Kartajaya, & Setiawan,
2010).
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It is notable that the PCNB quickly picked up the buzzwords in the rising
marketing trend, “participation” and “digital,” in the publicity and promotion for
nation branding. The PCNB was able to adopt cutting-edge marketing techniques
(aside from how successful they were), indebted to its organizational structure as a
government-business collaborative body (C.-i. Yun, 2010, p. 127). Through these
marketing techniques, the Council was able to boast that they induced citizens’
voluntary involvement and contribution to nation branding. In its comprehensive
report in 2013, the PCNB included small details about the digital participation of
citizens (about 70 pages out of 350 page-report) (PCNB, 2013a).
In the “participation marketing” campaign, the Council adopted business
marketing tools to mobilize citizens for nation branding. The adoption of
participation marketing illustrates the changing mode of citizen mobilization in
government-led campaigns from the developmental mobilization of the past.
Moreover, the PCNB conducted citizen participation marketing through digital
media in a cost-effective way by passing the actual work of promotion on to the staff
from business and to participating citizens and residing foreigners.
Branding mobilizes affective attachment and emotional loyalty of the
consumer (Arvidsson, 2005). Nation branding appropriates citizen participation in a
commercial way in the sense that the nationalist, patriotic passion is converted into
collective loyalty to the nation brand.
The nation branding campaign through the participation marketing tools
depended on the social conditions in which the “participants,” who were usually
college students seeking jobs, were situated. A number of public institutions and
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private organizations have offered idea contests and prize contests that usually
involved digital media activities such as blogging and video production. Many young
college students in South Korea have been eager to participate in these contests to
add a line on their résumé and to increase their job opportunities (Y.-r. Kim, 2009;
Ku & Na, 2009, p. 113). In this context, the participation marketing tools were in fact
used to exploit digital, “free labor” of participants for commercial purpose in the
guise of voluntary and active participation of the public (Arvidsson, 2005).
Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined the public policies for nation branding, focusing
on the policy activities by the PCNB and investigated the nature of nation branding
in South Korea. The PCNB took the role of coordinating substantive policies that
respective governmental departments and agencies executed and the role of
communicating and publicizing the governmental public policies for nation
branding. The public policies for nation branding were governed under the guidance
of the principles of the government-business coordination and the participation of
the citizens. Based on the examination so far, in the concluding section, I will discuss
a few points about the nature and implications of the public policy for nation
branding.
The public policy for nation branding needs to be understood in the
sociopolitical context of the advance of neoliberalization and provides a clue to
understand the post-developmental contingency of neoliberalization in South Korea.
Neoliberalism, among other dimensions, could be conceptualized as a set of
institutions and norms which put the whole society to serve on the imperative of
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market competitiveness under the premise of globalization beyond one’s control. In
the mandate of neoliberalization, the state is asked to be revamped as a brand-state
in the global market. The Lee Myung-bak government, led by a former CEO for a
conglomerate, openly advocated neoliberal ideology by proclaiming businessfriendly policies. He accelerated the process of neoliberalization through promoting
outright deregulation, liberalization and privatization.
The PCNB was established as a governmental institution at presidential level,
symbolizing a serious commitment by the Lee government to nation branding and a
brand-state, which the business sector spearheaded by the news media and think
tanks have demanded for years. The PCNB coordinated to reorganize and straighten
out the existing public policy actions with regard to nation branding, which were
taken care of by various governmental departments and agencies: including
dispatching volunteers overseas, providing ODA, promoting Korean culture and
Korean studies overseas, executing national image ads, providing supports to
multicultural families, educating Korean tourists on global etiquettes, and so on.
These policy actions for nation branding aimed to promote and support
Korean business overseas as well as attract foreign investment and tourists by
providing a favorable socio-cultural climate. Nation branding seems to symbolize
the transformation of the state toward a neoliberal governance that constructed the
business-friendly space of the competitive “brand-state” in South Korea.
Considering that the policy actions listed above were in fact nothing
completely new and already in operation by respective governmental departments
and agencies, what really changed with the establishment of the PCNB was that they
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were rebranded and paid more attention than before. In that sense, the main focus
of the PCNB was on the publicity and promotion of governmental policies on nation
branding and of the impending global event, the Seoul Summit of G20 in 2010. In
terms of the aspect of publicity and promotion, the PCNB included in their work the
development of the nation brand index, and the production of public service ads on
global etiquettes, and the recruitment of college students, domestic and
international, for the publicity of Korea through digital media.
It is notable that these publicity activities were highly dependent on the
mobilization of big business such as Samsung (for the SERI-PCNB NBDO index), LG
Group, and other chaebŏls (for public service ads and digital publicity). However, the
appearance of the mobilization of big business by the government may be at the
same time the continued intervention by chaebŏls into the state management and
nation branding with their own stake. The PCNB in effect worked as if it was a
publicity or advertising agency run by big business for the government in the name
of the cooperation between the government and business. The PCNB highly
depended on big business for financial and creative resources while big business
pushed corporate claims in the nation branding campaign. The mobilization of big
business was not through a forced pressure by the government, but through the
sharing of interest in the name of cooperation.
The PCNB’s publicity and promotion activities also reveal how they
attempted to mobilize citizens for nation branding. In practice, the PCNB made its
efforts for the international event, G20, and attempted to mobilize and educate
citizens on global etiquettes for the event. It implies that the nation branding
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campaign was more domestically oriented than globally conscious. In the attempt to
mobilize citizens, the PCNB did not adopt developmental methods of coercion. It did
not even use admonishing and didactic tone adopted by the nation branding
campaign by the news media. Rather, the participatory events centered on a
voluntary method of using digital media and the public campaign used advertisingstyled persuasion. The nation branding campaign addressed individual citizens for
voluntary participation in nation branding and aimed to produce the subject of
“brand-citizens” with motivations for self-improvement and competitive personal
branding in the neoliberal context.
Underlying the construction of neoliberal brand-citizens was the national
imaginary of South Korea as an advanced country, standing side by side with the
Western developed countries in the global stage in the G20 Summit. In particular,
the public service ads, commissioned by the PCNB and produced by LG, projected
the aspiration for the status of an advanced country by placing the Western and
Korean paintings side by side. The campaign ads urged the citizens with the
aspiration for an advanced country to follow the global standard and norm,
symbolized in global etiquettes.
The PCNB’s public policy for nation branding, especially policy actions for the
publicity and promotion, illustrates how the productions of the space of the
neoliberal brand-state and the subject of the neoliberal brand-citizens was
predicated on the post-developmental imaginary of the nation as standing in the
rank of the advanced countries.
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CHAPTER 6
THE “KOREA PUBLICITY” CAMPAIGN AND ITS DISCONTENT
A print ad, placed on the New York Times in March 12, 2014, caused a little
scuffle in the public discursive space in South Korea. The ad (Figure 7) featured
Shin-soo Choo (a.k.a. Ch'u Sin-su), a South Korea-born Major League Baseball player.
Breaking 130-million-dollar deal with the Texas Rangers in 2013, he became a
celebrity in South Korea and in Texas, but not necessarily elsewhere. In the ad, he is
not in his usual baseball helmet and uniform which baseball fans are used to, but in
a casual outfit without a baseball cap. In this way, it is not likely that he is
recognized by the majority (especially, considering the ad is on the New York Times).
Instead of holding a baseball bat, he is grabbing a dish full of food in his left hand
and a pair of chopsticks in his right fingers. With a piece of meat between the
chopsticks, he seems to suggest that readers try a certain kind of food. From the
headline of the ad, "Bulgogi” with a question mark, it is highly likely that the food is
pulgogi (bulgogi), a Korean-style grilled dish made of beef marinated in sweet soy
sauce.
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Figure 7: A Korean food ad titled “Bulgogi,” which appeared on the New York
Times, March 12, 2014 (Image from the article, No, 2014).
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The next day, a Korean news agency Newsis favorably reported the
appearance of the ad (No, 2014). The report relied almost exclusively on the press
release package provided by Mr. Seo Kyoung-duk (Sŏ Kyŏng-dŏk) who had this ad
run on the New York Times. In the report, which were widely reproduced across
mainstream media in South Korea, Mr. Seo expressed his intention: “Mr. Choo, who
has a lot of fans in the United States, came out as an advertising endorser. With him,
I want to introduce pulgogi to New Yorkers in a more familiar way.” Donating his
“talent” to the ad for free, Mr. Choo also commented, “I agree with the purpose of
publicizing our Korean food to the world. As a Korean, I appeared on the ad to
provide support.” The news report also featured three images — the original copy of
the ad, the image of the page A8 of the New York Times where the ad was printed,
and the photo of the two gentlemen.
For many South Koreans, the message of the ad seemed obvious. An ethnic
Korean, who made a great success in the world’s best stage and won respect as a
national pride by many South Koreans, was promoting a favorite Korean food
pulgogi to the people of the world on the world’s prestigious newspaper. Associating
Koreanness to many “bests” of the world, this ad definitely aimed to make South
Koreans feel good about and be proud of their food, their country, and themselves.
The appearance of the ad itself on the New York Times became a news item widely
reported in most news media in South Korea.
It was a business as usual for the news media to widely and favorably report
this kind of publicity stunt deployed by Mr. Seo and others. This publicity had been
called “kukka hongbo 국가 홍보” (the “promotion of Korea,” or the “Korea
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publicity”)46 in South Korea, and it could be conceived more broadly of as part of the
“public diplomacy” by non-government actors. The news media had been reporting
Mr. Seo’s publicity stunt as a goodwill and patriotic act for years by then.
In the next few days, the situation changed sharply as critical remarks on the
ad spread on the internet. It started with a few pieces of news reports or rather, blog
postings by the US news media. Luis Clemens, editor for race and identity of NPR,
followed the ad that he found “weird” and “disorienting” (Clemens, 2014). He wrote
that he was not able to understand why the ad was advertising a generic Korean
food rather than a specific brand or a restaurant, and followed the clues to make
sense of the ad. In the process, he was led to the website,
ForTheNextGeneration.com only to find English phrases written obviously by a nonnative speaker and a more confusing hotchpotch of South Korea-related information
such as K-pop, Korean food, history, territory, and the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter
Olympic Games. He was finally able to locate the ad in the context of a series of ad
campaigns that promoted Korean food and culture that Mr. Seo had been running
for several years. He also found that the ad was sponsored by Chicken Maru, a
Korean fried chicken franchise, which was also a mystery to him.
The ad was also spotted by Jon Tayler of Sports Illustrated, who got
interested in this ad because it featured a highly paid baseball player. In his online
report, he called this ad “bizarre” (Tayler, 2014), suggesting its poor quality and

The phrase “kukka hongbo 국가 홍보” literally means “country-publicity”
or “country-promotion.” In this study, I translate it into English as the “promotion of
Korea” or the “Korea publicity.”
46
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messy communication. A few days later, David Gianatasio of Adweek found this ad as
“the year’s oddest celebrity endorsement” (Gianatasio, 2014).
These cynical remarks, in turn, drew serious attention in South Korea. These
articles were deemed as significant news reports by the “influential news media of
the United States” (McPherson, 2014) although they were as casual as personal blog
postings by news reporters. Many news media as well as blogs and online
community forums discussed these articles, and they added critiques in rather
direct and heated languages than those suggestive articles. Some blogs and
community board postings advocated the sincerity and patriotism of Mr. Seo despite
shortcomings (for instance, K’ŭrosŭrod (2014) and Kŏlpidi (2014)). Yet many
others joined the harsh criticism of his ad campaign for its narrow-sighted,
nationalistic, self-centered, and unprofessional amateurism. Examples are found in
the discussion forum on reddit.com ("Choo Shin-soo bulgogi advertising. What do
you think about this ad?," 2014), and the discussion that followed the online news
article on huffingtonpost.kr (P. Kang, 2014).
Notably, the criticism raised by the Western news media reporters drew
wider public attention in South Korea even though some domestic writers have
already raised similar criticisms on the issues of the Korea publicity campaign by
the non-state actors. Moreover, the effects of the criticism by the Western reporters
published in the US media websites were amplified and resonated by writers and
reporters for the domestic news media. Especially, the criticism was relayed by
those writers with broader transnational experiences and cosmopolitan
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perspectives -- an American residing in Korea, and Korean correspondents residing
abroad.
For instance, Joe McPherson of ZenKimchi, a Korean food blog, criticized the
nationalist blindness of the ad, the Korean media, and the public. He wrote in the
online edition of Chung’ang Ilbo:
These ads are confusing and ridiculous to Americans. The main problem of
the Korea publicity by Seo and other “brand experts” is that the target of the
publicity is not foreigners. They want to say to Koreans, “We're doing this.”
The Korean media would spotlight the Korea-related ads in New York Times
or Times Square. An idiot can have an ad run on the New York Times if he has
money. This kind of nationalism does not help the Korea publicity. If you are
a true public relations expert, you need to thoroughly analyze the target and
the market and calculate the investment effects and risks. One word can
describe this kind of ad: embarrassment. As a foreigner who loves Korea, I do
not understand why Korea continues to spend money to make such a
campaign (McPherson, 2014).
Jane Han, New York correspondent of the Korea Times, an English-language
newspaper, blamed the ad for making a Korean sports hero “laughingstock.” She
called the ad a “PR catastrophe” (J. Han, 2014), failing to understand the PR barrier
beyond confined cultural customs. Pak Chŏng-yŏn, reporter of
Chaeoedongp'osinmun (the Overseas Koreans Newspaper), residing in Cambodia,
wrote in Ohmynews, a leading online news media:
Mr. Seo’s ads were made from Koreans’ perspectives and lacked the
consideration of foreigners who do not have sufficient understanding of
Korean culture…… The Korea publicity, which started from the sense of
cultural superiority and self-centered worldview, can risk a disgraceful
calling of an underdeveloped country and generate the sneer from the
international society (C.-y. Pak, 2014).
The controversy around the Korea publicity campaign by Mr. Seo suggests
the extent to which publics were concerned about the international image of South
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Korea seen from the external perspective in line with global standards. While the
news media, celebrities, and the public had almost unanimously supported the
Korea publicity activities and ad campaigns by Mr. Seo and the like, there were
raised some questions and critiques against Mr. Seo’s Korea publicity campaign for
several years. However, with the Choo’s pulgogi ad controversy, the perception of
the Korea publicity campaign suddenly fell from “national pride” to a “disgrace” (C.y. Pak, 2014) and “shame” (S.-d. Sin, 2014). The controversy around this ad
campaign illustrates that the examination of the national image promotion should
not be limited to the governmental public policy nor to the news media campaign
for nation branding which I covered in the previous chapters.
In this chapter, I examine the public engagement with and the debate around
the promotion of the nation brand and national image. Especially, I focus on an
aspect of public diplomacy, performed by non-state organizations and individuals in
the name of the “promotion of Korea” or the “Korea publicity.”
First, I examine how non-state actors deployed the Korea publicity campaign,
the public engagement with the nation image and brand promotion. The Korea
publicity campaign emerged as nationalistic responses to the regional politics in
East Asia in the context of increasing global exchanges and technological availability.
Since the late 2000s, in response to governmental policy initiatives, the campaign
has concentrated on the promotion of Korean food. In this discussion, I examine the
nature of the public engagement with nation branding and how it articulated the
collective desire for the international recognition of the excellence and legitimacy of
South Korea by the world.
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Next, I examine the public debate and critiques around the Korea publicity
campaign. The critiques pointed out the problem of the campaign in terms of its
excessive nationalism and the lack of professionalism and expertise in advertising
and public relations and the mismanagement of communication messages and
methods. They suggested that a more effective publicity should focus more closely
on the target audience of the world, rather than asserting its own cultural legitimacy
and supremacy. The critiques further suggested that the publicity should follow
adequate universal cultural codes and professional protocols in line with the global
standard.
Lastly, in the concluding section, I discuss the Korea publicity and its
criticism within wider public discourse toward the advanced nation. I discuss how
the Korea publicity campaign and its criticism were differently predicated on the
imagination of Korea as an “advanced” nation, recognized and respected by the
outside world. The Korea publicity campaign imagined that being advanced should
be recognized by the West. The critics were drawn to the imagination of an
advanced nation as embodying global standards and proper business codes.
The non-state actors for the Korea publicity
Since the early-mid 2000s, the discourses of nation branding and national
prestige have become prevalent in South Korea. Under the Lee Myung-bak
government (2008-2012), nation branding was instituted with the establishment of
the PCNB, and it became a public policy priority. Nation branding and national
prestige became a discursive framework for public policy against which other major
public policies were legitimized. Indeed, side by side with the public policy drive, the

201

ideas of nation branding and national prestige became prominent in the public
discursive space as well.
In this broad public policy setting for nation branding and national prestige,
NGOs and individuals, independent of the government, also exerted voluntary public
diplomacy efforts. In fact, the public diplomacy by non-state actors or the nongovernmental effort for the Korea publicity had a longer history: the campaign for
providing (correct) information about (wrongly known) Korea to the world had
developed before, and independently from, the government campaigns for nation
branding by the Lee government.
The non-governmental campaign for the Korea publicity emerged as
voluntary individual and civic activism, triggered by the regional politics in East
Asia. Around the year 2000, conflicts over historical and territorial issues
deteriorated between Korea and Japan as the Japanese government attempted to
revise history textbooks in order to glorify the past imperialist Japan, denied
apology and compensation over “comfort women” issue, and claimed sovereignty
over Tokto (Dokdo) islets (called Takeshima in Japan). Japan and Korea also
competed over the name of the sea between them (the Sea of Japan or East Sea) in
the international stage (Bong, 2013). Moreover, the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences promoted the “Northeast Project,” which included an attempt to
incorporate the ancient kingdom of Koguryŏ (Goguryo) in Northeast Asia
exclusively into Chinese history (Gries, 2005). The Korean government responded
to these provocations by Japan and China on the history and territories through
diplomatic and policy measures, but the nationalist sentiment of anger and
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resentment grew among Korean publics. It was in this atmosphere in the early
2000s that voluntary individuals and civic activists intervened in these issues. Most
notable among them who engaged with the publicity activities were the VANK and
Mr. Seo Kyung-deok.
The Voluntary Agency Network of Korea (VANK) was founded in 1999 by Mr.
Pak Ki-t’ae (Park Ki-tae) as an online-based collaborative network of volunteers
(prkorea.com). The VANK claims to be have up to 75,000 members, who are called
volunteer “cyber-diplomats” (T. a.-ŭ. Song, 2015, p. 212). It has carried out a
campaign to find out and correct “errors” in a wide variety of Korea-related
information in textbooks, libraries, maps, and websites (Wikipedia, the World
Factbook by the CIA and so on) around the world. For instance, they sent letters to
those who were in charge of those documents and records and pressured to change
the names “Takeshima” or “Liancourt Rocks” to “Tokto” and to change the name of
the “Sea of Japan” to “East Sea.” Notably, a majority of the VANK members were
composed of middle to high school students, who were eager to use “collective
intelligence” to locate erroneous information on the Internet all over the world (T.
a.-ŭ. Song, 2015).
Mr. Seo earned considerable media and public attention by conducting a
public service ad campaign on famous newspapers and billboards. Most notably, he
had a series of full-page opinion ads concerning the Tokto issue placed in the New
York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal since 2008. He also had
a video-format advertisement run on the electronic billboard in Times Square on
March 1, 2010, the anniversary of the March 1st Movement against the Japanese
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occupation in 1919 (I.-s. Kang, 2010). Financially sponsored among others by a
popular music singer, Kim Chang-hun, famous for his generous donations for cause,
these ads affirmed that Tokto belonged to South Korea, not Japan (C.-h. Kim, 2010).
These ads refuted Japan’s territorial claim for Tokto (“Do You Know” ad in 2008)(C.
a.-h. No, 2008), blamed the “error” (sic) of the newspaper for using the name “Sea of
Japan” instead of “East Sea” (“Error in NYT” ad in 2009) (No, 2009b) (Figure 8), and
promoted South Korea and Tokto as tourist attractions. The 2012 Tokto ad,
sponsored by Gmarket1 (S.-h. Pak, 2012), argued for Tokto being South Korean
territory, likening to Sicily being Italian territory and Hawaii being American (Figure
9).

Figure 8 "Do You Know?" ad in 2008 and "Error in NYT" ad in 2009 (Images
from the articles, C. a.-h. No, 2008; No, 2009b, respectively)
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Figure 9: "Visit Dokdo" ad in Times Square in 2010 (image from I.-s. Kang,
2010) and "Connect" ad on the NYT on March 1, 2012 (C.-h. Chŏn, 2012)
Along with the historical and territorial issues in Northeast Asia, Mr. Seo
turned to promoting Korean food in his ad campaign in the late 2000s, by the time
the South Korean government took the promotion of Korean cuisine as one of the
major public policy agenda. Especially, in relation to the public policy effort for
nation branding, the government launched the Korea Food Foundation (KFF) and
pushed the drive for the global promotion of Korean cuisine (한식 세계화 추진
hansik segyehwa ch’ujin). In the context of the rise of nation branding, the project of
Korean food promotion was regarded as contributing to national economic wealth
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and national pride. Thus, the project was widely supported by the news media and
drew attention from the general public.
The governmental campaign for the promotion of Korean food received a
positive response among publics as it was regarded as enhancing national pride and
national image. It was regarded as an apolitical, national issue that transcended
partisan interests. In the public opinion survey by Korea Research in 2009-2010, 92
percent of the respondents agreed on the necessity of the global promotion of
hansik (H.-c. ŏ. Yi, 2014). Around the year 2010 when the nation branding campaign
was at its height, it was regarded as a great national cause to spread good images
and information of Korea across the world. Deeply embedded in the developmental
as well as neoliberal imperatives, the best way to deliver it passed as
commercialization and industrialization.
Mr. Seo’s ad campaign found extra boost when he was featured in the most
popular television show in South Korea at that time, Muhandojŏn (Infinite Challenge)
on Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC). The reality-television-inspired show
set various challenging goals for the show members to competitively but comically
accomplish or to work out together. In 2009, the show set the goal of promoting
Korean food and received sponsorship from the MoFAT and the Korean Food
Foundation (Chŏngch'aekkonggam, 2011). The show invited Mr. Seo for the
consultation of their tasks. Over a few episodes, the show followed how the show
members along with Mr. Seo managed to conceive and produce a print ad to
promote pibimpap. They finally had the ad published on the New York Times, in A23,
December 21, 2009. Titled “how about bibimbap for lunch today?,” the ad featured a

206

picture of pibimbap garnished with egg and various colorful vegetables. Then it
listed 17 Korean restaurants located in Koreatown on 32nd street in Manhattan
(Figure 10).
The next year, the show members made efforts to produce a video ad on the
outdoor billboards at Times Square. It incorporated a variety of Korean traditional
and modern cultural elements (samulnori performance, puch'aech'um dance,
t’alch’um dance, t’aekwondo, and a percussion performance, Nanta) to give shape to
Korean food, pibimpap. The 30-second ad ended with the phrase, “the taste of
harmony, bibimbap,” epitomizing the concept of the ad, and then the phrase “the
taste of Korea,” with the shot of the show members pausing in a funny gesture
(Figure 11). The ad was run every 30 minutes until the end of the year, totally about
500 times. This ad was directed by Mr. Ch’a Ŭn-taek (Cha Eun-taek), one of the most
prominent music video and ad directors in South Korea. Mr. Seo also participated in
the production as a Korea publicity expert. It featured 200 dance major students,
exhibiting various traditional Korean dances and performances.47

The video ad is available to watch on the official YouTube channel of the
KFF, “the Taste of Korea” (The Taste of Korea, 2010).
47
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Figure 10: "Bibimbap" ad on the New York Times (Image from the article,
Hyŏn-jun Kim, 2010)
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Figure 11: Screenshots of “Taste of harmony, bibimbap” ad (Images captured
from The Taste of Korea, 2010).
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These ads were almost unanimously praised by the news media as well as in
blogs, online forums, and social media for creatively showing the excellency and
diversity of Korean food and culture. For instance, a blogger, specialized in
advertising, praised the colorful and dynamic video quality of the ad and expressed
a patriotic feeling in the blog posting titled, “Extraordinary creativity” (Kwanggoin,
2014). For another, Medius, an online news media, published a blog-style article,
“Why is Muhandojŏn’s pibimpap ad great?,” which praised the artistic achievement
and the patriotic implication of the ad:
The pibimpap video ad, which was created with pure patriotism and
enthusiasm, with help by civil experts, genuinely expresses a thirst and
affection for our own thing. Hundreds of participants played their own roles
and put together to express the message of harmony hidden in pibimpap,
which seemed to bring us back together in the time when we are scattered
like sand (Ch’aimi, 2010).
The popularity of and the attention to the video ad is illustrated by the fact
that many Koreans residing in or visiting the Manhattan area bothered to visit
Times Square to see this ad on the electronic billboard in person. Many of them took
photos and videos on their own of the billboard running the ad,48 and they posted
them on their own blogs, community forums, and on their YouTube channel.
Typically, they added to the photos and videos how they felt patriotic and proud of
their country when they visited the venue. For instance, Hŏ Su-jin, a member of
“Young Hyundai Global Reporters,” a community group of college student interns

These media cultural practices of making use of digital technologies and
networks are called “chiktchik 직찍” and “chikk'aem 직캠” in South Korea, which
were the abbreviation of “chikchŏp tchigŭn sajin” (photo taken in person) and
“chikchŏp tchigŭn yŏngsang” (video taken in person) respectively.
48
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managed by Hyundai Motors, visited Times Square and wrote a blog posting of the
photos of Korea- and Hyundai-related advertisements, including the pibimpap video
ad (S.-j. Hŏ, 2010). Rokimsa, a power blogger writing its everyday life in New York,
visited Times Square, waited for 30 minutes to watch the pibimpap ad, and posted
photos of its own taken with pride (Rokimsa, 2010).49
In 2013, Mr. Seo followed up to have a series of print ads on Korean food
placed in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times. These ads promoted
representative Korean cuisines such as makkoli (makgeolli), pibimbap (bibimbap),
and kimch’i (kimchi) that were among those items chosen for the global promotion
of Korean food by the government. These ads featured television and film celebrities
such as Song Il-guk, Yi Yŏng-ae, and Kim Yun-jin, who were born in South Korea but
more or less gained international fame.50 They willingly appeared in the ads free of
charge for the cause (Figure 12).

On YouTube, there are many video clips of the pibimpap ad in Times
Square. They are also taken and uploaded on their own by Koreans who resided in
or visited New York at the time the video ad was running on the billboard. For
instance, cocoaya777 (https://youtu.be/VmiNLGIs0nA), mintmochaa
(https://youtu.be/aHuj1rAGlos), jy3186 (https://youtu.be/nFlgRjqatas), Yujin Bae
(https://youtu.be/hyBZZO8fVGw) , and so on.
50 Song Il-guk (a.k.a. Song Il-gook or Song Il-kook) is a South Korean actor
who earned fame when he played the leading role in the Korean historical serial
drama Jumong, televised on MBC in 2006.
Yi Yŏng-ae (a.k.a. Lee Young-ae) is a South Korean actress who emerged as
one of the most famous Hallyu (Korean Wave) stars when she played the leading
role in the enormously successful Korean historical serial drama Tae Chang-gǔm (or
Dae Jang Geum), televised on MBC in 2003-2004 and exported to gain popularity in
East Asia and Middle East afterwards.
Kim Yun-jin (aka Kim Yunjin) is a South Korea-born, American actress, who
earned fame for her role on the American television series Lost, televised on NBC in
2004-2010.
49
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Figure 12: "Bibimbap" ad featuring Yi Yŏng-ae, shown side by side with the
front page of the New York Times in 2013 (Image from the article "Yi Yŏng-ae,
nyuyokt'aimsŭ pibimbap kwanggoe 'chaenŭnggibu' [Yi Yŏng-ae, 'Talent
Donation' in New York Times bibimbap advertisement]," 2013)
Riding on the successful and acclaimed ad campaign, Mr. Seo brought the
Korean food ads to other places around the world such as Pataya (Thailand) (J.-y.
Kim, 2013), Shanghai (China), Tashkent (Uzbek), Seoul (South Korea) and so on (No,
2013; S.-j. Yu, 2013) (Figure 13). The video ad was also aired overseas via Arirang
TV, an English-language broadcasting run by the South Korean government (Han-ju
Kim, 2010).
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Figure 13: Mr. Seo pausing in front of "Bibimbap?" ad featuring Yi Yŏng-ae on
the billboard in Qipulu, Shanghai, 2013 (Image from the article, No, 2013)
The public support for the Korea publicity
The non-state actors such as VANK and Mr. Seo were widely supported and
praised by the mainstream media as well as by publics. Through their prominent
activities, they also gained a wide popular participation and sponsorship, as well as
the financial support by the government. When the Lee government tried to slash
the budget to support the VANK, it was harshly criticized by the media and had to
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restore it. The news media and publics often contrasted the government’s behavior
with the donation by a popular singer Kim Chang-hun (a.k.a. Kim Jang-hoon), who
had generously supported the VANK and Mr. Seo (Y.-h. Ch’oe, 2008). Mr. Seo’s
campaign ads for promoting Korea and Korean food gained wide media and public
attention and found broad support and praise. The pulgogi ad featuring Mr. Choo
was a follow-up of the series of ads with Korean celebrities endorsing Korean food.
To understand the positive response to and favorable support from publics
for the campaign, two major conditions should be considered which characterize the
non-state activities for the promotion of Korea.
On the one hand, the non-governmental promotion of Korea resorted to
nationalist sentiment, stimulated by regional conflicts in East Asia such as history
textbooks, “comfort women” and territorial disputes in the 2000s. It also reflected
an emerging sense of national pride and self-confidence expressed in the 2002
World Cup event.
The campaign itself often became a focus of heated exchange in the
international politics in the region. For instance, the pibimbap print ad in 2009
became an object of a quarrel with the provocation by a Japanese journalist, Kuroda
Katsuhiro. Having resided in Seoul over 30 years working for the right-wing Sankei
Shimbun and written many books on Korea including Korean food, he caused a little
stir by making a remark with regard to the pibimbap ad. In his column for Sankei
Shimbun on December 26, 2009, the far-right journalist wrote that the food was
likened to “lamb head, dog meat” because it looked colorful and beautiful when set,
but looked strange and squashy when mixed up to eat. He thus showed skepticism
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about the global success of the food (H.-s. Kim, 2009). The four-character Chinese
idiom, “lamb head, dog meat” (yangduguyuk, read in Korean), is used for the case of
exaggerated packaging and even hypocrisy, a similar expression to “crying out wine
and selling vinegar.” When his column was reported in the Korean news media,
many Koreans took his remark as disregarding Korean food and insulting Korean
identity. His former remarks were freshly recalled which referred to Tokto as
“symbol of patriotism” and Japanese comfort women as “chose [to be one] out of
poverty” ("Chuhan il ŏllonin hansik hŭmjimnaegi [Japanese journalist resident in
Korea Scratching Korean food]," 2009). Kim T’ae-ho, program director of the
Muhandojŏn show stung back at him, blaming his “ignorance” (No, 2009a). The
controversy escalated as Kuroda claimed in his next column that he had received a
call to threaten to kill him (T.-g. Song, 2010).
The non-governmental campaign for the Korea publicity helped and was
helped by this rising nationalist sentiment in the context of East Asian geopolitics
(Takahara, 2007). The governments occasionally attempted to utilize the nationalist
sentiment among publics, but they were usually cautious and even reluctant to
resort to popular nationalism in the matter of formal diplomacy. The nationalist
public often regarded the official line of diplomacy, the so-called “quiet diplomacy”51
“Quiet diplomacy” in South Korean context refers to the diplomatic policy
line in which keeping a low profile and exerting back channels and personal
contacts is regarded as the best method of the management and the resolution of
international conflicts. It especially refers to the official diplomatic line concerning
the Tokto issue. As South Korea maintains the “substantial ownership and effective
control” of the islets, it argues, it is South Korea’s best interest not to respond to the
provocations by Japan. However, quiet diplomacy was often caught up in
controversies. For instance, in 2006, when Japan attempted to conduct maritime
51
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by the government, as passive and half-hearted. Instead, the public praised the nongovernmental efforts for the Korea publicity by the VANK and Mr. Seo and
contrasted them with the official quiet diplomacy.
On the other hand, the changing media environment provided a fertile soil
for “net nationalism” in East Asia (Takahara, 2007). Since the early 2000s, news
articles have been consumed more on the online platform than on paper. Moreover,
online news service was monopolized by Naver, a monopoly operator for online
search engine and portal service.52 As most news providers (newspapers,
broadcasters, and internet news) depended on the Naver News service by Naver for
web traffic and online revenue, they competed to draw attention with soft and
“tabloid” news items which could induce more “clicks” (C.-g. Yi, 2007). The
subordination of news to Naver and the “ghettoization of journalism” exacerbated
around 2010 (W.-g. Kim et al., 2013).
The news featuring the Korea publicity were suitable news items for the
news providers to exploit in this media environment as their appeal to nationalist
sentiment and their potential for light consumption. Many news articles of the Korea

surveys around Tokto waters, the liberal Roh government seriously reexamined the
diplomatic line (Ch’a, 2006). A public opinion survey revealed that 93 percent of the
respondents agreed to quit the quiet diplomacy line (S.-g. Im, 2006). The
government was not consistent with the Tokto issue and caused a stir when Lee
Myung-bak visited the islets in 2012 for the first time as South Korean president
(M.-k. Kim, 2012).
52 Naver has enjoyed an absolute market monopoly position since the early
2000s. By 2012, Naver had a share of 72 percent in the search engine market. South
Korean internet users used 45 pages on Naver when they did 55 pages elsewhere.
South Koreans spent 36 percent of internet time on Naver (C.-h. Yi, 2012). Most
news consumption on the web has been on and through Naver. Naver News service
explained 40 percent of online news circulation by 2007 (S.-m. Yi, 2007).
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publicity were exploited by the news media. Numerous online news services
reproduced and duplicated news, and the legacy news media (newspapers) even
produced news solely for consumption on the web, not meant for print publication.
The non-governmental activities for the Korean publicity, especially by Mr.
Seo, took advantage of this changing media environment. At first glance, their
activities proclaiming “civilian diplomacy” seemed to target international audiences,
but in fact centered on the domestic news media and audiences at least in equal
measure. His press kit included the original ad materials accompanied by other
materials such as actual photos of the newspapers and scenes (see figures 12 and
13). His story was well circulated on the web, not necessarily in print, first by the
news wires (such as Yŏnhap News and Newsis) which were supplied the press kit by
Mr. Seo, then by numerous news media which duplicated and reproduced the
original stories by the news wires, and then by numerous bloggers and online
forums.
Controversies over the Korea publicity
While the promotion of Korea by the non-state actors drew positive
responses from the news media and publics in general, it also caused controversies
and sparked criticism, cynicism and ridicule. The VANK’s internet activism was
rarely put to criticism by the news media and publics perhaps because it was mostly
perceived as pure and just activism by righteous youth. On the contrary, Mr. Seo’s ad
campaign was frequently put under fire: especially a series of Tokto ads (Figures 8
and 9), and a series of Korean food ads (Figures 10-13).
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In this section, I examine how publics criticized Mr. Seo’s ad campaign for the
Korea publicity. I identify two different modes of criticism: the one is the criticism of
his excessive nationalism and the other of his lack of professionalism in public
diplomacy, advertising and public relations.
For the examination of the former, the criticism of excessive nationalism, I
looked into the remarks generated and circulated in two of the largest online
subculture communities, DC Inside and Ilbe. They generated satirical and cynical
remarks which ridiculed and criticized Mr. Seo’s excessive nationalism. Moreover,
subcultural criticism often went beyond the online subculture communities and
spread widely across the news media and among publics. Their neologism, witty
remarks, and sharp satire were widely shared and circulated, reflecting subcultural
responses to the contemporary social issues in South Korea
For the examination of the latter, the criticism of the lack of professionalism
in public diplomacy, advertising and public relations, I focused on the op-ed
columns by news reporters and experts for the mainstream news media. Focusing
on expert opinions in this matter does not mean that they did not criticize excessive
and emotional nationalism. Rather, the criticism of excessive nationalism underlies
the critical remarks by journalists and experts on Mr. Seo’s “unprofessional”
practices of public relations and public diplomacy.
These two aspects are closely related and cannot be separated in a clear-cut
way. The distinction between the two aspects of criticism has an analytic purpose.
They are followed by a more comprehensive discussion. Put together, the
examination of the criticisms enables to locate Mr. Seo and the controversies around
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his campaign in a wider context of the discourses and imaginations of the state and
the nation in South Korea.
Criticism of excessive nationalism
In the subcultural game of playfulness, Mr. Seo and his campaign for the
promotion of Korea was not just put into criticism but became an object of ridicule
and mockery and provided rich materials for internet memes, jokes and buzzwords.
His ad campaign was mentioned for the first time in 2008 when the “Do You
Know” Tokto ad (Figure 8, left) was published in the NYT. At the time, a DC Inside
user, Misuda, posted a clipping of a news report on his campaign on the subcommunity imageboard without any specific criticism or mockery.53 Consecutive
Tokto-related ads, including the “Visit Dokdo” ad in 2010 (Figure 9, left), drew
mixed responses with some advocating and others being suspicious of the effect and
hidden intention. On the one hand, for instance, a DC Inside user identified !!!!!
commented on a television talk show featuring Mr. Seo positively as “a meaningful
program as the National Liberation day is approaching.”54 Another user, identified
as Tokto, gave respect to Mr. Seo for his effort to advertise the Tokto issue by
contrasting it with the neglect of the issue by the National Assembly.55 On the other
hand, citing an expert opinion critical of Mr. Seo’s campaign on the Tokto issue, a DC
Misuda (2008, July 10). Kim Chang-hun, nyuyokt'aimjŭe 'toktonŭn
han'gukttang' chŏnmyŏn kwanggo sirŏ [Kim Chang-hun carries a full-page
advertisement in the New York Times, “Tokto is Korean terrority”]. Retrieved from
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=suda&no=507329
54 !!!!! (2008, August 10). Murŭp'p'aktosa miribogi [Previewing a kneejerkdosa]. Retrieved from
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=kanghodong&no=21502
55 Tokto (2008, August 12). Sŏgyŏngdŏgiran min'ganinŭn [A civilian Sŏ].
Retrieved from https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=stock&no=4626328
53
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Inside user Tchoyŏjunŭnhyŏna ridiculed him of misrepresenting Tokto for a tourist
destination. The user continued to denounce Mr. Seo as “an exemplar of stupid
patriotism.”56 Other postings in 2011 blamed Mr. Seo for his commercial intention
behind the Tokto ads,57 and called his activities as a “selling patriotism.”58
Meanwhile, “Bibimbap” ads produced by the Muhandojŏn team in
collaboration with Mr. Seo in 2010 (Figures 11 and 12) have generally been
acclaimed within online subculture communities, not quite different from the
responses from the blogosphere. One DC Inside posting, written by the user Ann,
titled “Yes, that’s the way to promote Korea,” praised the team and Mr. Seo for
exerting efforts to promote Korean culture.59 Another DC Inside user Ttugimcyu
showed an expectation about the ad and a wish to see the ad in Times Square in
person.60 Yet another posting by Kŭraesŏ praised the ad for its colorfulness and
quality.61
Tchoyŏjunŭnhyŏna (2010, August 11). Toktogwanggo, punjaengjiyŏgŭro
pich'ige hanŭn yŏkhyogwaman [Tokto advertisement, only adverse effect that
makes it appear as conflict zone]. Retrieved from
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=etc_program&no=1465984
57 Rhrh (2011, April 17). Kim Chang-hunŭl kkoktugaksiro iyonghanŭn Sŏ
Kyŏngdŏk [Seo Kyung-duk, who uses Kim Jang-hoon as a puppet]. Retrieved from
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=history&no=499966
58 Balkiri (2011, August 12). Toktoga kukchejaep'ansoe kal kyŏnguŭi
kaep'ibonŭn saram [When Tokto goes on to the International Court]. Retrieved from
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=history&no=542096
59 Ann (2010, December 8). Kŭrae, irŏn'gŏl haeya chintcha taehanmin'gugŭl
allinŭn'gŏji [Yes, that’s the way to promote Korea]. Retrieved from
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=news_new&no=55070
60 Ttugimcyu (2010, November 2). Mudo hansikhongbo kwanggo
tchingnŭndago ham [Mudo Korean Food Promotion Advertisement]. Retrieved from
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=yjs&no=64896
61 Kŭraesŏ (2010, November 26). Urinara pibimpap kwanggo [Korean
pibimpap advertisement]. Retrieved from
https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=Gdragon&no=121421
56
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Then, it was the “Bulgogi” ad featuring Shin-soo Choo in 2014 (Figure 7) that
led to an explosion of criticism of excessive nationalism and patriotism in the online
subcultures, especially in Ilbe community. An Ilbe posting by P'ŭroyagup'aeninde
cited the blog posting by the NPR reporter, mentioned in the introduction of the
chapter, and asked, “Is it exposing the bottom? I’ve seen it since the pibimpap ad
came out,” and commented, “It is embarrassing that it seems to expose [our
psychological] complex.”62 A comment to this posting lashed, “Stop kukppong
marketing!”6364 A user Hyeryŏng’i showed a feeling of hatred toward Mr. Seo and
ridiculed, “[He] thinks he is such a great patriot.”65 An agreeing comment
mentioned, “Now, it is funny just to see another “Do you know,” hahaha,”66 and
another comment ridiculed by simply asking, “Pulgogi? Kimchi? Pibimpap? Do you
know?”67 A user Paprdoxx commented, guessing the hidden intention, “I don’t think
the ad was made for Americans to see.”68

P'ŭroyagup'aeninde (2014, March 18). Sŏgyŏngdŏk kyosu tŭdiŏ padak
tŭrŏnanŭn'gŏnya? ch'amna pibimbap kwanggohal ttaebut'ŏ arabwatta. [Is it
revealing the bottom? I’ve seen it since the pibimpap ad came out]. Retrieved from
http://www.ilbe.com/view/3177428506
63 Kukhoeŭiwŏnhuboja (2014, March 18). [Comment to the posting].
Retrieved from http://www.ilbe.com/view/3177428506
64 Kukppoing marketing designates a hidden marketing plot which aims to
appeal to excessive and emotional nationalism and patriotism. More discussions of
kukppoing follow.
65 Hyeryŏng’i (2014, March 24). Kkolbogi sirŭn saekkiryugap.jpg [A fella
whose face I don’t want to see]. Retrieved from
http://www.ilbe.com/view/3213276405
66 Kanadaramabababa (2014, March 25). [Comment to the posting].
Retrieved from http://www.ilbe.com/view/3213276405
67 Praengkŭraempadŭ (2014, March 26). [Comment to the posting].
Retreived from http://www.ilbe.com/view/3213276405
68 Papardoxx (2014, June 15). Sasilsang Ch’ushinsu anti [Practically
dismissing Ch’u]. Retrieved from http://www.ilbe.com/view/6007957435
62
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To make sense of the seemingly sudden rise of criticism of Mr. Seo’s ad
campaign, it is necessary to put it in the context of a wider rhetorical terrain in the
online subcultures. The ridicule and mockery of excessive nationalism had become
one of the popular plays widespread among subcultures since the early 2010s. It
was partly a reaction to thriving nationalism on the internet, which greatly helped to
boost Mr. Seo’ s campaign. The online subcultures ridiculed and mocked excessive
nationalism as well as its commercial exploitation by the news media and
corporations. These online subculture communities coined playful, tongue-in-cheek,
and to-the-point neologisms such as “kukppong 국뽕,” “du yu no 두 유 노 do you
know,” and “haeoebanŭng 해외반응 overseas reactions,” and widely circulated as
internet memes beyond the subcultures.
The buzzword kukppong is known to be a combined word of kuk (which
means the nation) and ppong (short for “hiroppoing,” Japanese/Korean slang for
methamphetamine). Thus, kukppong designates the behaviors intoxicated with
excessive emotional nationalism and patriotism. The term became a widely
circulating buzzword since the early 2010s,69 mocking excessive nationalism and
narcissistic celebration of the grandeur and greatness of the nation of Korea. The
criticism of kukppong culminated in January 2014 with the commercial, which E1,
LPG energy company, launched ahead of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. The
television commercial for the subsidiary company of the SK conglomerate featured

It is not easy to pin down exactly when the term kukppoing was first used
among subcultures, but the item for kukppong appeared in Namuwiki as early as
2008 ("Kukppong (r1 edition)," 2008).
69
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Yuna Kim, the world champion of figure skating from South Korea. The punchline of
the commercial, “You are not Kim Yuna, you are the Great Nation of Korea,” became
controversial. The commercial was blamed as “kukppoing marketing” for resorting
to “forced patriotism” with commercial intention behind (S.-y. Pak, 2014). Criticism
around this commercial reflected the changing attitude of publics, appreciating
individual achievement and distancing from excessive nationalism. Amidst
torrential criticism, the company had to shut down the commercial.
The term began to be in great circulation in 2012 when it was used to mock
the behaviors of news reporters who excessively and obsessively attached to South
Korean singer Psy of globally viral hit song “Gangnam Style” (H.-p. y. Kim, 2014).
The term was used in combination with other related cynical neologisms and
internet memes such as “du yu no” and “haeoebanŭng.”
The phrase “du yu no”70 became a famous internet meme for sarcastically
mocking the obsessive pursuit of recognition from foreigners, especially from the
advanced Western countries. It became widespread when a video clip went viral
around 2013, which featured an exchange between a South Korean reporter and the
spokesperson of the US State Department. During the US State Department briefing
on North Korea’s missile tests in October 2012, a South Korean news reporter from
Yŏnhap News asked the spokesperson, “I’m wondering if you know a Korean singer

When in use for internet meme, the phrase “두 유 노” (read as “du yu no”),
a Korean transliteration, was usually used rather than the corresponding English
phrase “do you know.” The Korean transliteration might reveal that this phrase was
uttered by Koreans in a didactic and awkward way and carry the implication of
mockery ("Du yu no [Do You know]," n.d.).
70
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Psy and his song “Gangnam Style.” Do you Know?” [emphasis added]. While other
reports were laughing in a grin, she answered, “No, but I bet you my daughter does.
She loves Korean pop”71 (H.-p. y. Kim, 2014). Korean journalists continued to ask the
same question “Do you know Gangnam Style?” to Hollywood actor Matt Damon and
producer Quincy Jones and so on when they visited South Korea in 2013. The
journalists’ behavior of unilaterally demanding recognition of Korea were
enormously blamed among and beyond the subculture communities. Since then, the
phrase “du yu no” generated a number of internet memes, flexibly combined with a
series of South Korean celebrities and cultures (such as Psy, Yuna Kim, baseball
players Hyunjin Ryu and Shinsoo Choo, Samsung Galaxy smartphones, Korean food
such as kimchi, pibimbap, and pulgogi, K-pop girl group Girls’ Generation, and so on).
It is hard to miss that Mr. Seo is one of the firsts who began to use the phrase
“Do You Know” in his ad for publicizing the South Korean ownership of Tokto islets
on the full-page of the New York Times as early as 2008 (Figure 8, left). The ad was
rediscovered and retroactively ridiculed.
“Haeoebanŭng 해외반응” literally means the reactions from overseas on
Korea-related issues and events ("Haeoebanŭng [Overseas reactions]," n.d.). This
term came into currency at the time of the launching of the websites which
dedicated to providing the translation of overseas reactions. These websites
translated news and magazine articles, but, more importantly, community boards
and social media comments concerning Korea-related issues and events. These
The video clip is available on YouTube: https://youtu.be/3qNx3nGySzg,
last accessed October 13, 2018.
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websites such as gasengi.com (2010 to present) and gesomoon.com (2007 to 2017)
thrived especially when there were international sports events such as the World
Cup, the Olympics, and the WBC (World Baseball Classic) by providing immediate
translation of the comments from communities and social media from China, Japan,
the US and so on.72
The phrase haeoebanŭng is plain and simple and does not imply criticism or
derision in itself, but significant is the fact that it was clearly recognized as a
“problem” and shared as a buzzword within online subculture communities. The
phrases haeoebanŭng and du yu no illustrate how subcultures and increasingly
publics realized the overly consciousness of others’ gaze as problems and became
critical of obsessive demands for overseas recognition.
Put together, these neologisms such as kukppong, du yu no, and haeoebanŭng
suggest how the promotion of Korea by the government, the news media, and nonstate actors drew positive attention and support as well as increasingly negative
attention and criticism. The criticism of Mr. Seo’s excessive nationalism in his
campaign for the Korea publicity can be well understood in the context of
subcultural rhetorics such as kukppong, du yu no, and haeoebanŭng. The “Bulgogi”
ad featuring Mr. Choo happened to come out in March 2014 at the peak of such
criticism. Within the subculture communities, Mr. Seo became the name
representing kukppong. He was recognized as a person who forced the recognition
of Korea in a way that could not be easily understood and accepted by the presumed
These websites got less popular and defunct as real-time translations
became available on such social media platforms as the YouTube, Twitter, Facebook
and so on.
72
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audience. It was the news media and experts here that more strictly criticized Mr.
Seo’s promotion of Korea for being incomprehensible and unacceptable to the
professional level and global standards.
The lack of professionalism
The second aspect of the criticism of Mr. Seo’s Korea publicity campaign is
that of the lack of professionalism in public relations and advertising
communications and public diplomacy. Mr. Seo did not have any educational and
professional background and experience in advertising and public relations before
he launched the advertisement campaign. However, he was recognized as an
“expert” for his public service ad campaign in the promotion of Korea and was able
to serve as a member of the advisory board at the PCNB.
The mainstream news media did not lend much space to the criticism of Mr.
Seo’s ad campaign. As discussed above, the mainstream media often resorted to
nationalist sentiment for inducing more clicks and views on the internet in order to
generate online revenue for profit and for survival. Mr. Seo’s campaign for the Korea
publicity had continuously provided news items with nationalist flavor as well as
gossip quality to draw light but wide public attention, which fit in with this media
environment.
Serious criticism and public discussion of Mr. Seo’s publicity campaign were
rare and limited; they were raised occasionally by some journalists, professors, and
experts. The mainstream news media responded only when the campaign caused
controversy and consequently became a sensational news item itself.
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The criticism of the lack of professionalism can be summarized in two points.
On the one hand, the criticism directed against the lack of a basic understanding of
the communications of advertising and public relations. As early as 2008, Sŏ Hwasuk, journalist of Han’guk Ilbo raised a rare criticism of the Tokto ad (“Do You
Know” ad of 2008, Figure 8, left):
The full-page advertisement in the New York Times may be a topic in Korea,
but it does little to encourage public opinion in America. Sometimes it can
make a bad impression on the matter. Because the advertisement is what an
absurd opinion chooses when it cannot be reported on the newspaper (H.-s.
Sŏ, 2008).
First of all, advertising and public relations should have a proper
understanding of the target audience. However, although the Tokto ad seemed to
address international, American audiences, in fact, it might have aimed at domestic
audiences as target. The similar criticism and suspicion have been raised against Mr.
Seo by the subculture communities, the suspicion that he aimed to appeal to Korean
audiences so that he sustained his “kukppoing marketing” (S.-y. Pak, 2014).
Moreover, she pointed out that the medium of advertising might not be able to elicit
trust, but it could lead to mistrust and suspicion among readers. She argued that the
obvious historical and real-world fact of Tokto belong to South Korea did not need a
buying of advertisement space from the authoritative newspaper. Instead, she asked
for more proper ways of informing the reader and the citizen of the world and
gaining international public trust. Directly writing to the newspaper could be more
trustworthy and effective method; supporting the Korean studies and researches
related to Korea could work better from a long-term perspective. Implicitly
criticizing the clumsiness of the ad campaign, she argued for a proper, systemic, and
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professional way for the promotion of Korea. Rather than directly bashing the
excessive nationalist sentiment of the ad, she implicitly criticized the amateurism of
Mr. Seo’s campaign which lacked the basic understanding of the modes of
communications of ads and public relations.
Similarly, Ch’oe Chin-bong, professor in Journalism at the Texas State
University, criticized the “Bibimbap” print ad in 2009 (Figure 10), when it became a
hot topic. He suggested that for enhancing the nation brand and national image,
buying an ad space was not as effective as organizing systematic public relations by
experts. He suggested, for instance, that the government should support Korean
professors and experts residing in the US and other countries to develop their own
localized public relations (C.-b. Ch’oe, 2009).
These views mainly raised the question about the effectiveness and validity
of the ad campaign from the standpoint of expertise in journalism, advertising, and
public relations. From this position, Mr. Seo made mistakes which went against the
basics of advertising and public relations. As an amateur lacking professional
knowledge, he was seen as gaining fame and profit by relying on nationalist
sentiment, according to the suspicion raised from the subculture communities.
These critiques warned against excessive nationalism carried out at the expense of
expertise.
On the other hand, while trying to acknowledge the good intention and
efforts by Mr. Seo and other non-state actors, the writers worried that amateurism
had adverse and negative effects on the official diplomacy by the government and
ultimately national interest.
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The official diplomatic policy by the government was “quiet diplomacy” with
regards to the issues such as Tokto, Koguryŏ, and North Korean defectors. South
Korea has exerted a substantive ownership and effective control over Tokto with
sufficient historical evidence supporting the Korean sovereignty of the islets. Thus,
concerning the Tokto issue, the government’s official policy was not to respond to
the provocation by the Japanese counterpart, who aimed to make the islets look like
a disputed territory and be recognized as such in the international governing bodies.
Kim Tong-sŏk, president of the Korean American Civic Empowerment, a USbased non-profit, grassroots political organization for the Korean American
community, pointed out that the ad could generate adverse effects by giving an
impression that Tokto might be a disputed territory. He argued that the Tokto issue
was a matter between the concerned parties, that is Japan and Korea, not a universal
issue with a humankind appeal, like the human right issue such as “comfort
women.” Thus, he suggested that the public diplomatic efforts by civil society for the
Tokto issue should be in line with the overall governmental policy for national
interest (T. g.-s. Kim, 2010).
In fact, this issue was not limited to the non-state actors because the
government as well as the mainstream news media were sensitive to the popular
nationalist sentiment and inconsistent with their positions with regard to “quiet
diplomacy.”
The mainstream news media has been raising a nationalist voice and
criticizing “quiet diplomacy” for not attending to public opinion since the mid 2000s.
They criticized the government when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
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(MOFAT) allegedly pressured to stop the ad campaign run by Mr. Seo and sponsored
by Mr. Kim (M.-k. Kim, 2010; k. Yi, 2013). Moreover, the President Lee Myung-bak
visited Tokto on August 10, 2012 for the first time as the incumbent president of
South Korea. The news media criticized this move for not just jeopardizing the
Korea-Japan relations but also ending the principle of “quiet diplomacy” and
publicizing Tokto as a disputed territory to the world, in order to raise the
approving rate of the lame duck president by appealing to nationalist sentiment (K.m. Yu, 2012).
The point of the criticism of the advertisement was that the ad was not
convincing to the readers and citizens outside Korea and could not produce
intended effects. For example, the Tokto ad of 2010 (Figure 9, left) was criticized for
presenting Tokto as a tourist destination. However, it was apparently misleading to
advertise the rocky islets, uninhabited with no regular traffic back and forth, as a
tourist destination. The ad for blaring Tokto for tourism was not just disrupting the
principle of quiet diplomacy, but also it was not supported by any official
governmental policy for tourism.
Moreover, the Tokto ad of 2012 (Figure 9, right) was also criticized for being
ignorant, self-centered, and insensitive to their post-colonial history because it was
a relatively recent and violent history when Bali, Sicily and Hawaii were
incorporated to Indonesia, Italy and the US respectively. This attitude of
insensitivity and ignorance was blamed for giving a bad impression, rather than
enhancing the national image of South Korea.
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The criticism of the lack of professionalism by a few journalists and experts
was limited and isolated and did not resonate widely. However, the situation
dramatically changed with the “Bulgogi” ad of 2014, introduced earlier in the
chapter. Just as the subculture communities poured out criticism and ridicule of the
excessive nationalism and the ad, the mainstream media joined by publishing op-ed
columns by journalists and experts as well as by contributing to the circulation of
the subcultural criticism to wider audiences.
The explosion of criticism
In the criticisms of the Korea publicity campaign, a couple of observations
are striking. One is concerning “when”: the criticism exploded both in the subculture
and in the mainstream media when the “Bulgogi” ad came out in March 2004. The
other is concerning “who” and “whose voice”: it was the Western journalists who
initiated to raise critical voices against the “Bulgogi” ad, and then it was Korean
journalists and experts with global life experiences who added their voices. Despite
some criticisms in the mainstream media and harsh derision within the subculture
communities, Mr. Seo’s ad campaign was not put into criticism and under scrutiny
until some Western journalists and a Western expatriate residing in Korea raised
questions about the “Bulgogi” ad. The timeline of the events in context clearly shows
how the criticism of the “Bulgogi” ad spread and how the Western journalists,
among different actors, provided a crucial tipping point.
The “Bulgogi” ad was published in the New York Times on March 12, 2014. It
was right after the closing of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, during which sports
nationalism as well as the criticism of its “kukppong” culminated.
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The next day (considering the time difference between South Korea and the
US, it was half a day later), the Korean newswires Yŏnhap News (K.-h. Wang,
2014)and Newsis (No, 2014) favorably reported the ad featuring the interview with
Mr. Seo. The news reports were supplied to most news media outlets, including the
largest news aggregate platform Naver News. These news reports circulated to draw
some favorable comments in the blogosphere and the subculture communities in
general.
On the day the ad appeared on the NYT, Jon Tayler from the SI posted a short
comment on his blog and expressed his curiosity and confusion (Tayler, 2014). On
March 13, a South Korean internet news site, CBS Nocut News reported Tayler’s
posting as well as Mr. Seo’s ad (C.-r. Im, 2014). The report was simple and straight
and not necessarily critical of the “Bulgogi” ad. The news report did not circulate
widely either. At this point, there seemed little or no criticism of the ad.
The situation sharply changed with the blog posting by Luis Clemens of the
NPR on March 14 (March 15 in Korea Standard Time), two days after the original
NYT ad (Clemens, 2014). Then, on March 16, Clemens’s critical remarks were
reported in detail in the English language newspaper, Korea Herald. This news
article was published in Korean as well as in English (H.-n. Park, 2014b). The news
article was also published at the same time in Naver News (H.-n. Park, 2014a). It
began to circulate in the online communities such as blogs and subcultural online
forums. The blogosphere was relatively less critical of Mr. Seo’s “Bulgogi” ad. Some
blog postings advocated the ad and retorted to Clemens’s article as “Americancentric” and “arrogant” (Alivehs, 2014). The subculture communities began to
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respond to the ad and the news report by Korean Herald. They were mostly critical
of the ad, blaming for the messy communications and showing their embarrassment
with excessive nationalism.
Then, on March 18, Kuki News reported the Clements’s remark as well as the
reaction to it in the online communities (T.-p. i. Kim, 2014). Kuki News is the online
unit of the national newspaper Kungmin Ilbo, dedicated to the production of online
news content for Naver News and other news service platforms. This article was
published in Naver News and drew more than one thousand comments, most of
which were critical of the “Bulgogi” ad. In turn, the article widely circulated in the
subculture communities, blogs, and online forums, drawing a lot of attention and
criticism. In the next week, small and big news media rushed to publish news
reports and opinion pieces by journalists and experts, reacting to the blog postings
by Clemens and Tayler as well as an article at Adweek (Gianatasio, 2014).
The titles of the pieces below suggest the extent to which the mainstream
news media was critical of Mr. Seo’s Korea publicity (J. Han, 2014; M.-h. Kang, 2014;
P. Kang, 2014; McPherson, 2014; C.-y. Pak, 2014; S.-d. Sin, 2014):
Han, Jane. (2014, March 19). 'Bulgogi' ad makes Choo laughingstock. Korea
Times.
McPherson, Joe. (2014, March 23). The ad that ruins the image of Korean
food. Joins.
Sin, Sŏng-dae. (2014, March 23). Choo Sin-soo's pulgogi ad is a shame, not a
publicity for Korea. Deilian [Dailian].
Kang, Pyŏngjin. (2014, March 23). Why is Choo Sin-soo's pulgogi ad blamed?.
Huffpost Korea.
Pak, Chŏng-yŏn. (2014, March 25). Choo Sin-soo’s pulgogi ad… frankly
terrible. Omainjusŭ [Ohmynews].
Kang, Mi-hye. (2014, March 25). If it had listened to the PR expert's advice
two years ago...Lack of strategy in PR Korea?. The PR.
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The timeline of the controversy around the “Bulgogi” ad illustrates the way in
which news was produced and circulated in the online environment in South Korea.
The “Bulgogi” ad was circulated and amplified in the circuit of online news content
producers, online news platforms, and online publics in a circular, self-referring
fashion. Mr. Seo provided a news item which could appeal to nationalist sentiment
and get attention online. The news media effortlessly produced an online news
article based on the press release provided by Mr. Seo and distributed it on the
online news aggregators such as Naver News. The online publics excitedly
responded with excessive nationalism. Usually, this would have completed a cycle.
What is striking in the timeline is that it was the blog postings by the
Western journalists that triggered the deluge of criticism of the ad campaign. In the
“Bulgogi” ad case, a new cycle was opened up as Western journalists reacted to the
ad. In fact, “overseas reactions” by the Western media were themselves news items
suitable for generating exited attentions and heated responses. This time, the news
report elicited cynical criticism, which also generated a lot of comments and
discussions within the subculture communities and the blogospheres. In turn, the
online public responses themselves became news items by the online news media.
In this amplified circulation, the news media followed and published many columns
and opinions on the ad.
The observation of the unfolding of the controversies around the Korea
publicity reveals how the desire for international recognition, especially by the
West, has driven the formation of public discourses in South Korea. The non-state
actors focused their activities on providing and disseminating what they deemed
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was correct information about Korean history and territory. They also devoted their
efforts to promoting what they deemed was excellent and proud Korean culture
such as food culture. The campaign was widely supported by South Korean publics
because their campaign resorted to nationalist sentiment and the public desire for
international recognition. However, the responses by the Western journalists
confirmed that the ad campaign looked weird and unidirectional to the Western
eyes and did not seem to follow the norms and standards. Thus, they seemed to
reveal that the Korea publicity could not achieve the said purpose of winning
international recognition and enhancing the nation brand.
The criticism of the Korea publicity campaign also took international
recognition seriously. The online subculture communities not only criticized the ad
but also felt embarrassed about and ashamed of the obsessive desire of excessive
nationalism. The “overseas reactions” from the Western journalists confirmed the
subcultural criticism. In addition, the feelings of embarrassment and shame
illustrate how the subcultures were conscious about the significance of international
recognition and the potential harm of the misplaced campaign on it.
The experts and journalists who participated in the criticism of the ad
campaign also confirmed the significance of winning international recognition and
enhancing the nation brand and national image from the West. They seem to suggest
a better and proper way of earning it. They suggested that the international
recognition of Korea and Korean culture could not be achieved by advertisements
but by proper practices of advertising and public relations. They implied that the
professionalism in advertising, public relations and public diplomacy should begin
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by understanding the target audience, in this case, the Western audience, and by
meeting the global business norms and standards.
International recognition and the imaginaries of an advanced nation
It seems that one of the most important keywords in understanding the
Korea publicity campaign and its criticism is the term “international recognition.”
What did “international recognition” mean to the campaign and its criticism? How
was “international recognition” conceived and constructed in different ways by
different actors? The varied constructions of international recognition suggest how
national imaginaries were rebuilt in different ways by different actors in the
changing conditions of globalization and infinite competition among nations. The
varied rebuilding of national imaginaries was predicated on the varied sense of how
South Korea was like and a certain public desire for what South Korea should be
like, conceived through the construction of the external gaze. The Korea publicity
campaign and the controversy around it illustrate how the formation of national
imaginaries was predicated on the external, Western gaze, or international
recognition, presumed in different ways by different actors.
In this section, I will discuss different ways in which the campaign and its
criticism conceived of international recognition and reimagined the nation,
especially as an advanced nation. I will sum up and discuss how the three different
perspectives — the Korea publicity campaign, the subculture communities, and the
group of journalists and experts — conceived of international recognition and how
they imagined and re-imagined the nation. Especially, I will examine how contested
were the national imaginaries of South Korea as an advanced nation.
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The Korea publicity campaign gained wide public support by resorting to
rising nationalist sentiment since the early 2000s. Undergirding the popular support
for the campaign was the sense of national pride of the economic achievement, the
rise of corporate national brands, and the expanding popularity of popular culture.
The Korea publicity campaign led by Mr. Seo among others was regarded as helping
enhance national prestige and win international recognition.
In the campaign, international recognition was constructed from a selffulfilling way. It was assumed that winning national prestige was equated with
winning international recognition and the latter was simply equated with attracting
a high level of attention from the international media and the public. Moreover, it
was simply assumed that appearing in the high-profile media, even if by buying
highly visible ad spaces, might guarantee high exposure and high attention from the
Western media and the Western public. This assumption was based on the selfrighteous, nationalist conviction of the self-evidence of legitimacy and excellence,
which was shared by the non-state actors for the Korea publicity and the supporting
public. It was assumed that the self-evidence of legitimacy and excellence was not
well recognized due to misunderstanding, obstruction and distortion, and the
advertisement and public diplomacy of the Korea publicity would help to wipe out
them. Thus, in the Korea publicity campaign, international recognition was
constructed in an imaginary way on a self-fulfilling nationalist desire.
The nationalist construction of international recognition, as a particular
reaction to the geopolitical situation of globalization and infinite competition,
reflected a certain public desire for what kind of country South Korea was and
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should be. Implicit in this desire was the re-imagination of the nation as recognized
for its legitimate, excellent and advanced status in terms of political, economic,
technological, cultural, as well as historical aspect.
The Korea publicity campaign quickly came under fire and criticized as
kukppong once its arbitrary and self-fulfilling construction of international
recognition and self-contained reimagination of the nation were exposed by actual
Western journalists who did not have a stake in South Korea.
In their criticism of the Korea publicity campaign, both the subculture
communities and the media and expert group shared the criticism that the campaign
was based on a naive nationalist sentiment and focused on self-satisfying publicity
and advertising.
The subculture communities widely used the expressions such as du yu no,
haeoebanŭng, and kukppong to critically satirize the obsessive seeking of
international recognition of what were deemed as the achievements of South Korea
especially from the Western media. However, the cynical reactions did not indicate
that the subculture communities did not care about international recognition or
haeoebanŭng. Rather, they had been so eager to pay attention to what overseas
online media and communities had to say about Korea that they had been drawn to
the subcultural websites dedicated to translating “overseas reactions.” From the
perspectives of the subculture communities, the Korea publicity campaign did not
make visible Korea’s excellence and pride, but the self-centered nationalist selfportrait of Koreans who could not see themselves objectively. In contrast to
nationalist knee-jerk reaction, the subculture was self-conscious and self-reflective
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to the extent that they felt ashamed of what the self-celebrating advertisements
which did not think through an objective lens would look like.
It is not clear what specific imaginary of the nation the subculture
communities shared with regard to their criticism of the Korea publicity campaign.
However, we can have a glimpse of it through a new coinage “Hell Chosŏn,” which
became a buzzword in South Korea in the mid 2010s. The buzzword Hell Chosŏn
described a state of despair of South Korea, especially experienced by the younger
generation, as full of inequality, unfairness, unemployment, gender discrimination,
extreme competition, and everyday power abuse (S.-W. Koo, 2015).73 The hellish
status of South Korea was emphasized as premodern and uncivilized, especially
when it was combined with another buzzword migae (uncivilized).
The subcultural reactions were to some extent predicated on the same
dichotomy between the advanced and the backward, the civilized and the
uncivilized, and the West and hellish Korea. In the subcultural criticism of the Korea
publicity campaign, in combination with the imagery of Hell Chosŏn, the nation of
South Korea was imagined as lacking a normal quality expected to any advanced
modern nation (K.-i. Pak, 2016; U.-c. a. Yi, 2016). The premodern, uncivilized
imageries of the nation conjured up by the subculture communities were completely
opposite to those of advanced nations, idealized in particular ways by the nation
Chosŏn is the old name for Korea until the early twentieth century. The
expression of Hell Chosŏn referred Korea (South Korea) to premodern state of
Chosŏn. The term originated from the online subcultural disparagement of
premodern Korea (Chosŏn) against the nationalist self-aggrandizing celebration of
Korean history and expanded its connotation to designate the contemporary state of
miserable suffering experienced by South Koreans, especially by the younger
generation.
73
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branding policy, the national prestige discourse, and the Korea publicity campaign.
To the subcultural perspective, the blind pursuit of national prestige and the
begging of international recognition by the Korea publicity campaign was the exact
shameful component of Hell Chosŏn.
Sharing the criticism of the Korea publicity campaign with the online
subculture communities, the group of journalists and experts took international
recognition seriously rather than cynically. The group of journalists and experts,
who shared a certain understanding of global capitalism and cosmopolitan
perspectives, criticized the Korea publicity campaign run by Mr. Seo for lacking
professionalism. The campaign, from the experts’ perspective, lacked proper
understanding of advertising, public relations and public diplomacy and generated
adversary effects on the official governmental efforts on diplomacy and nation
branding.
For the expert group, the critical task for South Korea to gain international
recognition was to obtain global citizenship as a legitimate partner to exchange
dialog in the global community. For this international recognition of global
citizenship, it was deemed crucial to embody universal rules and global norms,
universally acceptable for professional interaction and business transactions in
global capitalism. Thus, international recognition meant to be accepted as a normal
partner in dialog by the Western media, professionals and business.
By criticizing clumsy communications of the Korea publicity campaign, the
group of journalists and experts envisioned South Korea as a normal participant in
global capitalism, measuring up to global standards and norms, on par with other
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advanced countries. The imaginary of a normal, advanced nation came to this group
seriously and at hand, not cynically as to the subculture communities, because the
issues of global standards and norms were not alien to this group which lived itself
in cosmopolitan sensibility and international business.
In this section, I examined how the Korea publicity campaign and the two
critical perspectives constructed international recognition differently and suggested
how they reimagined the nation and envisioned an advanced country through it. The
examination suggests how contested the idea of international recognition as well as
the imaginaries of the nation with regard to the aspiration for an advanced nation.
Additionally, it suggests how South Koreans are sensitive to the external view of
them, and especially obsessive about the Western view. The excessive
consciousness of the external view underscores the anxiety about an uncertain
position between a developing and developed country within the global capitalist
order.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined how publics were engaged with and contested the
aspect of nation branding or public diplomacy in South Korea. I critically examined
the Korea publicity campaign by the non-state actor, and its criticism raised by the
online subculture communities and the group of journalists and experts. The
controversy around this ad campaign illustrates that the examination of nation
branding should not be limited to governmental public policy nor to the news media
campaign. It suggests how publics were concerned about international recognition
with regard to the national imaginaries of an advanced nation.
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Reflecting the emerging sense of national pride and self-confidence, the
Korea publicity campaign emerged as nationalistic responses to the regional and
global politics. Asserting the legitimacy and excellence of Korean history and
culture, the public engagement by the Korea publicity campaign articulated the
collective desire for the international recognition of Korea by the West. It was
through the construction of international recognition that the national imaginary of
an advanced country was imagined and reimagined.
The online subculture communities raised criticism about excessive
nationalism and ridiculed the obsession for international recognition in South
Korean society. They did not seem drawn to the national imaginary of an advanced
country, but to a bleak national portrait in the middle of hellish competition and
hopeless collapse. The subculture communities found the “overseas reactions” to
the Korea publicity embarrassing and exposing the hellish reality of South Korea.
The group of journalists and experts criticized the problems of the campaign
for the lack of professionalism in public relations and advertising communications
and public diplomacy. The criticism suggested that the publicity should follow
adequate universal cultural codes and professional protocols in line with the global
standard. From this perspective, winning international recognition should be the
logical consequence of professional practices by meeting up the global business
norms and standards. The perspective suggested the imaginary of an advanced
nation through earning normalcy in global capitalism.
In this chapter, I examined the unfolding of the Korea publicity campaign by
the non-state actor and the controversies around it in a wider context of public
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discourses in South Korea. The examination revealed how the desire for
international recognition, especially by the West, has driven the contested
formation of public discourses centered on the imaginaries of an advanced nation in
South Korea.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to examine how the discourses and
institutions of nation branding and national prestige reshaped the social imaginaries
of the nation in South Korea since the early 2000s until the mid 2010s. I followed
the trajectory of the nation branding discourse and traced how it was converted,
transformed, and articulated with other actors, discourses, and institutions. In doing
this, I examined different moments of the re-imagining of the nation of South Korea
(rather than Korea) as an advanced nation by different social actors.
Summary: nation branding and the social imaginaries of the advanced nation
In Chapter 4, I examined how the news media played a crucial mediating role
in importing and disseminating the discourse of nation branding. In the late 1990s,
Western business consultants turned the techniques in marketing and business
management into a globally-circulating governance discourse of nation branding. In
the early and mid 2000s, the South Korean news media in collaboration with private
and public think tanks, embraced and localized the discourse of nation branding.
In the chapter, I showed how the news media discourse connected the
marketing-oriented discourse of nation branding with the self-consciousness about
the international status of the nation, that is, “national prestige.” Through this
discursive conversion, the news media successfully promoted nation branding as a
discourse for neoliberal national reform.

244

Mainstream news media, strongly linked to the conservative political party
and sharing interest with big conglomerates, promoted nation branding as a state
discourse for advocating business interest as well as for accommodating a
conservative government in the presidential election in 2007. They launched a
series of massive public education and enlightenment campaigns with series
articles, features, and op-ed columns. I analyzed how these news articles and
columns constructed a particular national narrative of the past, the present and the
future of Korea through the lens of nation branding. The news media narrative
depicted South Korea as experiencing a unique historical process of the double
achievement of industrialization and democratization. From this developmentalist
perspective, South Korea is standing in the world at the threshold of being in the
rank of advanced countries. Thus, the narrative set sŏnjinhwa (being advanced) as
the national goal and the global standards as a way to realizing the goal. Nation
branding in practice worked toward prioritizing business, controlling labor and
society, and disciplining the conduct and behaviors of citizens. In this operation of
nation branding, the state was repositioned as the neoliberal manager to reorganize
the whole society for the benefit of business.
The social imaginary of the nation provided by the news media discourse of
nation branding geared toward a particular vision of the advanced nation led by the
neoliberal corporate state. Thus, the discourse of nation branding by the news
media played a significant role in the ongoing neoliberalization of South Korea. At
the same time, the neoliberal imaginary of the nation, depending on the
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developmental (post-developmental) ideal of sŏnjinhwa, showed a historical
continuity in South Korean modernity.
In Chapter 5, I examined how the conservative government instituted the
media-promoted agenda of nation branding as a highly visible official public policy
by setting up the Presidential Council for Nation Branding (PCNB) in 2009. The
discourse of nation branding, promoted by the news media, was elevated to the
status of official state agenda, providing a general discursive framework for other
public policies. To examine the official public policy practices of nation branding, I
analyzed official documents, meeting minutes, advertising and promotional
materials, and website pages of the PCNB and other related governmental
departments and agencies. Additionally, to get a wider sense of the public policy
practices, I also used interviews, books, columns and other writing written by those
who were related with the PCNB.
Contrary to its ambitious rhetoric and grandiose appearance, the PCNB has
not gone beyond its symbolic gesture of proclaiming nation branding as a state
project. The Council’s roles were quite limited to regularly presiding over meetings
among working-level Ministries and other governmental agencies in charge of
actual governmental affairs, and mainly organizing communications and
promotional activities toward domestic citizens rather than foreign audiences.
Closer look at the organization and activities by the Council revealed that its focus
was on the advertising and promotion toward domestic citizens with quite a small
organizational size and a limited budget. I especially focused on two of the
communications and promotional activities by the PCNB. The one was a series of
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public service advertisements which aimed to educate citizens on global etiquettes.
One of the ads, called “Saranghaeyo Korea” was analyzed at length. Juxtaposing
Korean and Western art works, the advertisement evoked national cultural pride,
symbolizing the aspiration for the international status of South Korea standing in
the world on a par with the Western advanced countries. The political economy
analysis revealed the corporate-dependent nature of the nation branding campaign
as the ad was produced by a particular conglomerate (LG) in line with its corporate
brand identity. The other was the mobilization of young citizens for online
campaigns for nation branding. Utilize the trend of “digital participation marketing,”
it illustrated how neoliberal orientation of the state to create a corporate-oriented
brand space and to encourage brand citizens to serve the nation brand.
In Chapter 6, I turned to the engagement by publics with nation branding,
whose discursive space was opened up by the news media and the government. I
focused on the controversies and debates around the “Korea publicity” campaign, a
form of public diplomacy led by various non-state actors. I followed the trajectories
of a series of public service ads which were produced and run by a non-state actor
for public diplomacy. These ad images, featuring Korea-born celebrities, were put
up on prestigious newspapers and metropolitan billboards and drew considerable
attention as well as generated controversies. Data were collected for the analysis of
the ads and their criticism by online subculture, journalists, and marketing experts,
across different platforms including news media reports, online blog postings,
subculture forums, and op-ed columns by journalists and marketing experts at
home and abroad.
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The analysis in this chapter showed how the desire for “international
recognition” accorded by the West has driven public discourses and shaped the
social imaginaries of South Korea as an advanced nation. The non-state actors for
the Korea publicity and their criticism constructed international recognition
differently. The former, driven by a nationalist desire, attempted to win
international recognition by aggressively promoting and advertising legitimacy and
excellence of Korean history and culture. For the latter, the self-celebrating
nationalism in the Korea publicity campaign was regarded not only as ineffective
but also detrimental to win international recognition. Instead, it should be won
through the professionalism in advertising and publicity and the embodiment of
universal rules and norms in international business.
The different constructions of international recognition by the West led to
different reimaginations of an advanced nation by different social actors. In Chapter
4 and 5, I discussed how the advanced nation was reimagined as a business-friendly
and “lawful and orderly” nation in the news media discourse, and it was as a
neoliberal “brand nation” in the public policy discourse. In contrast, the Korea
publicity campaign articulated a self-content nationalist imagination of an advanced
nation with legitimate history and excellent culture. In the online subculture
discourse, reflexively distanced from nationalism, it was imagined negatively as an
opposite of the current status of Hell Chosŏn. In the discourse of cosmopolitan
journalists and publicity experts, it was imagined as a culturally sophisticated,
globally accepted nation, internalizing the global standards of universal codes of
behaviors and civility. The analysis suggested how different social actors
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reimagined the nation and envisioned an advanced country through different
measurement of international recognition.
Critical media studies, neoliberalism, and South Korea’s modernity
In the analysis of the discursive circulation of global phenomenon of nation
branding in the local context of South Korea, I made an academic intervention into
and potential contribution to at least three primary areas of debate.
The first area I engaged with is the critical media and cultural studies where
researches on nation branding and public diplomacy are expanding. I examined the
travel and localization of the transnational discourse of nation branding in South
Korea, informed by critical media and cultural studies, with various operations of
the media in critical focus. In the analysis, I addressed a few issues present in this
research stream in critical media and cultural studies.
First, my study highlighted the domestic dynamics of the cultural politics of
nation branding. In Chapter 4, I described how the transnational discourse and
technique of nation branding was imported and localized by private and public
think tanks and the mainstream news media. In the process, I examined how the
news media’s discourse of nation branding mediated the interest of large
conglomerates as global actors and facilitated that of the conservative political
party. In Chapter 5, I looked into how the government used the rhetoric of the
nation branding and national prestige for its domestic political interest and for the
interest of business. In Chapter 6, I examined how different social actors adopted
the languages of the nation brand, national prestige, and international recognition in
the contestation for the envisioning of the direction of the nation.
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The focus on the domestic cultural-political dynamics is contrasted with the
emphasis by some existing researches on the role played by transnational
consultants of nation branding (Aronczyk, 2013; Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Jansen,
2008). The case of nation branding in South Korea exhibited that the “transnational
promotional class” (Aronczyk, 2015) played a limited role and even was invoked at
the convenience of domestic actors. My study is in line with some other critical
studies of nation branding which focused on what is going on in the domestic
cultural politics, especially among elites, in the name of nation branding and public
diplomacy (Graan, 2013; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). I contributed to this stream of
research by examining a wider range of cultural politics, not limited to elite politics
but to encompass popular politics raised by non-state actors as well as online and
subculture publics.
Second, relatedly, my study also addressed the question whether the
orientation of nation branding is internal or external. While it sounds obvious that
most nation branding campaigns look outward and aim to project a positive national
image toward foreign audiences, it should not be taken for granted that it has
inherently outward orientation. Many researches, including mine, attended to the
inward orientation of nation branding, seeking political legitimacy, class control,
citizen discipline, and nation building (Graan, 2013; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011;
Skilling, 2010; Valaskivi, 2016; Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011)}. However, nation
branding was not inherently inward oriented either. It seems that the
internal/external orientation was contingent to domestic political and geopolitical
conditions in which a particular state and government was hinged on. Thus, the
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internal/external orientation of a particular nation branding campaign should be
examined on a case-by-case basis rather than in accordance with a predetermined
pattern. More importantly, the two orientations were not exclusive but intertwined
in the actual process: the external projection of the nation became an important
factor in the domestic cultural politics by which ruling elites attempted to win
cultural hegemony and the publics were stimulated to mobilize nationalistic
passions, populist discontents, and reformist political agenda.
Third, focusing on the effects of the internal-external dynamics on domestic
cultural politics, I highlighted the multiple roles played by the media, which were
relatively underdeveloped in nation branding research in critical media and cultural
studies. In Chapter 4, I focused on how the news media mediated and facilitated the
localization of the discourse and technique of nation branding in South Korea with
their institutional and discursive capacities. In Chapter 5, I critically examined the
public service ad images in combination with the political economy analysis. In
Chapter 6, I featured various traditional and electronic media forms, including the
news media reports, ads on newspapers, blogs, online forums, and advertising
billboards. I focused on how these media provided platforms on which images and
talks with regard to nation branding and public diplomacy traveled across borders
quickly. It was in this technological infrastructure of the old and new media that the
nationalist sentiment as well as its criticism were escalated within the self-referring
feedback loop. My study, focusing on the multiple roles played by the media,
corresponds to the recent call and attention to the media as technologies and
organization as well as representation for the implications for the analysis of nation
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branding campaigns (Bjola & Pamment, 2018; Bolin & Miazhevich, 2018; Bolin &
Ståhlberg, 2015; Budnitsky & Jia, 2018; Ingenhoff & Klein, 2018; Jacobsen, 2018).
The second area I aimed to engage with is the study of neoliberalism with
regard to the state and the nation. In Chapters 4 and 5, I examined how nation
branding facilitated the discursive construction of the nation as a space for
international competitiveness and the state as a “competition state” or a neoliberal
manager for business and capital. The news media’s discourse and narrative of
nation branding urged and “educated” the state, the nation, and citizens to
“advance” toward global standards of politics, business, and civil behaviors. The
public policy of the government for nation branding constructed a “brand state”
which continued favorable relations with business and capital and mobilized “brand
citizens” which embodied the normative imperatives of international
competitiveness.
The observation in these chapters confirmed the broader understanding of
neoliberalism as the normative imperatives to reorganize the whole society,
including the state and nation, according to the principle of market competitiveness
(Brown, 2005). However, the other important point I aimed to make in the analysis
of neoliberalism was not to understand it as a sweeping, totalizing logic, but as a
messy process with many contradictions and loopholes, and as particularly situated
practices (Hoffman, 2006a, 2006b; K. Mitchell, 1997; Ong, 1997, 1999; Rofel, 2007).
My dissertation illustrated how the public policy for nation branding was poorly
planned and executed “on the fly” with little significant effects as a result. I also
found that the policy was embedded in private interests and ambitions of

252

politicians, bureaucrats, and business. Thus, the neoliberalism of nation branding
was not executed in a clear-cut way but was entangled in a murky reality of
bureaucratic incompetence and often conflicting political interest.
The contingency of neoliberalism in South Korea was striking with regard to
the conceptual framework of social imaginaries (Taylor, 2002). From the
perspective of social imaginaries, nation branding needs to be understood not as a
monolithic idea/ideology and practice of the neoliberal doctrine, but a set of
heterogeneous ideas and practices which are entangled with existing ones in society
(cf. Ong, 1999). Avoiding the understanding of neoliberalism as a sweeping logic, I
focused on how the neoliberal logic of nation branding intersected with the existing
developmental logics in South Korea. In terms of social imaginaries, the deployment
of nation branding in South Korea illustrated that neoliberalism hinged on, rather
than excluded, the very ideas of the state and the nation as well as the economy. The
social imaginaries offered by nation branding were obviously leaning toward
neoliberalism in which market competitiveness was prioritized, but they were not
completely alien to the developmental social imaginary where the ideas of the state,
the economy and the nation were central. For instance, the discourse of nation
branding oscillated between developmental “aggressiveness” and neoliberal
“attractiveness.” Moreover, neoliberal competitiveness centered on the “competition
state” (Cerny, 1997, p. 251) and depended on the developmental imaginary of the
hierarchical international order. The rupture and the continuity with developmental
imaginary is central to the understanding of modernity in South Korea, which is the
next discussion topic.
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The third area of engagement is the study of modernity in South Korea.
Focusing on the centrality of the notions of the state and the economy in South
Korean modernity, I found that, in line with nation branding, the ideas of national
prestige, international recognition and the advanced nation not just revealed the
continued Western-oriented nature of modernity in South Korea but also became
the crucial discursive sites for the contestation of the social imaginaries of the
nation’s modernity.
The prospect of South Korea’s modernity is ambivalent. On the one hand, the
emphasis on the aspects of culture and civility in modernity indicated a degree of
reflexivity of the economy-centered development and modernization. On the other,
the reflexivity of developmental modernity seemed quite insufficient and superficial
in that culture and civility were within the Western-oriented hierarchy and even
mobilized for economic growth and development. In that sense, South Korea’s
developmental modernity is not seriously challenged, if often questioned, which is
evidenced by the general silence and indifference in South Korea to climate change
and environmental issues beyond lip service.
Limitations and suggestions
There are several limitations to this study.
First, my analysis was mostly limited to representations, narratives, and
discourses related to nation branding (Chapters 4 & 5). The analysis primarily
aimed to follow the trajectory of fast-moving, quick-transforming discourse of
nation branding. For this purpose, my data were limited to quickly surveying the
“surface” of the discursive circulation. In that sense, it was inevitable to some extent,
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but it would have unfolded a more complete picture of the discursive arrangement
with an in-depth research of those who were actually involved in each discursive
and institutional process (in the bureaucracy and the business world).
Secondly, the research of the reaction to the Korea publicity on the internet
and within the online subculture (Chapter 6) was selective in terms of data
collection, sampling and analysis. Although the study did not intend to conduct a
full-fledged online ethnographic research, a more detailed strategy could have been
learned from online audience studies for a fuller picture of the online activities: for
instance, basic questions were not answered but speculated due to the lack of
ethnographic research, such as “who they are,” “what they do online and in real life,”
“what they think about social issues in general,” and so on.
Thirdly, the key ideas of a “culturally” advanced nation and cultural
modernity were underdeveloped. While the idea of an “advanced nation” was
predicated on the developmental imaginary, the ambivalent aspects of a “culturally”
advanced nation were not fully investigated with regard to the direction of South
Korea’s modernity. This might be related to the limited examination of the idea of
“culture” and the cultural aspects in relation to nation branding.
The first future research suggestion is related to this last point of limitation.
The rise of Korean popular culture, spearheaded by K-pop, would be a fertile ground
to investigate the deployment of nation branding and public diplomacy and the
unfolding of the ideas such as national prestige and the “culturally” advanced nation.
Secondly, based on the insights learned from the examination of the case of
South Korea, the research can be expanded to include the international politics of
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nation branding, public diplomacy, and soft power in East Asia and Southeast Asia.
One possible direction is the changing national image and the increasing soft power
of South Korea (cf. Chua, 2012). Another direction is relevant to examine the shift
and turmoil in regional geopolitics due to the rise of China as superpower, the
remilitarization of Japan, the nuclear armament of North Korea, and the increasing
strategic significance of Southeast Asia.
The third suggestion is historical research. The notion of nation branding
itself was short-lived and tied to neoliberalism, but the notion can be connected to
the history of international relations and contribute to the study of propaganda and
cultural diplomacy during the Cold War era and beyond.
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